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SUMMARY
This thesis develops a model for the net 
present value to the firm of a strategy of 
increasing an SBU*s market share as a function of 
four quantitative variables: the firm's initial
market share, the current position in the product 
life cycle, as viewed by the firm, the competitor's 
relative experience curve slope and the 
competitor's view of the shape and size of the 
product life cycle. The net present value is 
calculated using traditional definitions, but 
includes a limit pricing strategy by the firm and 
assumes the existence of the experience curve.
The prime reason for the development of this 
model is to test quantitatively . the capital 
budgeting implications of the portfolio matrices 
proposed by the Boston Consulting Group and 
McKinsey and Company. And, to suggest a format that 
better integrates corporate strategy and finance.
The most important finding of this research is 
that the inclusion of experience curve effects 
causes relative market share to assume dominance
ill
over market growth rate in the BCG matrix and 
causes business strength to assume dominance over 
industry attractiveness in the McKinsey matrix, at 
least within the limitations and assumptions of the 
model. Put into laymen's terms, that means that 
corporate planners should abandon attempts to 
convert low share but high growth businesses (what 
BCG calls "Problem Children") into "Stars", if such 
conversion can only be accomplished .through price, 
or price equivalent competition, as long as both 
participants are equally competent.
A second important finding is that other 
variables, beyond growth and share, can be 
successfully and quantitatively incorporated into 
the model. This means that the two-dimensional 
approach of the Boston Consulting Group can be 
improved upon by adding additional variables or 
that businessmen can make better use of the 
McKinsey approach to strategy and its investment 
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Business has long recognized that among the most 
important decisions it has to make, indeed one on which 
its very survival depends, is the decision on which 
businesses it should be in and how to allocate its scarce 
resources among those businesses. Traditionally, this 
dual problem of business has been addressed by two 
related, but certainly not integrated disciplines, 
strategic planning and finance.
Ansoff (1965:18-19), the great "guru" of corporate 
strategy, has defined both the problem of deciding what 
business the firm is in and what kinds of businesses it 
will seek to enter, and the choice of resource 
commitments among alternatives, as strategic decisions. 
Finance, through its capital budgeting theory, has 
addressed the same questions in its own ways. However, in 
my view, no quantitative model has ever been proposed 
that successfully links strategic planning and finance. A 




Clearly the question of how the firm should allocate 
its scarce resources among investment opportunities is an 
important one. Both finance and strategic planning have 
addressed it, albeit from different starting points and 
using different tools. I personally am uncomfortable with 
each method standing alone, but I believe that if the two
disciplines are better linked, a more complete answer to
this important question can be developed.
As a starting point for this work, let me briefly
review my concerns with both the approaches of finance
and strategic planning to the firm's investment problem. 
Naturally, all the concepts discussed in this brief 
introductory chapter are more fully addressed in the 
appropriate sections of this thesis.
The capital budgeting theory of finance, clearly the 
older of the two disciplines, has historically looked at 
the investment decision from the perspective of the fixed 
assets to be acquired, and perhaps the associated working 
capital, and not necessarily the business in which those 
assets are employed. The reason for this focus 
undoubtedly resulted from the need in discounted cash 
flow analysis to define a useful life. Capital assets 
have a reasonably short life based on physical wear or 
obsolescence; businesses, however, may last for 
generations.
Capital budgeting theory suggests that the proper
-4-
way to analyze investment proposals is to calculate an 
incremental net cash flow and then to discount it at the 
firm's cost of capital to give net present value. The 
rule then, assuming independence and no capital 
rationing, is to accept all such investments with NPV 
greater than zero. The logic is that: (1) only
incremental effects are important in decisions, (2 ) only 
cash flow effects are important (not earnings) because 
only cash has a time value, and (3 ) net present value is 
the appropriate yardstick of value because, in theory, 
increases in NPV directly increase the value of the firm, 
the goal assumed paramount in capital budgeting.
The logic of capital budgeting theory, assuming only 
NPV matters, is irrefutable. However, in implementation 
certain problems develop. Undoubtedly, it was exactly 
these problems that caused the development'of certain 
strategic planning tools such as the portfolio matrices. 
First, cash flow analysis, even for the relatively short 
life span of fixed assets, requires forecasts be made for 
sales volumes, prices, costs, investment requirements, 
tax rates, and the cost of capital over that life time. 
Businessmen have found it uncomfortable to make such 
forecasts. The reasons are understandable! Forecasting 
accuracy declines rapidly with time. Forecasts of the 
order of magnitude of a decade away can be nothing more, 
practically speaking, than extrapolations of current 
trends. Considering that there is little to assist 
forecasters in predicting the long term path of costs and
-5-
prices, and practically nothing, save a crystal ball, to 
predict competitive reaction, external shocks, tax rates, 
and inflation, it is not surprising that most forecasts 
of net cash flow beyond a year or two away are made only 
with a low degree of confidence.
Second, businessmen know intuitively that it is a 
business they are really investing in, not fixed assets 
and working capital. Capital budgeting theory has no way 
to consider investing in a business except to link 
together fixed asset acquisitions as they wear out or 
become obsolete, and expand them as the market grows. 
Such an approach only compounds the uncertainty and 
uncomfort of long term forecasts by making them even 
longer.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, business needs 
to develop reliable incremental net cash flows. 
Considering only asset acquisitions, incremental net cash 
flows appear easy. For expansion type proposals, clearly 
the largest category for most businesses, the difference 
between acquiring a fixed asset and not acquiring it is 
simply the cash flows from the acquisition, since no cash 
flows result if the asset is not acquired. However, from 
the perspective of investment in a business, the 
difference^ is not as clean. If the firm fails to 
invest, and competition does, it is possible (and I 
believe from conclusions about the experience curve, 
highly likely) that the long term attractiveness of the 
business to the firm will be impaired. Traditional
-6-
capital budgeting provides no explicit framework for 
addressing this dilemma.
Such problems with implementing the quantitatively 
elegant capital budgeting theory of finance have lead to 
the development of a much less quantitative approach. 
Strategic planning switched the approach from fixed asset 
acquisition analysis to the management of and support for 
the strategic business unit. Strategic planning suggests 
continual monitoring of specific opportunities and risks 
within the SBU's industry and specific strengths and 
weaknesses within the firm. They suggest this will aid in 
predicting future developments, lower the reaction time 
to current changes and.help define what may be "special" 
about individual investment proposals.
The General Electric Company and McKinsey and 
Company carried such ideas through to investment 
implications with their "Business strength-Industry 
attractiveness" matrix. They conclude that if an SBU is 
above average on at least one axis and never below 
average, then the firm should invest. The McKinsey 
approach is highly qualitative in that both axes can 
include whatever the firm feels important, and no attempt 
is made to justify any weights given the various factors.
The Boston Consulting Group, starting from the 
assumption that total cash flows within the firm should 
be balanced, developed the cash flow implications through 
their "Growth-Share" matrix. Both growth and share are 
readily quantifiable and BCG implied relative investment
-7-
attractiveness (i.e., "Stars" are better than "Dogs") as 
a function of two variables alone.
Regarding strategic planning, particularly the 
matrix approach to investment attractiveness, my concerns 
are many. The McKinsey*s matrix may be an excellent 
debating tool within the firm to highlight relevant 
factors for investment analysis, but what logic leads us 
to believe that an SBU is attractive for investment only 
as long as it is above average on at least one axis and 
never below average? The construction of the matrix 
assumes symmetry of importance between business strength 
and industry attractiveness. What logic demands equal 
importance? Further, how can we practically use such a 
tool with vague definitions of the axes and no help in 
weighing the relative importance of the many variables on 
each axis or even assistance in defining what is average 
and above and below.
The Boston Consulting Group's "Growth-Share" matrix 
appears on the Surface to be something with more meat. 
However, what logic demands that a firm's cash flows be 
balanced among SBUs? Shouldn't some firms attract outside 
financing if their investment opportunities are 
particularly attractive? Similarly, shouldn't others 
contract in size through large dividend payments if good 
reinvestment opportunities do not exist? Further, an 
essential question, why should investment attractiveness 
be a function of only growth and share? Are not other 
factors important? The competitive environment
-8-
immediately comes to mind. Again, how can we tell which 
axis is most important? In a world of capital rationing, 
that question will inevitably arise and we will need to 
know.
What is needed to link the seemingly divergent 
approaches of finance and corporate strategy? I believe, 
as a first step, we need a model based on the logic of 
incremental cash flow and net present value that:
1. Looks at investments in the market share of 
businesses, not asset acquisition.
• 2. Provides a tool to predict long term prices, 
costs and investments that is believable.
3. Allows a meaningful way to calculate incre­
mental net cash flows, considering the NPV 
of not investing in existing businesses is 
negative, not zero, if the experience curve 
phenomenon is important.*
4. Considers all factors effecting investment 
attractiveness, not just growth and share.
* As discussed further in Chapter 4
-9-
5. Is quantitative, not qualitative.
Little, if any, work on a quantitative link between 
strategic planning and capital budgeting has been done 
except perhaps various conceptual attempts at a link by 
Tomkins (1979-1984), and McCosh, Rahman and Earl (1981). 
This work attempts to build on that base. Specifically, 
by building a model that measures the net present value 
of a decision by the firm to increase its market share as 
a function of four variables: the firm's initial market 
share, the current position in the product life cycle as 
viewed by the firm, the competitor's relative experience 
curve slope, and the competitor's view of the shape and 
size of the product life cycle. In that sense,- this 
thesis fits between the Boston Consulting Group's 
portfolio matrix, in that it considers more variables, 
and McKinsey's portfolio matrix, in that it is more 
quantitative. Different from both matrix approaches, it 
does not presuppose symmetry.
This background section is meant to define where 1 
am "coming from" in writing this thesis —  my concerns, 
and my plan of attack. As already mentioned, the concepts 
discussed in this brief introductory chapter are more 
fully addressed in the appropriate sections later on.
Statement of objectives
The overall objective of this thesis is to provide a
-10-
model that will measure the financial attractiveness to 
the firm of investing in current or potential strategic 
business units (SBUs). The measure of financial 
attractiveness used will be the familiar net present 
value from traditional capital budgeting theory. The 
refinement proposed, in fact the reason this thesis is 
written, is the attempt to include quantitatively the
generally qualitative considerations of corporate 
strategic planning into the firm's capital budgeting 
decision.
The first specific objective of this thesis is to
quantify the incremental change in the net present value
of investment in increased market share in an SBU with 
respect to incremental changes in what McKinsey and 
Company might call "industry attractiveness" and 
"business strength". The result of such a calculation 
is to allow the mapping, with constant isobars of net 
present value, of the portfolio matrices proposed by 
McKinsey and BCG to measure the attractiveness of 
investing in an SBU.
The second specific objective of this thesis is to
demonstrate how the model can be used to assist strategic 
planners in their search for candidate SBU's, both 
internally to the firm and externally, to aid the firm in 
satisfying its objectives over the strategic planning 
horizon.
Scope of the study
— 11 —
This thesis is theoretical, rather than 
experimental or comparative, in nature. It combines ideas 
from many disciplines —  marketing, cost accounting, 
microeconomics, finance, and strategic planning —  into a 
model that describes the attractiveness of investing in 
an SBU. Conclusions drawn from the model are primarily 
based on logic, rather than based on experimental testing 
in the business world. Of necessity, such model building 
must be general in nature and not closely related to the 
conditions in any particular firm or industry, if it is 
to be useful. As Bromwich (1970:8) says,
"Using models is probably the only way of 
progressing in academic research for they allow 
us to think through the consequences of
changing one variable at a time, holding all 
others constant."
The results, it is hoped, will be generally if not 
specifically useful as a guide to businessmen. More 
importantly,the model provides a framework which can be 
adapted to fit the specific conditions applicable to any 
firm.
Limitations of the study
As might be expected from the prior discussion on
— 12—
the scope of the study, the list of limitations on this 
thesis is as long as it is important to understanding the 
usefulness of this work. As Cohen, and Cyert (1975:18) 
point out, the obvious connection of a model with reality 
is through its assumptions. The assumptions need not be 
exact representations of reality, but they should be 
reasonable abstractions of reality. Following is a list 
of what is believed to be the reasonable abstractions of 
reality necessary to characterize the type of world to 
which the model is intended to apply,
1. The firm can identify meaningful strategic 
business units. As Allen (1978) says, each 
SBU should be a complete business, including 
all functions and its external competition 
should be identifiable. As Ansoff and 
Leontiades (1976) add, it should also have 
its own distinctive trends, threats and 
opportunities.
2. The experience curve describes cost 
performance over the life cycle of the SBU. 
Further, the experience curve is continuous 
and linear on a log-log scale.
3. Costs decline only through experience and 
not through other methods such as adopting 
competitive technology, buying expertise.
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etc. This abstraction will be relaxed 
occasionally.
4. Contrary to Abernathy and Wayne (1974), 
managing the SBU to receive the full benefit 
of the experience curve does not hamper the 
firm's ability to accomplish rapid product 
innovation and improvement in product 
performance. In other words, if the 
experience curve gives benefit to the firm 
in one SBU, that benefit is not offset in 
anyway in other areas of the firm.
5. The firm can define the size and growth rate 
of the market for an SBU over its entire 
life cycle. This does not imply that the 
firm knows the product life cycle with 
certainty; but, it is able to specify its 
own estimates.
6 . The firm understands the competition. That 
is, the firm knows how competitors view the 
product life cycle, how competitors make 
investment decisions, the competitors cost 
of capital, competitive strengths and 
weaknesses, etc.
7. The competitors are logical and make
-14-
rational decisions based on their own 
economics. That is, their objectives are 
simple —  to maximize net present value 
(NPV).
8. The world is not lumpy. Prices may be 
increased or decreased incrementally, i.e. 
pricing focal points do not exist. 
Investment in capacity can be added 
incrementally, i.e. no minimum economic size 
plant exists, etc.
9. There "is no difference in the SBU's 
product between the firm and its 
competitors. The product can not be 
differentiated other than by price.
Listed above are many of the assumptions required, 
particularly those that the reader might appreciate at 
this stage» Collectively, they at best give a feel for 
the type of model proposed in this thesis. Other 
assumptions will be added as the model develops.
— 15—
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH
-16-
The goals of this chapter are: (1) To show how
traditional capital budgeting theory and traditional 
strategic planning both look at the problem of deciding 
which businesses the firm should support with its scarce 
resources to achieve the objectives of the firm.(2) To 
describe what needs to be done to more fully integrate 
capital budgeting and strategic planning. And (3) To see 
what assistance the relatively new portfolio matrix 
analysis approach is in guiding the firm in its strategic 
investments.
-17-
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRM
— 18—
Any attempt to formulate corporate strategy begins 
by defining the firm's objectives. The purpose of this 
section is two fold. First, to review a number of 
conflicting theories regarding the firm's objectives. 
Second, to select a tool, consistent with reasonable 
objectives, to measure the financial attractiveness of 
further investment in current or potential strategic 
business units.
The central question is what kind of objectives 
should the firm seek? Here we will consider four 
possibilities - maximum profit, maximum market value of 
the common stock, survival, and balanced satisfaction of 
stakeholders.
The historically oldest objective of the firm is 
unquestionably the maximization of profit, that unique 
measure of the efficiency of a business firm. Early on 
business ethics theorists, such as Anthony (1960:63-64) 
recognized serious problems with profit maximization as 
the goal of the firm. Eventhough profit is measured over 
an accounting cycle of at most one year, the firm 
generally expects to exist over many accounting cycles, 
in fact in perpetuity. Care must be taken that the 
objective of the firm has a longer horizon than one year. 
If short term profits are overemphasized, long term 
commitment of resources will be neglected and the very 
survival of the firm, in the long run, will be 
threatened. Thus the concept of profit maximization as 
the objective of the firm must be extended to long term.
-19-
not just short term profits. Unfortunately, accounting 
systems are not adept at measuring the success of 
strategic decisions on long term profitability.
Aside from concerns about whether firms have the 
information necessary to maximize profit, there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether they would want to 
if they could. As Hawkins (1973:60-61) says,
"To say that a man maximizes profits means in 
practical terms that nothing - absolutely 
nothing - which conflicts with profits yields 
him any utility at all. He would sack 10,000 
men and all his relatives and friends if it 
would make him a farthing of extra profit, even 
if he was already making 100 million pounds 
worth a year. He would work in a damp, dingy 
office and drive around in a second hand 
rubbish truck - if it helped profit by however 
little. He would cheat, lie and risk the lives 
of millions of people if only it would make his 
firm a few extra pennies."
Clearly, businessmen do not operate in that extreme 
fashion; therefore, there must be more to the objectives 
of the firm than pure profit maximization.
Most introductory financial texts, such as Weston 
and Brigham (1982), say the goal of the firm is to 
maximize the market value of its common stock, for the
-20-
benefit of the residual owners of the firm - its common 
shareholders. This goal relieves some of the burden in 
trying to measure long run profit by accounting 
techniques. In theory at least, changes in the long run 
outlook for the firm are quickly reflected in its stock 
price. Also, the goal of maximizing the firm's market 
value ties in well with generally accepted capital 
budgeting techniques. That is, if the firm's value is
related to the discounted value of the cash flow 
generated, then the capital budgeting technique of net 
present value advances this goal by selecting those 
investment proposals which yield increases in the
discounted value of cash flows; hence, in theory,
increasing the firm's market value.
Arguing against simple value maximization as the 
firm's objective are at least two considerations. First, 
anything Hawkins (1973) said above about maximizing 
profit could be said as well for maximizing the market 
value of the firm's common stock. Second, if firms truly 
attempted to maximize market value, and they believed
their net present value calculations, they would accept 
all non-mutually exclusive investment proposals which 
have a net present value greater than zero. No capital 
rationing would exist. However, Gitman and Forrester 
(1977:66-71) reported that in over 50% of large business 
firms studied, capital rationing does in fact exist. 
Therefore, the goals of the firm must be broader than 
maximizing profits or value of its common stock.
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In a sharp break with the concept of maximization, 
Drucker (1957:81-90) said that with respect to business 
objectives, "Profit maximization is the wrong concept 
whether it be interpreted to mean short range or long 
range profits." In its place he proposed "survival" as 
the central objective of the firm. "Adequate" 
profitability was but one of a set of "survival 
objectives" based on five "survival functions". It is 
interesting to note that perhaps Drucker's "survival" 
objective may not totally diverge from the concept of 
long run profit maximization in that if a firm is to 
maximize profits in the long run, it first must survive 
in the long run.
Along somewhat similar lines, Abrams (1954) 
developed what he called a "stakeholder theory" of 
objectives. In this theory the objectives of the firm 
should be to balance the conflicting goals of the various 
stakeholders: managers, employees, stockholders,
customers, suppliers, creditors, government, competitors, 
and society in general. Dermer (1977) suggested the 
nature of those tradeoffs. Owners expect a reasonable 
growth in earning per share, dividends and market price 
of the common stock. Creditors expect timely payment of 
interest and low risk of default on principal. Customers 
expect a reliable source of supply and a fair price. 
Management and labor expect fair pay, opportunities to 
advance and job security. Competitors expect legal and 
ethical behavior by the firm. Suppliers expect timely
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payment for goods ordered and advance warning of changes 
in order pattern. Government expects adherence to its 
laws and a dependable source of tax revenue. Society 
expects the firm to be socially conscious and responsible 
in all its actions. In such an objective function the 
goals of the common stockholders need not receive special 
predominance.
Perhaps a more reasonable and real world approach is 
that taken by Ansoff (1965:42) where he assumes:
"The firm has both economic objectives aimed at 
optimizing the efficiency of its total resource 
conversion process and social or non-economic 
objectives, which are the result of interaction 
among individual objectives of the firm's 
participants. In most firms the economic 
objectives exert the primary influence on the 
firms behavior and for the main body of 
explicit goals used by management for guidance 
and control of the firm. Social objectives 
exert a secondary modifying and constraining 
influence on management behavior."
Any system for selecting which businesses the firm 
should support and what kinds of businesses it should 
seek to enter must consider a multiple objective function 
such as that described by Abrams or Ansoff. Ijiri (1975) 
has suggested a quantitative approach to this problem
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called "goal programming". Unfortunately, this and other 
methods of considering conflicting stakeholder goals in 
the strategic problem assumes the firm can determine
exactly what those goals are. Not only would goals vary 
among members of a class of stakeholders, and over time; 
but, the firm's stakeholders goals would undoubtedly 
change as their own stakeholders' goals changed. 
Obviously, the full integration of stakeholder goals into 
the strategic problem of the firm is very complex.
Probably, it will never be solved deterministically and 
exactly.
Fortunately, the purpose of this thesis is not to 
solve quantitatively the strategic problems of the firm. 
Its purpose is to propose a model that will measure the 
financial attractiveness of investing in current or 
potential strategic business units. At that level of
analysis, capital budgeting theory says there should not 
be any built in assumptions made about constrained 
resources. These constraints, such as the quantification 
of certain stakeholder goals, are validly considered only 
at the total firm level, not at the business unit level. 
To do otherwise would theoretically cause a sub-optimized 
solution to the strategic problem.
What is needed for the model is a measure of
financial attractiveness that can be used unambiguously 
to compare investments in SBU's. While we must recognize 
that the objectives of the firm are much more complex 
than maximizing the market value of its common stock, the
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proper analytical framework for measuring the financial 
attractiveness of investment in an SBU is net present 
value. Basically, I have not addressed the complex 
strategic problem of determining which investments, in 
total, the firm should actually make. This must consider 
complex corporate objectives beyond NPV maximization, and 
solution of that problem exceeds the scope of this 
thesis.
The output of this work will be the NPV of further 
investments in SBUs. Therefore, final decisions, at the 
corporate level, about which SBUs will be supported may 
be inconsistent with NPV maximization, but at least the 
cost of such decisions will be quantifiable.*
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TRADITIOWAL CORPORATE STRATEGIC PLANNING
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The strategic decisions of the firm refer, according 
to Ansoff (1965:42), to the problem of deciding what 
business the firm is in and what kind of businesses it 
should seek to enter. It is important to recognize that 
in this concept the word "strategic" means "pertaining to 
the relationship between the firm and its environment" 
and not the more common usage of "strategic" signifying 
"important". Clearly, the selection of the firm's 
product/market mix is an "important" decision; but, 
depending on the firm's current position it may find 
other types of decisions, such as operating decisions or 
administrative decisions to be more important than 
strategic decisions.
Strategic decisions influence and to an extent 
control in turn operating and administrative decisions. 
Changes in strategy impose an operating structure capable 
of setting prices, timing output to meet demand, 
responding to changes in demand and changes in customer 
needs. These needs help determine an administrative 
structure and in turn set channels of authority, 
responsibility, and information requirements within the 
firm. Chandler (1962) has shown historically that as the 
U.S. economy developed, firms changed strategic plans. As 
a result, operating inadequacies developed which in turn 
dictated new forms of organization —  namely the modern 
concept of centralized policy making coupled with 
decentralized operating management.
A big difference, however, between strategic
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decisions and other types of business decisions is that 
the need for changes in strategy is almost never obvious. 
See for example Starbuck (1982). Failure to meet business 
objectives is often blamed on operating or administrative 
problems while the major problem is strategic in nature. 
Since strategic problems are hardest to pinpoint, they 
require special attention. Ansoff (1965) has developed a 
method of analysis which is focused on the search for 
strategic decision needs and opportunities.
Ansoff's method, in the tradition of microeconomics 
and behavioral theories, attempts to understand the 
nature and structure of management decisions by studying 
the way business firms actually operate. It does not seek 
to understand, as might philosophy and psychology, the 
decision maker's "mind as he selects among strategic 
alternatives. The thrust of Ansoff's (1965:177) method is 
to:
1. Identify the problem.
2. Enumerate and define the controllable and 
uncontrollable variables.
3. Establish relationships among those 
variables.
4. Recognize important decisions.
5. Prescribe decision rules.
Complicated as corporate strategy methods may appear, 
remember that the end product of the firm's strategic
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decisions are deceptively simple —  the firm selects a 
combination of products and markets in which to compete.
Much can, and has, been written about corporate 
strategic planning. For the purposes of this thesis 
however, a rather short overview of Ansoff*s approach 
will suffice. A simplified schematic diagram of the 
firm's strategic plan is shown in Figure 2-1.
FIGURE 2-1. THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
ar —
Figure 10.1. The strategic plan.
The trigger mechanism, external to the plan, is 
set-off in various ways primarily as a function of the 
firm's style and competence of management. Reactive 
management waits for operating results to deteriorate 
before attempting to solve the problem. Forward planning 
management anticipates future problems and take steps to 
offset their effects. Entrepreneurial management not only 
anticipates problems, but is also able to discover 
opportunities and take advantage of them. Since
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opportunities are continually available, at least to a 
certain degree, entrepreneurial management does not await 
a specific trigger, i.e. a "problem", but conducts a 
continual search for opportunities that may require an 
update of the strategic plan.
The result of the strategic plan's trigger being set 
off, however it occurs, is the need for a review of how
the changing environment will effect the firm's
objectives (1). Various philosophical approaches to 
defining the firm's objectives or goals have already been 
discussed. Ansoff's (1965:177) position regarding the 
firm's objectives as it effects the strategic plan in 
that they should be:
"..adaptable to a variety of different 
management attitudes, so long as the underlying 
concept of the firm is that of an efficiency 
seeking organization which meets the objectives 
through the mechanism of making and selling
goods and/or services."
At this stage of the strategic plan, it is important that 
the firm's objectives not be set as precise planning
targets without further consideration of the firm's 
capabilities and the opportunities available to it. 
Notice, the plan's objectives (1) include a feedback loop 
resulting from a review of its internal capabilities and 
external opportunities.
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Once tentative objectives are set, an internal
appraisal (2) is conducted. Essentially it reviews the 
ability of the firm to meet its objectives internally 
through growth and expansion of its current 
product/market mix. The appraisal involves:
a) a review of the economic environment in 
which the firm currently operates, that is 
the potential which exists within the
industry,
b) a review of the firm's strengths and
weaknesses in that industry, and
c) a competitive audit, which defines the
strength and weaknesses of other competitors 
in that industry.
As Sutton (1 9 8 0) says, the firm needs to appraise those 
features that determine the success or failure of 
alternative competitive moves. Further, the main job here 
is to ensure that the firm can identify factors 
contributing to competitive success, so that they can 
realistically appraise their own and their competitors' 
strengths and weaknesses. These strengths must be
assessed in terms of comparative advantages over 
competition in areas relevant to the product/market 
analyzed. As Tilles (1963) says.
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"Within each specific business, the real 
significance of a strength and weaknesses 
analysis is what is says about the company's 
competitive posture. For example, having an 
unparalleled manufacturing capability may not 
be worth very much in an industry when 
competition is primarily on the basis of 
styling and distribution. Similarly having a 
first-class marketing group scores no 
competitive points if many other people in the 
industry have a marketing group that is equally 
first class."
The result of the internal appraisal is a measure of 
the potential that exists within current businesses to 
satisfy the objectives the firm has set. If a gap exists 
(what Ansoff calls the "expansion" gap), the firm is 
faced with two options —  either reduce the objectives or 
seek out opportunities outside the firm's present 
operations. If a gap does not exist between the objective 
of the firm, as tentatively stated, and what current 
businesses can provide, the firm again is faced with two 
options —  either be satisfied and ignore possible 
diversification opportunities or raise the objectives and 
begin an external appraisal of opportunities. 
Management's choice of which way to proceed is determined 
in part by whether the management is a reactor, a planner
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or an entrepreneur.
The external appraisal (3) is meant to find and 
analyze diversification opportunities open to the firm. 
Ansoff (1965:178) believes that,
"..because of partial ignorance, external 
appraisal does not attempt to deal with 
individual firms and products...The outcome of 
external appraisal is a series of lists of 
industries ranked in the order of their 
potential for closing the diversification gap 
and a definitive management decision on whether 
the firm will diversify."
Before any diversification strategy can be selected the 
firm must decide to what extent, if any, it will vary its 
administrative structure to take advantage of synergy 
potential (4). Synergy value and changes in 
administrative structure must be considered concurrently 
in the external appraisal since they may well affect the 
final ranking of industries as aids in closing what 
Ansoff calls the "diversification" gap.
The next step is to assemble several product/market 
portfolios which are feasible for the firm, based on its 
available resources. Finally, management must make a 
decision on the "best" portfolio based on the firm's 
objectives, the inherent risk and uncertainty of the
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analysis, all in an environment of at least partial 
ignorance of both the opportunities and the threats 
associated with each portfolio. This process proceeds in 
parallel for both the diversification (5) and the 
expansion (6) substrategy and is then combined to produce 
the total strategy for the firm.
A selection of a preferred product/market portfolio 
will have profound influences on the firm. Both an 
administrative strategy (7) and a financial strategy (8) 
must be developed before the firm can begin 
implementation. The administrative strategy will include 
rules for the organizational evolution of the firm and 
will be further specified to include specific 
organizational relationships and for resource growth such 
as management development plans. The financial strategy 
will include rules governing how the firm will finance 
its growth such as specified debt to equity and earnings 
retention ratios. Clearly, such strategies are not simple 
derivatives of the selected product/market portfolio.
They are both influenced by the selection and in turn
influence the selection process. For example, financial 
limitations tend to set overall limits on strategic 
activity.
Finally, the respective strategies combined with the 
firm's objectives are used to produce a strategic budget. 
The strategic budget is a document which will
systematically organize the effort to implement the 
decision made about the preferred product/market
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portfolio. A description of the strategic budget is based 
on Drucker's (1959:238-239) definition of business 
planning as:
"..a continuous process of making present 
entrepreneurial decisions systematically and 
with the best possible knowledge of their 
futurity, organizing systematically the effort 
needed to carry out these decisions and 
measuring the results of these decisions 
against expectations through organized 
systematic feedback.”
An adequate strategic budget must consist of a 
performance budget, which defines the actions to be taken 
along with the expected results, expressed in pro forma 
financial terms; and a resource budget, which defines the 
amount and timing of resource commitment in support of 
the performance budget.
The general framework of the strategic plan would 
look as shown in Figure 2-2 on the next page. The 
strategic plan, with responsibility resting at the 
highest level of the firm, decides upon and allocates 
resources to the strategic business units selected by the 
firm. This is further described in three component 
plans.
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Figure lO J. Generic structure of plans.
The product/market development plan details 
Implementation of changes required in the 
products/markets of the firm and defines such activities 
as acquisitions, product/market development and research 
and development efforts. The resource development plan 
details the structure and acquisition of resources 
including organizational changes, personnel planning, 
finance and facilities planning. The operating plan 
details the day-to-day operation of the * firm, and 
includes the traditional functions of purchasing, 
manufacturing, marketing and distribution.
As a quick summary, let's review Day's (1975) 
description of the specifics of the strategic planning 
process :
1) State the mission of the strategic business 
unit (SBÜ).
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2) State the desired future position of the 
SBU that the firm wants to attain.
3) Review key environmental assumptions and 
threats and opportunities.
4) State the strengths, weaknesses and 
problems of the SBU and its major 
competitors.
5) Calculate the strategic gap between the 
desired and forecast position of the SBU.
6) Decide the actions to be taken to close the 
gap —  the strategy.
7) Plan for obtaining the resources required 
for implementation.
To define the strategic planning process is not to 
prove that is it necessary to the firm. Ansoff (1965:101) 
addresses this point by first examining the alternative 
■ to strategic planning. That alternative is basically to 
have no rules beyond the simple decision to look for 
attractive investments. Several reasons favor this 
approach. Substantial resources, primarily executive 
talent, could be reallocated in the firm if strategic
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planning were discontinued. The field of potential 
opportunities would be completely unrestricted —  
strategic planning somewhat limits the scope of the 
search. Since strategy is based on incomplete knowledge, 
some attractive opportunities will be missed —  but 
delaying resource commitment until an opportunity is well 
defined, the firm is able to act on the best possible 
information.
In favor of corporate strategic planning, the 
following arguments can be made. Without a strategy, no 
rules guide the search for new opportunities. Both 
research and development internally and acquisition work 
externally lack focus and can only either await 
opportunities or use a shotgun approach, both inefficient. 
Investment decisions will likely be of poorer quality, 
due to a lack of understanding of unfamiliar businesses. 
With no formal provision for dealing with partial 
ignorance, the firm will be unable to judge whether a 
particular opportunity is a rare one which demands 
action. There is a danger of premature resource 
commitment or perhaps undercommitment. Without benefits 
of strategic reappraisals, the firm may commit resources 
to SBU's that should not receive support.
To recap, the advantages of not missing 
opportunities with an unlimited search scope, not 
committing resources until opportunities are well defined, 
and conserving executive talent must be weighed against 
the disadvantages of inefficient search, poorer decision
—38—
quality and a lessening of control over resource 
allocation. It would seem that for most firms, 
particularly fully integrated operating companies, the 
advantages of strategic planning will outweigh those of 
total flexibility.
However, as reported by Lorenz (1982), criticism of 
traditional strategic planning has developed. At a recent 
conference on exploring the strategy-making process, 
sponsored by the Strategic Management Society, Mintzberg 
claimed that complex planning processes are not always 
needed, and that a company does not need to reassess its 
strategy each year as part of a planning cycle. More 
important than formal strategy, Mintzberg s'aid, is the 
entrepreneurial ability to respond to sudden 
environmental changes. At the same conference, Runett 
argued that a strategy was important only when the firm 
stands the chance of gaining a sustainable competitive 
advantage over its rivals. In most industries, he 
claimed, the status of firms is impossible to alter and 
as a result most strategic planning is wasted.
Naturally, as with most everything, controversy 
swirls and formal strategic planning's final place as a 
business tool is unsettled. It does appear, however, that 
the increasing use of corporate planning groups by 
corporations over the last decade favors Ansoffs 
argument, that on balance it is useful.
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TRADITIONAL CAPITAL BUDGETING THEORY 
SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS TO STRATEGIC PLANNING
-40-
At first glance, strategic planning, defined by 
Ansoff (1965:18) as "the problem of deciding what 
business the firm is in and what kinds of businesses it 
will seek to enter", closely resembles the capital 
budgeting decision. The purpose of this section is to 
describe in some detail the present state of the art in 
capital budgeting ' theory, and to see how well it helps 
the firm solve its strategic problems.
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Caoital budgeting theory
Johnson (1971:149) defines capital budgeting as the 
evaluation of capital expenditures whose principal
benefits are realized over a period longer than a year. 
He recognizes the distinction from operating expenditures 
is arbitrary, because in both cases the firm spends its 
money in the hope it will realize some return on its 
investment. Why then the concentration in finance on 
analyzing capital expenditures over operating 
expenditures if conceptually there is really no 
difference? Johnson (1971) points out three basic 
reasons. Capital expenditures are often of considerable 
size relative to the firms resources. Capital 
expenditures represent long-term commitments of funds, 
which cannot be quickly and/or cheaply reversed. Capital 
expenditures, which may take the firm into new businesses 
with significantly different risk characteristics, 
require additional analysis not deemed necessary when 
analyzing operating expenditures. Finally, since the 
benefit of capital expenditures are spread into the 
future, discounted cash flow techniques, a concept 
relatively new to the business world*, are required for
*For example, Solomon (1967) reports that as recently as 
1949 only 2% of a sample of U.S. companies used 




A discussion of capital budgeting theory must begin 
with a decision of the goal of the firm. The goal used by 
essentially all writers in capital budgeting is the 
maximization of the market value of the firm's common 
stock. Therefore, if the firm's market value is related 
to its future cash flow, the way to maximize the firm's 
market value is to select those projects with the highest 
net cash flows, time value of money considered. Basically 
then, the capital investment decision boils down to 
determining the proper cash flows and proper discount 
rate for each potential investment proposal, and setting 
selection rules. Early in this century, Fisher (1907) 
proposed exactly that path. Current theorists, such as 
Merrett and Sykes (1963), still follow it.
It is now generally accepted in the literature that 
capital budgeting decisions should be based on the 
additional net cash flows generated by an investment 
proposal. As Bierman and Smidt (1980:127) point out:
"Every investment analysis involves a 
comparison of alternatives. If there are not at 
least two possibilities there is no problem of 
choice...because the investment analysis 
involves a comparison of two or more 
alternatives, it is not surprising to find that 
any estimate of cash flows must also be on a 
comparative basis."
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Cash flows that are developed for a particular investment 
proposal that seems to stand alone without the need for 
comparison, such as those for starting a new business, 
are called absolute cash flows. The analysis of projects 
with absolute cash flows, using net present value, 
implicitly compares the investment to an investment that 
would yield a return equal to the cost of capital 
indefinitely for each net outlay.
Bromwich (1970:8) says that the most important 
question to ask when determining relevant cash flows is, 
"What difference does the decision make?" Two specific 
examples of costs will be used to illustrate relevant 
costs. Cost accounting correctly allocates a share of 
costs like administrative expense to all operations based 
on some reasonable yet arbitrary method like allocation 
based on sales. Such costs are not relevant to the 
proposal unless its adoption would actually increase 
administrative expense by the amount allocated by cost 
accounting. The rule to follow is that expenses that 
would be incurred by the firm whether or not the 
investment is accepted are not relevant to the investment 
decision. In some cases an investment proposal may 
require the use of some scarce resource available to the 
firm for which the current cash outlay may be nonexistent 
or may understate the value of the resource to the firm. 
An example would be a project which would use existing 
floor space in a plant already owned by the firm. Cost
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accounting would allocate to the project a share of the 
depreciation of the plant based on historical cost. The 
proper cost to the project, called the opportunity cost, 
is the estimate of how much the resource would earn, say 
by renting out the idle space, if the project were 
rejected.
The second major step in the capital budgeting 
decision is determining the proper discount rate for each 
investment proposal. A direct attack on the problem of 
the definition and measurement of this cost of capital is 
only about a generation old —  see Solomon (1956). Over 
that period, the concept has been one of the most 
controversial in finance. Generally, the cost of capital 
is assumed to combine both the concepts of the time value 
of money and expected • risk. Bierman and Smidt 
(1980: 258-259, 263) argue against their dual inclusion 
and suggest using a default free interest rate as the 
discount rate with risk adjustments made separately. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) even challenge the concept 
of an optimum capital structure and therefore a minimum 
cost of capital.
Fortunately, the model proposed in this thesis 
doesn't require the solution of these and other problems 
related to the cost of capital. The main contribution of 
the model is in the area of incremental cash flows 
attributable to investments in SBU's. Its practical 
usefulness is limited by the correctness of the discount 
rate used on those cash flows.
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The final step in capital budgeting theory is the 
decision rules to follow based on the discounted 
incremental cash flows of the investment proposal. Using 
net present value the decision rules are straight 
forward; assuming no resource constraints. If a project 
is independent, it should be accepted if the net present 
value to the firm is greater than zero. If a project is 
mutually exclusive with one or more alternatives, the 
project with the highest net present value should be 
selected, assuming its net present value is greater than 
zero. The logic of those selection rules supports the 
goal of increasing the market value of the firm's common 
stock.
Relationship to strategic planning
On the surface, the procedure described in capital 
budgeting theory appears applicable to strategic 
planning, that is selecting what products to develop and 
what markets to enter. Beranek (1963) extends capital 
budgeting theory to the entire spectrum of corporate 
investment decision, including the strategic. Where, if 
at all, do product/market investments differ from plant 
and equipment investments?
Simon (I960) has shown that the decision process has 
four steps:
1. Perception of the opportunity or need.
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2. Formulation of alternative courses of action.
3. Evaluation of the alternatives.
4. Choice of alternative(s) for implementation.
Capital budgeting theory concerns itself with the last 
two steps. The others area assumed to take place before 
and external to the analysis.
Ansoff (1965:27-32) sees these deficiencies and 
others as severely limiting. Strategic planning requires 
a method for continuing intelligence and for the 
diagnosis of need for new strategies. All this must take 
place before opportunities are sought and analyzed. 
Strategic decisions are characterized by conditions of 
partial ignorance about opportunities. Capital budgeting 
theory on the other hand assumes that all investment 
alternatives are known, even down to the point of 
describing cash flows. Practical strategic planning must 
broaden capital budgeting to include provisions for 
search and evaluation of projects under partial 
ignorance. Capital budgeting theory uses net present 
value, and indirectly market value of the common stock, 
as the measure of a project's worth. Many writers have 
pointed out the need for a multiple objective function of 
the firm, see for instance Dermer (1977). Also important, 
as Ansoff (1965:28) says:
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.Limitations of data usually lead to cash 
flows which are typical of a produot-market 
area, not one that are specific for the
opportunities in question. However, what the 
firm needs is not typical but particular* 
flows which will reflect the unique competitive 
advantages of the product market 
opportunity..."
While capital budgeting theory implicitly requires such 
effects be taken into account, it provides no method for 
doing so.
Ansoff (1965) has developed what he calls a
"checklist" of shortcomings in capital budgeting theory 
that must be corrected in a strategic decision model, as 
follows :
1. Include all four, rather than the last two 
steps in the generalized problem-solving 
sequence (as listed earlier in this
section). Emphasis should be on the first
two steps, monitoring the environment for 




2. Handle allocation of the firm's resources 
between opportunities in hand and probable 
future opportunities under conditions of 
partial ignorance.
3. Evaluate joint effects (synergy) resulting 
from addition of new product-markets to the 
firm.
4. Single out opportunities with outstanding 
competitive advantages.
5. Handle a vector of potentially antagonistic 
objectives.
6. Evaluate the long-term potential of 
projects eventhough cash flow projections 
are unreliable.
The model proposed in this thesis will assist in 
integrating capital budgeting and strategic planning by:
1. Aiding in the search for attractive product
opportunities by defining which kinds of 
product/market opportunities are
potentially profitable for the firm.
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(Ansoff"s Checklist #1)
2. Aiding the evaluation of joint effects 
(synergy) by including experience curve 
effects. (Ansoff*s Checklist #3)
3. Aiding in identifying opportunities with 
outstanding competitive advantages by 
defining which kinds of opportunities are 
potentially most profitable for the firm. 
(Ansoff*s Checklist ^4)
4. Improving the reliability of long-run cash 
flow projections by proposing a system to 
"manage" the competitive environment of 





What seems to be lacking in the traditional
strategic planning process is, as Day (1975:4) points 
out, "a systematic procedure for generating and choosing 
strategic alternatives." Portfolio matrix analysis, in 
its many forms, is a recent attempt, as Henderson (1979)
says, to move strategy development from an intuitive art
toward something closer to a logical, explicit and 
orderly analysis. The purpose of this section is to look 
at a number of the most important portfolio matrix
schemes and to see what, if any, help they are to the 
firm in selecting which businesses it should invest in.
First, the idea that a firm should have a portfolio 
of businesses rather than a single business needs to be 
addressed, particularly in the light of much work denying 
the benefits of diversification. For example, Pogue and 
Lall (1974:20) contend that:
"No gain in aggregate market value (from 
acquiring firms) can be anticipated...the 
market value of the new firm will simply equal 
the sum of values of the component firms. 
Corporate diversification, while often 
attractive to corporate management, may lead to 
no benefits to the stockholders (assuming away 
synergy or undervalued companies). The 
shareholder can easily achieve any desired 
degree of portfolio diversification by 
selecting a portfolio of securities he feels to
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be appropriate. Additionally, corporate 
diversification reduces the number of 
diversification options open to investors and 
may lead to a reduction rather than an increase 
in aggregate market price."
Henderson (1979:80), however, points out that without 
mergers growing firms must always be self-financed either 
through retained earnings or from public capital markets. 
If a firm's current profits are not in proportion to its 
growth potential then it is likely that growth must be 
restrained to match financial resources available. The 
conglomerate* however is exceedingly well positioned to 
direct capital investment into the most productive areas. 
It can be more efficient and effective than public 
capital markets are ever likely to be, for two important 
reasons.
First, top management of even a very diverse firm is 
better equipped than an outside investor to judge the 
potential of a growing business. Such a firm has access
*"Conglomerate" is Henderson's word choice to describe a 
firm with many diverse businesses linked by common 
financial resources. Companies not traditionally thought 
of as conglomerates such as DuPont, with synthetic fibers 
as well as auto paint, qualifies as does General Electric 
with light bulbs as well as engineering plastics.
-53-
to product, market and competitive data that even the 
most detailed prospectus cannot provide to the general 
public. Further, the firm has management and staff data 
analysis skills that are likely to be superior to that of 
any individual.
Second, in a world of high corporate and individual 
tax rates, particularly with taxation of dividends, the 
ability to include in one tax paying entity both quickly 
growing businesses, which are likely to report accounting 
losses, along with mature businesses, which are likely to 
report profits, has a large cost advantage. Income taxes, 
in the U.S. for example, will take away about half of 
reinvestable funds, if reported as profit. If the 
remainder is paid out in dividends and taxed at 
individual rates, only a fraction will be left for 
eventual reinvestment. As a consequence, if the firm is 
able to treat these reinvestment expenditures as an 
expense offsetting profits elsewhere in the firm, as 
"conglomerates" do, then it has a great advantage in 
terms of its cost capital. Further, as Weston and Brigham 
(1982:391) point out,
"The cost of new common stock or external 
equity capital is higher than the cost of 
retained earnings because of flotation costs 
involved in selling new common stock."
In conclusion, the conglomerate is in an unexcelled
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position to obtain capital at the lowest possible cost 
and to put it to the best possible use. Therefore, it is 
to the firm's advantage to have a stable of businesses to 
balance cash flows within the corporation. As Day 
(1975:9) says,
"Some products should generate cash (and provide 
acceptable reported profits) and others should 
use cash to support growth; otherwise the 
company will build up unproductive cash 
reserves or go bankrupt."*
The achievement of this balance is the art of portfolio 
management.
As mentioned earlier, portfolio matrix analysis has 
taken many forms. We will review six of the best known:
(1) the Boston Consulting Group's Share-Growth Matrix,
(2) McKinsey and Company's Business Strength-Industry 
Attractiveness Matrix, (3) the Shell Directional Policy 
Matrix, (4) Sutton's Strategic Planning Matrix, (5)
*Day does point out in a footnote that changing debt or 
dividend policies could increase growth or delay 
bankruptcy, assuming as he does that for most companies, 
the likelihood of new equity funding is limited.
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the PIMS approach to portfolio planning, and (6) 
Rothschild's Financial Ratio Matrix. Much of the work 
reviewed is taken from Channon and Jalland's (1979) 
summary of strategic portfolio planning systems.
Share-growth matrix*
Early on, the Boston Consulting Group recognized two 
primary determinants of a business' ability to generate 
cash —  relative market share and market growth rate. 
High share businesses, with at least some monopoly power 
and likely economies of scale, should generate 
substantial operating cash flow. High growth rate 
businesses should consume substantial amounts of cash to 
finance fixed asset and working capital requirements. The 
interplay of these two variables gives rise to the 
familiar growth-share matrix as shown in Figure 2-3, on 
the next page.
*Among Boston Consulting Group publications that describe 
the portfolio are Perspectives on Experience (1970), The 
Product Portfolio (1970), Cash Traps (1972), and The 
Experience Curve Reviewed; The Growth Share Matrix of 
the Product Portfolio (1973).
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FIGURE 2-1. THE GROWTH-SHARE MATRIX







"Stars", in the upper left quadrant are both high
share and high growth businesses. They require
significant investment to maintain growth, but due to 
their high market dominance they should also generate 
large operating cash flows. "Stars" tend to be in rough 
equilibrium in terms of cash flow. "Cash Cows" tend to be 
former stars whose market has matured and become low or 
no growth. Opportunities for profitable reinvestment are 
not sufficient to absorb the cash generated by
operations; hence "cash cows" are the principal source of 
the firms internally generated investment funds.
"Question marks" (or as Henderson calls them,
'problem children') are the firm's low share entries in 
high growth businesses. They require large investments to 
maintain share but have poor operating cash generation 
prospects. The result is a large negative cash flow. 
Usually, the firm can adequately support only a few such 
businesses. Again because of large negative cash flows, a
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decision must be reached early about which- such
businesses will be supported and which divested or
abandoned. Recognize, that to support adequately a
problem child, the firm must invest to buy market share;
otherwise, it will become a "dog" as its market matures.
Businesses with low market share and slow growth are 
"dogs". They probably show an accounting loss due to a
poor relative cost structure and still require some
investment support to sustain even the slow growth. Many 
such businesses tend to become cash traps, perpetually 
absorbing cash. The business is a drag, except perhaps 
in liquidation.
As Henderson (1979:166) says,
"The need for a portfolio of businesses becomes 
obvious. Every company needs products in which 
to invest cash. Every company needs products
that generate cash. And every product should 
eventually be a cash generator; otherwise, it 
is worthless."
The goal, according to BCG, is to achieve a balance in 
the firm's business portfolio, taking cash generated by 
"cash cows", the liquidation of "dogs" and the divestment 
of some "questions marks" and using it to support the 
"stars" and certain fledgling growth businesses. One way 
to achieve such a balance is to plot on the share-growth
4
matrix the location of each business in the firm's
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portfolio as shown in Figure 2-4.
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The size of each business, based on sales, assets or cash 
flow is proportional to the area of the circle used to 
define the business* location on the matrix. Conclusions 
can then be stated regarding the overall balance and the 
adequacy of internal funds to support growth prospects.
Business streneth-industrv attractiveness matrix
The familiar, and highly qualitative, McKinsey 
matrix is shown in Figure 2-5 on the next page. It is the 
result of early work at General Electric, which 
subdivided its activities into strategic business units 
and positioned them on a three by three matrix measuring 
business strength and industry attractiveness. McKinsey*s 
approach recognizes that other factors beside share and 
growth play an important part in corporate strategic 
planning.
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FIGURE 2-5. THE MeKIWSFY MATRIX
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According to McKinsey (1978) the industry 
attractiveness is determined by the size of the market, 
the growth rate, the degree of market segmentation, the 
competitive structure, the profitability, technical 
inputs required and environmental factors such as social 
implications, legal considerations and human relations. 
The firm's business strengths are determined by market 
share and product strengths, its image among customers
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and competitors, its technological competence, its 
financial and human resources, its risk preferences and 
its commitment factor to the business, which is a 
function of how closely this business fits the strategic 
mission of the firm.
Clearly, this system as advocated incorporates both 
quantitative and qualitative variables and allows
cross-impact relationships to be considered. Strong
criticism of McKinsey*s approach is primarily directed at 
the model's vagueness; that is, the axes can mean 
whatever any user wants them to mean. As Channon and
Jalland (1979) say:
"In reality this (matrix) is not 
practicable...(because) there is no specific 
weighting system for the variables on which 
data is collected. As a result the positioning 
of a business within the matrix is much less 
precise than with the Boston approach where 
both the main variables are quantifiable."
Many see McKinsey's approach as a tool for
debating strategic resource allocation, even if it is not 
precisely quantifiable. If the market attractiveness is 
defined as being that expected over the next five to ten
years and business strength being the firm's current
position, which could potentially be changed by
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investment, then the focus becomes one of managing 
movement around the matrix.
Directional policy matrix
A fairly simple-minded attempt to overcome the 
McKinsey problem of locating the position of a business 
on the product portfolio matrix is the Directional Policy 
Matrix developed by Royal Dutch Shell (1976). Similar to 
the McKinsey matrix, the Directional Policy Matrix is a 
three by three matrix with the axes measuring 
"competitive capability" and "prospects for sector 
profitability". Again the two dimensions are composed of 
multifactor variables, the composition of which can vary 
among firms. Each variable is assigned a score* from zero 
to four with zero being "poor" and four being 
"excellent".
Shell has defined "competitive capability" on the 
basis of three factors: market position, production
capability, and product research and development. Thus a
•Actually, Shell itself uses "stars" instead of numbers 
for increased "visual impact"; i.e. a score of two would 
for Shell become three "stars". (One star translates to a 
score of zero.)
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five "star" rating would apply to a business with Shell 
having a high relative market share, sufficient and 
modern production facilities, and technical leadership. 
Conversely, a one "star" rating would signify a minor 
current position in the business.
The Directional Policy Matrix, as used by Shell, 
defines the "prospects for sector profitability" on the 
basis of four factors: market growth rate, market
quality, industry feedstock position and environmental 
aspects. In another industry, says insurance, industry 
feedstock position and environmental aspects would be 
replaced by more meaningful factors, say level of 
training of agents and flexibility of insurance 
regulators.
Other competitors would be similarly analyzed with 
weighting factors applied if desired, and the final 
result plotted on the matrix as shown in Figure 2-6, on 
the next page.
From these relative positions alternative strategies 
emerge. Competitor A, in a leadership position equates 
approximately with a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix 
"star". Competitor C, in the double or quit zone closely 
conforms with the BCG "question mark". Competitor B, in
FIGURE 2-6 THE DIRECTIONAL POI.TCY MATRIX
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the try harder position implies that the SBU, while no 
longer a BCG "question mark" must be allocated sufficient 
resources if it is to move toward a leadership position.
The Directional Policy Matrix incorporates a richer 
mixture of quantitative and qualitative variables in 
assessing portfolio positions than does the BCG approach. 
Further, a three by three matrix reduces the sharpness of 
the BCG matrix positions. Criticisms of the Directional 
Policy Matrix are obvious. Is a two "star" rating really 
twice as good as a one "star" rating? And, on what 




Sutton (1980:83-85) has developed what he calls the 
Strategic Planning Matrix based on Shell's Directional 
Policy Matrix. Different from the others, though he 
explicitly recognizes that:
"The matrix...assists the classification of 
individual product areas, but on its own, this 
is not sufficient to determine the firm's 
strategic portfolio. The strategy must also 
consider the effect of interactions between 
different areas, and in particular it should 
consider the effects of instability and 
uncertainty."
The Strategic Planning Matrix is also a three by 
three matrix with the axes measuring "competitive 
capability" and "general performance prospects". 
According to Sutton (1980:84), general performance 
prospects are predictable from the structure of the 
market; and the firm's ability to share in that section's 
growth or profitability is determined by the firm's 
present competitive strengths in that product area. No 
mention is made of what determines the structure of the 
market or the firm's competitive capability.
An example of the Strategic Planning Matrix is shown 
in Figure 2-7, on the next page.
FIGURE 2-7. THE STRATEGIC PLANNING MATRIX
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Grow w ith market
Priority
product
Priority products combine a strong competitive 
position with generally attractive prospects. Conversely, 
the combination of a weak competitive position with an 
unattractive market identifies areas ripe for immediate 
divestment or phased withdrawal. A weak competitive 
position in an attractive market calls for a double or 
quit strategy. Finally, the remaining areas, the "grow 
with market" and "minimum resource commitment - maximum 
cash generated" areas may have a variable dividing line 
depending on the resources available after the priority 
needs have been met.
Profit impact of market strategy (PIHS)
An interesting attempt to define what conditions 
make a business successful is the PIMS study. I have
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included a short discussion of it here eventhough it is 
not a portfolio matrix analysis because its findings lend 
support for the logic of many matrices. Also, it relates 
quite closely to the model proposed in this thesis in 
that it considers the impact of market share, growth, 
competitive environment, etc. on financial results. 
Conclusions drawn by this work from theory must not
contradict what PIMS finds empirically.
Buzzell, Gale and Sultan (1975) describe PIMS as a 
major data base containing key details of the operating 
characteristics of a wide variety of different 
businesses. From this data a series of cross-sectional
multiple regressions models have been developed and 
refined to attempt to discover the "laws of the market 
place". There is a special attraction to the PIMS model. 
As Murphy (1983:178) says:
"There is a limit to what any of us can learn 
from experience. We run out of money to pay for 
our mistakes. We run out of lifespan to profit 
from the wisdom those mistakes give 
us...Learning from PIMS is almost as useful as, 
and a good deal less painful than, learning
from experience."
There are two basic PIMS models. The oldest and the 
best in terms of predictive ability is the PIMS Par ROI 
model which measures financial performance in terms of
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pre-tax returns on investment. The other, the PIMS Par 
Cash Flow model was developed as a result of the high 
interest rates of the 1970*s and hence corporate interest 
in liquidity and cash flow.
Without invading the workings of the model lets 
review some useful generalities from it:
* "Doing the right thing is much more important 
than doing it well. Being in the right business 
in the right way is 80% of the story; operating 
that business in a skillful or lucky way is 
2 0%..9 Murphy (1983:178)
* Businesses that produce a high value added per 
employee are more profitable.
* Large market share, relative to the three 
biggest competitors, enhances profits and cash 
flow.
* High quality products, as viewed by the 
customer, enhances financial performance.
* The financial result of innovative R & D and 
increased marketing effort is heavily 
determined by initial position in the market.
Those who start from a weak position in the 
marketplace usually fail to benefit from
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innovation.
* Vertical integration is a good strategy if the 
market is mature and stable. It is a bad 
strategy when markets are growing or declining 
rapidly.
* Growth, either from market growth or a strategy 
of increasing market share, tends to increase 
profit but decrease cash flow.
* Product characteristics do not effect financial 
performance. "...It doesn't matter if the 
product is edible or toxic, large or small,...
Two businesses making entirely different 
products but having the same investment 
intensity, productivity, market position, etc. 
usually show similar operating results." Murphy 
(1983:178)
* "Most clear strategy signals are robust." 
Usually a favorable strategic move will have a 
large cost/benefit surplus. Moderate size 
forecasting error should not change the 
decision and invalidate the strategy. Murphy 
(1983:178)
Clearly, for any firm, understanding the impact of the
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underlying dynamics of the businesses in its portfolio in 
terms of both pretax return and cash flow is useful. 
Further, PIMS also incorporates a strategy sensitivity 
and optimization model which permits alternative 
strategies to be assessed under varying environmental 
conditions.
Financial ratio matrix
Finally, Rothschild (1976:179) has put together a
Financial Ratio Matrix, based on PIMS results and shown 
in Figure 2-8.
FIGURE 2-8. THE FINANCIAL RATIO MATRIX
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The matrix’s axes measure return on sales and return on 
investment. Those businesses which are to receive 
priority tend to do well in both dimensions. Businesses 
doing poorly in both dimensions tend to be candidates for 
divestment. This matrix particularly seems simple-minded, 
clearly, return on investment is more important than 
return on sales since margins are a function of the type
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of business and generally are related to asset turnover.
Usefulness of portfolio matrix analysis
Early on in this chapter, I suggested that one of
its goals was to see what, if any, help the various
portfolio matrix schemes were in selecting which
businesses the firm should support. As a format for 
discussion, consider in detail only the capital 
investment implications of the Boston Consulting Group’s
Share-Growth Matrix, although all other matrices have 
similar investment implications.











r e l a t iv e  d o m in a n c e
Again, the general rules are that "stars" should be 
priority investments, "cash cows" are expected to throw 
off sufficient quantities of cash to finance "stars" and 
support market share expansion by at least some "question 
marks". "Dogs", as Henderson (1979:166) says:
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”...are not necessary. They are the evidence of 
failure either to obtain a leadership position 
during the growth phase, or to get out and cut 
losses."
Examples of movement within the matrix that yield 
strategic success and disaster are shown in Figure 2-10.













The rules seem clear and even logical at first 
glance, but as Lorenz (1982) reports:
"The danger of BCG’s labels is that in
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themselves they convey simplistic policy 
prescriptions...BCG's own consultants do not 
use them in a simplistic manner, but the fact 
remains that large numbers of businessmen did 
just that..."
As an example of the simplistic investment implications 
of the portfolio matrices, lets consider "stars"; 
probably the least controversial with respect to 
investment priorities.
Clearly "stars", if everything goes right, have a 
very high value to the firm. By definition, the market 
share battle has been won and the product is still early 
in its life cycle. In financial terms, the net present 
value of the remaining time left in the product life 
cycle is high because much of the investment in assets 
and in acquiring market share has already been made. The 
big payoff in cash flow yet remains to be realized. Does 
it naturally follow that further cash investment in this 
"star" will necessarily yield high net present value? As 
always, net present value must be calculated from
incremental cash flows —  in this case what the business' 
future cash flows will be if the firm invests versus not 
investing. That incremental cash flow will be heavily 
dependent on competitive actions.
Assume a simple competitive environment with only
two players, the firm (A) and a competitor (B), and allow
the transformation of the BCG's "growth" axis into
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position in the product's life cycle. Figure 2-11, on the 
next page, shows the position on the matrix of the firm
at A and therefore the firm's estimate of the
competitor's position at Bq  ^ Two alternate positions for
the competitor are also shown depending on how he views 
the product. Note, there can be no argument about the 
current relative market share, and therefore the relative 
cost position if the experience curve effect is in force. 
But reasonable men can differ on the position in the 
product, life cycle, primarily based on their ability to
understand the market. At ^ he competitor believes
it is very early in the life cycle. At B^^ ^e believes
it is much later, even later than the firm suspects.
Will the competitor's response vary depending on 
whether he views his position as being B\j or B2 ? 
Likely so —  the competitor is much more apt to select 
the business for further support if it believes the
business is located at B, instead of Bs- As 
previously discussed, the way a firm moves a "question
mark" product toward becoming a "star" is to invest in
market share. Generally, a competitor selecting one of 
his "question marks" to challenge this firm's "star" will 
result in lower prices and/or higher costs and therefore 
lower earnings and cash flow for the "star".
Logically, there are basically two extremes in
incremental cash flow that the firm can expect from 
further investment in its "star". They depend primarily
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on whether and to what extent the competitor desires to 
increase share. Let's look in more detail at those two 
extremes.
The firm's present value of further investments in 
its "star" business, given the competitor thinks that his
position is at  ^ very high. A look at the firm's 
incremental cash flow position for investing versus not 
will show why. If the firm invests, it will likely 
maintain share and therefore volume; and if the 
"experience curve" effect is in operation, it will also 
maintain a cost advantage over its competition. If it 
fails to invest, and the competitor does as he is likely 
to do, the firm will lose share and volume, and the cost 
advantage will deteriorate. The difference between those 
two scenarios is likely to produce large incremental cash 
flows and therefore a large present value for further 
investment in the "star" business.
Conversely, the present value of further investment 
by the firm, given the competitor thinks that his
position is at Bg is not nearly so high. Again, an 
incremental cash flow analysis tells the story. If the 
firm invests and the competitor does not, it is true that 
the firm's market share will grow and its cost advantage 
on the experience curve will widen. However, if it fails 
to invest and the competitor does not fill the void, no 
volume will be lost and prices might even improve as 
product scarcity takes over. Further, the firm's 
operating rates, i.e. operation as a percent of capacity.
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would likely improve thus lowering costs. The total 
effect may well be only a small incremental cash flow and 
therefore a low present value of further investments in 
the "star" business.
The preliminary conclusion must be that all "stars" 
are not always the highest priority investments that the 
firm has —  if by highest priority we mean those with
highest net present value based on incremental cash
flows. As it turns out, that preliminary conclusion is 
only partially confirmed by the model results. This will 
be fully discussed in the final chapter, "A Wrap Up".
Some might argue that the preliminary conclusion put 
forth above, while valid for BCG's Share-Growth Matrix 
that . does not consider competition, would fail with a 
matrix that does. The McKinsey matrix, perhaps the most• 
general of all, specifically lists "competitive 
structure" as a partial determinant of "industry 
attractiveness. The closest match McKinsey makes to BCG's 
"star" is that matrix sector including businesses with a 
high level of market attractiveness combined with a high 
degree of business strength. The strategy "rule" given 
for that sector is to-— invest! Without facing the
problem of how we rank various determinants, such as high
market growth combined with either favorable or 
unfavorable competitive structure, to calculate market 
attractiveness, I contend that all portfolio matrix 
analyses measure the attractiveness to the firm of a 
business, assuming the competitive equilibrium is not
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upset, Capital investments, by their very nature, upset 
the competitive equilibrium. As Henderson (1979:22) says:
"A business should be regarded as a system in 
equilibrium. An effective corporate strategy is 
a predetermined sequence for the allocation of 
resources in such a fashion that the 
equilibrium will be shifted to a more favorable 
relationship."
Therefore, the capital investment decision aspect of 
strategic planning must explicitly consider competitive 
reaction quantitatively to accurately measure the 
attractiveness of further investment .in any business. 
Again Henderson (1979:7, 11) points out:
"Competitors determine your market share. 
Competitors determine your price. Competitors 
determine your return on investment. They do 
this by their investments...Aggressive 
competition produces revolution instead of 
evolution in competitive relationships."
In summary, all portfolio matrix schemes are little 
help in selecting which businesses the firm should invest 
in. They are flawed in that they measure the 
attractiveness of a particular business to the firm and






In Chapter 2, "The Review of Related Research", I 
attempted to show how capital budgeting theory,
traditional strategic planning and portfolio matrix 
analysis each looks at the problem of deciding which 
businesses the firm should support with its scarce
resources to satisfy or maximize (depending on how you 
look at it) the goals of the firm. The stated objective 
of this thesis —  to provide a model that will measure 
the financial attractiveness to the firm of investing in 
current or potential SBU's —  is less grand in that it 
does not actually choose among the SBU's so quantified.
This chapter's goals are to describe the basic 
framework of that model and to explore in more detail the
tools required. The actual integration of those tools
into the working model is reserved for the subsequent 
chapter.
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STATEMENT OF THE MODEL AND TOOLS REQUIRED
—81 —
Any model that attempts to quantify accurately the 
financial . attractiveness to the firm of investing in a 
current or potential SBU must go far beyond the 
simplistic, traditional capital budgeting approach of 
forecasting sales volumes, prices, costs, investment 
requirements and cost of capital over the economic life 
of the assets employed. Although, the final result of 
such a model must be expressed in exactly those terms if 
the financial attractiveness is to be measured by its net 
present value.
This model attempts to integrate, as fully as 
possible, all strategic implications of such investment. 
It differs from the traditional capital budgeting 
approach in the following ways. .It is truly 
market-oriented in that it considers important the 
differences in how competitor's view the size, growth and 
ultimate end of the market for the product (i.e. the 
entire product life cycle). It is oriented towards the 
strengths and weaknesses of each competitor because it 
explicitly considers their abilities to reduce cost over 
time (i.e. the slope of the experience curve) and the 
ultimate limits of each competitor's willingness to 
commit financial and other scarce resources to the 
business. Also, it is capable of including synergy 
effects (i.e. by initial positions on the experience 
curve).
Further, this model improves capital budgeting 
theory for those investments with strategic implications
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in the following ways. It improves the ability of the 
firm to predict and control competitive response by 
assuming that "if selected" the business will be managed 
for dominance (i.e. using limit pricing). It improves the 
accuracy of long-term cost, price, volume and investment 
requirements by giving simple rules for the calculation 
of each (based on the product life cycle, the experience 
curve and limit pricing). It better measures the 
incremental cash flows associated with the investment by 
explicitly recognizing that the net present value of not 
investing in a current SBU is not zero, but is in effect 
negative. Finally, it allows for a consistent method to 
specify what is special about the specific business 
opportunities, not just what the general economics are 
for investment in that business.
The obvious place to start in the development of 
such a model is to describe in more detail the tools to 
be used; namely, the product life cycle, the experience 
curve and limit pricing. That is the goal of the rest of 
this chapter.
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THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
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IntuitiVely, the attractiveness of a particular 
business to the firm must be strongly related to the 
market for the product or service offered. A business 
with sales volume forecast to grow substantially and 
continue for a long time is more attractive that one in 
which volume is declining and the end of the product is 
in clear sight. The reason is directly related to net 
present value. Everything else equal, an investment will 
have higher net present value if it has many years of 
positive cash flow rather than few. A firm must start its 
search for attractive investment opportunities by 
understanding the market and forecasting its remaining 
level of sales over time.
The concept of the product life cycle has been 
developed in marketing to help forecast sales into th.e 
distant future. Marketing texts, see for example McCarthy 
(1975:231), show four stages in the life cycle of a 
typical product: introduction, growth, maturity and
decline, as shown in Figure 3-1 on the next page.
The typical cycle is explained by the fact that any 
viable new product must somehow be an improvement over an 
older product or fulfill an unsatisfied need. Over time 
sales will grow through this replacement process, 
ultimately being limited as Buzzell, Nourse, Matthews and 
Levitt (1972:373) say by the:
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duction Growth Maturity Decline
Time
"natural 'ceiling* or saturation level for any 
product.subsequent changes in sales will be 
governed largely by changes in the size of the 
relevant total market."
Ultimately, invention or further improvement will make 
the product obsolete and sales will decline.
A valid question is, "How realistic is the
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intuitively satisfying product life cycle?" As always, 
there is controversy. Research results run the gamut. 
Levitt (1965) found that sales patterns can frequently be 
described in terms of the four stages previously 
discussed. Cox (1967), studying 258 ethical drug 
products, found six different sales patterns were needed 
to describe the sample; however, about two-thirds would 
fit the shape of Figure 3-1 if a second cycle repeating 
the first was included about the point of the initial 
sales decline. Polli and Cook (1969:400), studying 140 
categories of nondurable consumer products commented on 
their results as follows:
"While the overall performance of the model , 
leaves some question as to its general 
applicability, it is clearly a good model of 
sales behavior in certain market situations —  
especially so in the case of different product 
forms competing for the same market segment 
within a general class of products."
On the other hand Dhalla and Yuspeh (1976) maintain that 
a life cycle is useless as a prediction of sales because 
products tend to have unique sales growth patterns. As 
Cravens, Hills and Woodruff (1976:335) say regarding the 
product life cycle:
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"Certainly, it is not a theory...Yet, there is 
empirical support to the effect that sales 
follow definite patterns over the life of a 
product."
Another usual inclusion in marketing texts is the 
supposed pattern of profits over the product life cycle. 
On this point there seems to be substantial disagreement 
both between text authors and more importantly this 
thesis. For example. Craven, et.al. (1976:334) show 
profits at zero at the point of product introduction. 
Profits peak at the end of the growth phase and decline 
throughout the remainder of the product's life. More 
realistically, I think, is McCarthy's (1975:231) 
approach, showing profits negative during product 
introduction.
Although it is too early in the development of the 
model proposed in this thesis to explain fully the 
reasons, I contend that profit margins (not profits) 
would be as shown in Figure 3-2, on the next page. The 
full support for the continually rising profit margins 
will be explained in a later section entitled, "Price 
Implications of the Model".
In contrast, I have reproduced Cunningham and 
Cunningham's (1981:233) five-stage product life cycle and 
associated profit margin pattern. The essence of the 
difference in profit margin pattern is that this thesis 
contends that a new product can achieve its fullest
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potential, as measured by net present value, if it is 
managed for market dominance, that is, prices would be 
very low relative to cost in the life cycle's early 
stages to discourage competition, encourage market growth 
and establish an unchallengeable cost position. As the 
product matures and eventually declines, prices could be 
raised without risking competitive investment.
The existence of a "standard" product life cycle is 
not crucial to the development of this thesis. What is 
needed however, is that the firm be able to forecast what 
it considers a believable sales pattern over the 
long-term. And, for the firm to develop what it thinks 
competitors' views of long-term sales are as well. The 
concept of the product life cycle is but a tool in this 
process.
There are, however, two refinements that must be 
made to the product life cycle to make it fully useful 
theoretically: (1) Sales patterns should be developed
through decline to the ultimate death of the product, and 
(2) the influence of different pricing strategies on the 
shape, size and length of the product life cycle must be 
considered.
All marketing texts reviewed* fail to show the 
decline phase of . the product life cycle continuing
*McCarthy (1975), Buzzell, et al. (1972), Cravens, et al. 
(1976) and Cunningham and Cunningham (1981).
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through time until sales are zero. This failure implies 
that they consider this final phase unimportant to the 
firm. This is confirmed when we consider they generally 
show profits asymptotically approaching zero as the sales 
decline. However, the final declining stage of the 
product life cycle is important if profit margins are 
continually rising over time as proposed in Figure 3-2. 
Therefore, difficult as it may be, the firm needs to 
describe fully the life cycle of the product in which it 
considers investing.
If the firm manages the product for dominance, 
rather than simply reacting to the market and 
competition, it must consider the implications of its 
price strategy on both the size and shape the product 
life cycle. The relationship is as shown in Figure 3-3, 
on the next page.
Notice, two curves are shown, one with a lower price 
strategy than the other. The effects of lower prices are: 
(1) a steeper growth phase, (2) a higher ultimate level 
of sales, and (3) a longer life cycle. The reasons are 
purely market-oriented. A lower price encourages more 
rapid replacement of the older product, raises the 
saturation level by increasing the size of the relevant 
total market and retards obsolescence by removing some of 
the financial incentive for invention or improvement. If 
the firm can manage the product, it must search for that 
price strategy, when combined with expected competitive 
response, which yields the highest value to the firm.
FIGURE 3-3. THE EFFECT, OF_PRICE STRATEGY 








LONG-RUN COST ESTIMATION 
AND THE EXPERIENCE CURVE
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From a strategic perspective, the firm with a cost 
advantage over competition will be in a superior 
position, all else being equal. It will have higher 
profits and cash .flow and will require less externally 
provided cash to grow with the market. Therefore, proper 
strategic planning as well as capital investment theory 
demands that business unit costs be estimated over the 
long-run, preferably over the entire product life cycle.
The purpose of this section is threefold. First, to 
look at microeconomic theory, with the goal of 
determining the proper shape of the long-run average cost 
curve and its implications for strategy. Second, to 
review the learning curve and its extension by the Boston 
Consulting Group into the experience curve. Third, since 
the experience curve is heavily used in the remainder of 
this thesis, criticisms of the experience curve need to 
be addressed and their validity weighted.
Economic theory
, r ~
I Traditional microeconomics assumes that the long-run 
average cost curve is U-shaped. As Hawkins (1973:44) 
explains;
"The initial fall (in cost) is assumed to 
reflect economies of scale which continue until 
output is raised to an optimum plant size; 
thereafter diseconomies of scale are assumed to 
set in."
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However, there is substantial empirical evidence to 
suggest! that assumed diseconomies in ^an^agementr- 
administration and other functions do not occur and! that 
costs do not generally rise as firms expand production. 
Studies by Pratten (1971) and Silberton (1972) and others 
suggest that long-run average cost curves ar(e L-shap ^  —  
either flat or falling as shown in Figure 3-4 on the next 
page.
Proponents of the U-shaped long-run average cost 
curve make the theoretical argument that there must 
eventually come a point, as output increases, when 
diseconomies of scale will make themselves felt. 
Arguments about what will happen to costs at some 
hypothetically extreme output level are impossible to 
refute with evidence. However, even the great pioneers of 
microeconomics have recognized effects in the real world 
that would imply L-shaped curves. As reported by Hawkins 
(1973:45), John Stuart Mill noted that:
"There is a tendency to substitute more and
more, in one branch of industry after another,
large establishments for small ones."
Also, Alfred Marshall saw that the production of certain 
commodities might conform "to the law of increasing 
returns in such a way as to give great advantage to large 
producers." Based on available statistical evidence, it
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does appear that we should accept that for many products 
L-shaped average cost curves best fit the empirical 
evidence.
As (^^^wkit^ ( 1973:47) summarizes, that with an 
L-shaped long-run average cost curve,
"Perfect competition is seen to be 
impossible...It is always profitable to expand 
output and eventually the firm must reach the 
situation in which it can affect the market 
price...The significant point is that in those 
industries where economics of scale extend out 
to very large levels of output (i.e. a falling r
L-shaped cost curve) the number of firms in the 
industry will become very small, ultimately
perhaps being reduced to one." '
. ;
To describe the relationship of the long run average 
cost curve from economics to the learning curve and the 
experience curve requires that the LRAC be considered 
dynamic rather than static. Generally, the LRAC is a
static concept in that it does not allow for cost changes 
other than through economies of scale. For example, if 
sales were 100 units per year and the minimum point of 
the short run average cost curve intersected the LRAC at 
that point, where the cost was $10, then the static
nature of the LRAC would suggest that the cost will be 
$10 in the future as long as sales remain constant.
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However, considering the dynamics of technological change 
we should expect lower costs over time. Bixby, Rucker and 
Tisdale (1964) found exactly that shifting downward in 
the LRAC of ammonia production caused by process and raw 
materials changes. Since technological change is but one
form of "learning" or "experience", both curves use
empirical evidence to predict the rate at which the LRAC 
shifts downward, ^ f  the rate at which the (^namic LRAC 
shifts is a function of cumulative production volume, 
then a jjynamic LRAC and the experience curve are exactly 
the same thing,^ and it requires only a small change to
'transform the downward shifting L-shaped LRAC into the
experience curve. If the axes of the dynamic LRAC are 
changed from linear to logarithmic scale, the L-shape 
becomes a straight line as shown in Figure 3-5.























To describe the decline in the hours of labor 
required to produce a product, it has become customary to 
speak of a "learning curve". The learning curve shows 
that for standardized products, manufacturing cost fall 
as volume rises. Some of the earliest reported learning 
curve effects were isolated in the aircraft industry 
during World War II —  see Carr (1946) and Crawford and 
Strauss (1947). Hirschman (1964) recognized the strategic 
implications of relative cost difference among 
competitors, and showed that a straight line relationship 
could be drawn between constant dollar cost and 
cumulative units produced when plotted on a double 
logarithmic scale. Further, he found that for __each 
doubling of the accumulated production experience/ the
(^ unit _cost would fall to about eighty percent of the
previous level, depending on the mixture of man and 
machine work involved.
The experience curve
The Boston Consulting Group |(b CG)) ( 1968) picked up 
on Hirschman*s ideas and combined them with widely 
available 0^ ta___on_Zpric^ e^^ ^^  ^ (not costs) and industry 
production experience. They found that_prices decline 
about twenty percent for each doubling of,cumulative 
_jexperience.j just as Hirschman found for learning curve
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related costs. BCG (1968:10) supported their position, 
looked at a number of products and industries (e.g. 
electric power, Japanese beer and paraxylene), and 
observed that:
"This decline goes on in time without limit (in 
constant dollars) regardless of the rate of 
growth of experience. The rate of decline is 
surprisingly consistent, even from industry to 
industry."
From this data BCG infers that if prices show a 
systematic decline with experience, then costs (all costs 
not just manufacturing costs as theorized by the learning 
curve) must also decline similarly with experience. In
^t^JLr words,
"(constant dollar) appear tCK-ga_down_on,„..,.
value added at about^20-30%^^verytimà product 
experience doublesJ"
When such a relationship is graphed, it appears as in
Figure 3-6, on the next page.
Point A denotes the cost of value added for the 
first unit produced and Point B similarly denotes the 
cost of value added of the last unit produced during the
product life cycle, both expressed in constant dollar
terms. The slope of the line reflects a 20-30% decline in
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the cost of the value added for each (doubling An total 
accumulated volume.
To simplify discussing experience curves, the 
following conventions will be observed: (1) "costs" will 
mean the constant dollar cost of the value added, (2) 
"prices" will mean constant dollar prices, (3)







Log Total Accumulated Volume
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"experience" or "cumulative volume" will mean total 
accumulated volume, and (4) graphs p o r ^ t h e  
experience curve effect will always be on a double 
logarithmicJ)asis> . .....
Do costs fall ^utomaticall'y with increased 
experience? No, unless the firm* s management seeks ways 
to reduce costs as physical volume grows and^Jœ_eps up 
cost reduction pressure over the product * s life. Such 
pressure on costs is reasonable, given the firm* s need to 
remain c_omp;^ tit,iye and the firm* s desire to be as 
profitable as possible. In the words of the Boston 
Consulting Group (1970:1)
"...the relationship (of the experience curve) 
is * of normal potential rather than one of 
certainty. However, competition
characteristically produces survivors who 
achieve the full potential."
If the experience curve is a valid tool, the 
implications for strategic planning and capital budgeting 
are many. For example, if we know current costs, and our 
cumulative volume and we can predict industry sales 
volume and our market share, we can also predict costs 
far into the future.Given the assumptions in Figure 3-7 
for industry sales volume and our market share with an 
initial cost of $10.00 per unit and an experience curve 
slope indicating a 30% decline in cost for each doubling
-102-
of cumulative volume , annual costs can be calculated.
FIGURE 3-7. UNIT COST AS A FUNCTION OF EXPERIENCE
INDUSTRY MARKET CUMULATIVE UNIT
YEAR SALES SHARE SALES SALES COST
(t) VOLUME (%) VOLUME VOLUME (C^)
(N, )L
0 100 50 50 50 10.00
1 200 55 110 160 5.50
2 300 60 180 340 3.73
3 400 65 260 600 2.78
4 500 70 350 950 2.22
5 640 75 480 1430 1.78
6 800 75 600 2030 1.49
7 700 80 560 2590 1.31
8 400 80 320 2910 1.24
9 200 80 160 3070 1.20
10 100 80 80 3150 1.19
In the above table, unit cost each year (C^) is
calculated from beginning cumulative sales volume of 50
units (Ng), beginning unit cost of‘ $10.00 (C^), and
cumulative sales volume each year (N^) according to the
relationship:




where E = -0.51457, which corresponds to an experience
curve slope with a 30% decline for each doubling of 
cumulative volume. The power coefficient E equals 
-0.51457 simply because the logarithm of a 30% decline 
for a doubling in volume or log 0.7 divided by log 2 = 
-0.51457.
further, if we can determine our competitors* 
cumulative volume now and predict their market share, we 
can also forecast their costs if we know the slope of 
their experience curve .j For example, let us assume that 
we have but one competitor, whose experience curve slope 
and initial unit cost is the same as ours. Using the same 
assumptions of Figure 3-7 regarding industry sales volume 
and recognizing that the competitor*s market share and 
ours would add to 100%, his unit costs are as shown in 
Figure 3-8, on the next page.
Notice the implications of the experience curve as 
shown in Figure 3-9 on the second following page. Both 
firms* costs decline sharply early in the product life 
cycle while industry sales volume is growing quickly. As 
industry sales volume growth slows and turns negative, 
both firms* costs continue to decline, but at a 
progressively slower rate. fMost importantly, the 
experience curve implies that the only reason that our 
costs are lower than our competitors is that our 
cumulative volume exceeds his due to higher market share. 
Since we would both face the same market price therefore, 




YEAR INDUSTRY HIS HIS CUMULATIVE UNIT
(t) SALES MARKET SALES SALES COST
VOLUME SHARE VOLUME VOLUME
(N,)
0 100 50 50 50 10.00
1 200 45 90 140 5.89
2 300 40 120 260 4.28
3 400 35 140 400 3.43
4 500 30 150 550 2.91
5 640 25 160 710 2.55
6 800 20 160 870 2.30
7 700 20 140 1010 2.13
8 400 20 80 1090 2.05
9 200 20 40 1130 2.01
10 100 20 20 1150 1.99
















AS % OF 
HIS COST
0 100 — —  ■ 10.00 10.00 — — 0
1 200 + 100 5.50 5.89 .39 7
2 300 + 50 3.73 4.28 .55 13
3 400 + 33 2.78 3.43 .65 19
4 500 + 25 2.22 2.91 .69 24
5 640 + 28 1.78 2.55 .77 30
6 800 + 25 1.49 2.30 .81 35
7 700 - 13 1.31 2.13 .82 38
8 400 - 43 1.24 2.05 .81 40
9 200 - 50 1.20 2.01 .81 40
10 100 - 50 1.19 1.99 .80 40
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cycle could expect higher profitability, as the cost 
advantage grows. |
The quantitative analysis of the experience curve 
has so far assumed that each competitor’s experience 
curve has the same slope; that is, each competitor is 
equally able to translate experience into lower cost. 
Certainly, at first glance, the assumption does not 
appear to be valid. Some firms prosper while others go 
bankrupt. However, consider the long-run implications of 
differences in the slope of the experience curve from 
Figure 3-10.
FIGURE 3-10.






Firm B has an experience curve with a greater slope 
than that of Firm A. Therefore, for any level of 
experience, B ’s costs would be lower than A’s costs. For 
a non-differentiable product in a perfectly competitive 
market, the price would tend to follow the path of the 
lowest cost producer’s costs and eventually A would find 
itself unprofitable. Given the different slopes of the 
experience curves, the only way A’s costs could be 
competitive with B’s costs is if A could increase its 
cumulative volume faster that B. In other words, A would 
have to increase continuously its market share to make up 
for its slower rate of cost reduction. Obviously such a 
plan would be difficult to sustain, particularly as A’s 
market share becomes larger.
What are A’s realistic options if initially 
confronted with the conditions of Figure 3-6, i.e. a 
lower slope on their experience curve? Certainly the most 
obvious is to copy the conditions that allow B to be more 
successful. That would include attempting to duplicate 
B’s manufacturing process, scale size and techniques, 
plant locations and labor conditions, product design and 
engineering, distribution systems, research and 
management organizations and all other factors that 
combine into total unit cost of product sold. Methods to 
achieve such a goal ethically, might include hiring away 
key employees familiar with B’s operation and methods, 
studying all public information regarding B’s operations, 
such as patent applications and performing ”reverse
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engineering” on its product. Most importantly, A would 
need an organization, at least as competent as B’s, in 
finding future ways to reduce cost. Such a plan is 
nothing more than a commitment by management to get and 
stay competitive. As the Boston Consulting Group (1968:1) 
says,
”Any failure...to relate any one of (the) cost 
elements (required to deliver the product to 
the ultimate consumer) properly to the others 
will have a degrading effect on the cost 
performance in serving the end user. This may 
be why the experience curve works as it weeds 
out everyone who has not used the optimum 
combination of cost elements compared to his 
competitors combinations.”
What is the effect when competitors start in 
business at different times? Clearly, a late entrant’s 
costs are above those of a competitor who has already 
accumulated experience. Total unit costs are determined 
by organization coordination and learning as well as 
scale effects, capacity utilization and many other 
factors besides simple know-how and technology. However, 
the last entrant’s costs are not necessarily as high as 
the first producer’s costs initially. The late entrant’s 
starting costs will be a function of his ability to 
combine the knowledge gained so far by his competitors
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with the current technology of production. For example, 
let us consider the conditions assumed in Figure 3-11, 
namely, the first producer has a starting cost of $10 per 
unit in year 0 and the late entrant's starting cost is 
$6.72 per unit in year 2 is 50% more than the first 
producer's cost that year. Both competitors' sales grow 
at a rate of 50% per year.
FIGURE 3-11. LATE ENTRY'S EFFECT ON THE UNIT COST 














0 100 100 0 0 10.00 ——
1 150 250 0 0 6.24 ——
2 225 475 100 100 4.48 6.72
3 338 813 150 250 3.40 4.19
4 506 1319 225 475 2.65 3.01
5 759 2078 338 813 2.10 2.28
6 1139 3217 506 1319 1.68 1.78
7 1708 4925 759 2078 1.35 1.41
8 2563 7488 1139 3217 1.09 1.12
9 3844 11332 1708 4925 .88 .90
10 5767 17099 2563 7488 .71 .73
The calculation of unit costs indicates that the 
late entrant's costs will eventually catch the first
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producer's costs. The ratio of approach is dependent on 
how fast sales grow and the late entrant's starting cost, 
assuming market shares are constant. The faster the 
growth rate in sales, the quicker the approach. The lower 
the late entrant's starting cost, the quicker the cost's 
approach.
I The strategic implications of the experience curve 
are again clearT^tost reduction knowledge^ gained any way 
other than through (Individual experience is very valuable 
to the (^late entrant) and very -^c„ostly ^ Jfor the first 
producer if he wishes to maintain a significant cost 
advantage. Hence any firm developing a new product could 
wisely invest significant sums in protecting its 
proprietary secrets and potential competitors could 
wisely invest significant sums in discovering those 
proprietary secrets, particularly when the product growth 
rate is high.
Criticisms of the experience curve
Criticism of the experience curve is basically of 
four types;
1. Simplistic criticisms caused by 
misunderstandings of the concept as 
presented by BCG.
2. Organization arguments that basically
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imply that, following the implications of 
the experience curve, poisons the firm's 
ability to accomplish rapid rates of 
product innovation and improvement in 
product performance.
3. Arguments that contend that even if the 
experience curve phenomenon is real, it is 
no longer useful in the "era of slow 
growth."
4. Very recent criticism by some economists 
arguing that the experience curve does not 
exist.
We will explore each of these criticisms, briefly in the 
case of the first three; the fourth in some detail.
The first criticism —  simplistic misunderstanding 
is perhaps best put forward in the following quote by 
Kiechel (1981:139)
"the sweeping downward arc of the experience 
curve hung like a guiding constellation over 
the business landscape of the 1970's...It was 
the curve that tied together (the notion that 
market share was important or that being 
low-cost producer conferred special benefits) 
with ineluctable logic. The news for the
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1 9 8 0 ' s . . . is that the curve is being consigned 
to a much reduced place in the firmament, of 
strategic concepts. With it is going a good bit 
of the importance originally attached to market 
share."
The reasons for the decline, as cited by Kiechel, are 
related to the firm's difficulty in executing a strategy 
of increasing share.
Some firms attempted to cut prices in the hope of 
picking up share. The predictable result was a price war 
they found unpleasant. Clearly, though, if the benefits 
of high market share are as attractive as BCG portrays, 
it should not be surprising that a significant investment 
of resources would be required. Perhaps such firms had 
too short a time horizon or insufficient commitment to 
the battle.
Other firms found that getting costs to proceed down 
the experience curve was no easy matter. It required 
constant management attention, pursuing new technologies, 
pruning inefficient and/or superfluous functions and 
people, and adding new and expensive capacity to grow 
with both the market and the increasing share. These 
findings are exactly consistent with BCG's projections. 
Perhaps such firms did not really understand the 
implications of the decision to increase share or they 
misread the size of the financial investment required.
Worst of all, some firms, who were successful in
\
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dominating their market and were anticipating the 
rewards, found their customers ready to switch to cheaper 
substitutes as they developed. Clearly, such firms erred 
in their forecast of the product life cycle —  they only 
waited too late to raise prices and reap their reward.
The conclusion has to be that for a firm to be happy 
with the results of employing the strategy implied by the 
experience curve it must have a long-term horizon, it 
must be accurate in its prediction of the product life 
cycle, and it must have both the financial resource and 
the internal commitment to use them to win the war.
Organizational theorists have criticized a cost 
minimization strategy (i.e. an expanding market share 
strategy) on the grounds that an organization geared 
toward reducing cost has a reduced ability to make 
innovative changes in their products and a reduced 
ability to respond to those introduced by competitors. 
Peters and Waterman (1982:157) found that "excellent" 
companies seem to focus especially on the revenue 
generating side through commitment to quality, 
reliability or service; not necessarily desiring to be 
low cost producer. In further support of this criticism 
Abernathy and Wayne (1974) cite the early days of the 
Ford Motor Company.
In 1 9 0 9, Ford consolidated its production line to 
the Model T, an open-bodied touring car. At that time, 
the list price of a Model T was about $3100, expressed in 
1958 dollars. Thereafter Ford followed almost
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singlemindedly a cost minimization strategy for the Model 
T, even to the point of opening coal mines and rubber 
plantations for backward integration. By 1925, the list 
price of the Model T was under $900, again expressed in 
1958 dollars. However, unit sales had peaked in 1923 as 
consumer demand shifted to a heavier, more comfortable, 
closed-body car. Thereafter, Ford never recovered its 
dominance. Ford, unbeatable at making one product 
efficiently, was vulnerable to GM's strategy of quality 
and superior performance.
Abernathy and Wayne (1970) contend that Ford's 
problems originated from the fact "product innovation is 
the enemy of cost efficiency, and vice versa". They see 
two ways to limit the damage;
"One is to maintain efforts to continue 
development of existing high-volume product 
lines. This requires setting the industry pace 
in periodically inaugurating major product 
changes while stressing cost reduction via the 
learning curve between model changes."
"The second course of action is to take a 
decentralized approach in which separate 
organizations or plants in the corporate 
framework adopt different strategies within the 
same line of business."
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IBM is cited as an example of the former strategy and 
DuPont, an example of the latter.
This criticism is not one that directly challenges 
the existence or usefulness of the experience curve. In 
fact, if anything it supports it. However, if the 
contention is true that organizations are incapable of 
coping with cost reduction and innovation simultaneously, 
then further work is needed;
* Either organizational research must be 
undertaken to eliminate the conflict between 
cost reduction and innovation, or if 
unsuccessful.
* Corporate strategies must attempt to 
quantify the innovation penalty into the 
rewards of lower cost positions, perhaps 
through the tool of the product life cycle.
This thesis ignores this criticism of the experience 
curve, essentially because the contention is 
controversial and even if proven, the effect could be 
incorporated into the model proposed in this thesis.
The third type of criticism, while not challenging 
the existence of the experience curve, argues that its 
importance is drastically reduced in the current "era of 
slow growth". This criticism, as reported by Kiechel 
(1981;146), is attributed to Alan Zakon, then head of the
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Boston Consulting Group. This criticism can be challenged 
on at least four fronts. First, it can be argued that the 
slow growth of the last decade experienced by the 
industrialized economics is cyclical rather than 
structural, along the lines proposed long ago by
Kondratieff (1935), and interest in the experience curve 
will again revive with the economy. Second, it can be
argued that even if business is now destined to grow at a
slower pace, capital investment decisions will by their 
very nature have to be made in those business segments 
that do show significant growth. Therefore, the 
experience curve is still useful in capital budgeting 
even if it has become less important in guiding operating 
decisions.* Third, from the standpoint of model building, 
it can be argued that if the experience curve is
generally thought to exist, it should be included in the 
model's assumptions because as Cohen and Cyert 
(1975:18-19) say
"...assumptions characterize the type of world
to which the model is intended to apply. It is
*Hammermesh and Silk (1979) give ground rules for 
managing low growth businesses which include 
concentrating on growth segments, being innovative and 
quality oriented and being attentive to all cost 
reduction opportunities.
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important to realize that the assumptions need 
not be exact representations of reality, but 
they may instead be reasonable abstractions of 
reality."
Fourth, it can be argued that including the experience 
curve effect in any model measuring the financial
attractiveness of investments in SBU's is no less 
important in times of slow growth than is including the 
concept of discounting cash flows in times of low 
interest rates.
The final, and most important, criticism of
experience curves challenges their very existence. Hart's 
(1983:96) position can be summarized as follows:
"Published evidence for their (i.e. experience 
curve) existence is not always convincing. Even 
if they do exist, they are merely mongrel 
relationships reflecting many economic forces
including technical progress and economies of 
scale in addition to 'learning' or 
'experience'."
Hart's point is primarily based on a comparison of the 
costs of generating electricity in the U.S. versus the 
U.K. for the period 1943-68. He compared a time series 
estimate of costs based on the experience curve with 
cross-section estimates of the effects of size of
-118-
generating plant together with estimates of technical 
progress obtained by stratifying the cross-sections by 
age of plant. Hart (1983:101) found that at least 92% of 
the decline in cost could be explained by scale and 
technical progress leaving as he says, "little left for 
'experience* or 'learning* to contribute."
Hall and Howell (1983) attack the economic 
underpinnings of the experience curve on a number of 
fronts. For example, using BCG's data for Japanese beer 
and integrated circuits, they found that when relating 
price to cumulative output through the experience curve 
they got an R2 of 0.97 and 0.93 respectively, but when 
they related price to current output instead of 
cumulative output, R2 was 0.98 and 0.92 respectively. 
As Hall and Howell say, "Clearly on this evidence there 
is nothing to choose between the effect of accumulated 
and current output." They also offer reasons why other 
investigators found that statistical evidence supports a 
relationship between cumulative volume and cost. However, 
the explanations they suggest make the correlation 
spurious. For example, they say that using cumulative 
volumes as the independent variable damps the data due to 
high autocorrelation of successive points. Also they 
claim the accounting life of assets is significantly 
understated when compared to economic life, guaranteeing 
a cost decline over time. Hall and Howell (1983:26) 
summarize their criticism as follows:
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"...establishing a statistical relationship... 
between, costs and accumulated output will not 
in itself prove useful. If the reason lies in 
economies of scale, potential entrants and 
established firms alike would be faced with 
decisions concerning the outcome of complex 
game-theoretic situations. Technological 
progress, on the other hand, may in certain 
circumstances ease entry... Learning-by-doing 
will serve as a barrier to the extent that 
experience is non-transferable through the 
market for human capital."
If the experience curve is truly a "mongrel" 
relationship and costs can decline markedly without 
accumulating volume, the implications for the model 
proposed in this thesis are major. Basically, the value 
of early and continued market share leadership would be 
drastically reduced, contrary to the portfolio matrices, 
the PIMS studies, and even traditional microeconomic 
theory assuming a downward sloping L-shaped long-run 
average cost curve.
This thesis elects to assume the existence of the 
experience curve, as described by BCG. The reasons 
include a preponderance of use and popularity within the 
business community, and the fact that the criticisms of 
the existence of the experience curve are very recent and 
have not as yet been fully debated in academic circles.
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Even Hall and Howell (1983:27) recognize the usefulness 
of the experience curve to business as a self-fulfilling 
prophesy :
"Vague notions of the benefits from experience 
have strong intuitive appeal, whilst graphs 
depicting accumulated data provide an apparent 
validity. Thus motivated to reduce costs the 
management of a firm riddled with inefficiency 
will usually achieve success."
Adjustments to the model, as proposed in this thesis, 
that would be required if the experience curve is really 
no more than economies of scale must logically await the 
description of another tool; i.e. limit pricing and a 
full description of the model. Such adjustments will be 




Conventional microeconomics clearly shows that 
monopolists and oligopolistics can make more than 
economic profit in any business if they can artificially 
restrict the quantity of product produced and thereby 
charge a price greater than their marginal cost. See for 
example Samuelson (1980). It follows logically that the 
financial attractiveness of investing in any particular 
business unit must be a function of whether the firm will 
have Ca^solute/^ monopoly power) the reduced power of 
oligopoly or fully face the market in pure competition. 
Strategic planners, particularly the Boston Consulting 
Group, implicitly recognize the importance of market 
share, as a surrogate for monopoly power, in determining
business attractiveness. ^Limlt pricing is the tool of
microeconomics that allows the firm to control orrlimlt ^  
the expansion plans of its competitors through its 
pricing strategy. If (successfulj the firm may have the 
ability to control itsjde^ree .of monopoly- power over the 
product's life cycle. The first goal of this section is 
to qualitatively discuss the mechanism of limit pricing 
for both smàll and large scale competitive threats to the 
firm. The second goal is to describe the effects of the 
experience curve on limit pricing and to review the 
complication of multiple competitors to limit pricing 
theory. A more detailed and quantitative discussion is 
reserved, for sake of readability, to Appendix 1. Much of 
the material reviewed is from Scherer's (1980) work on 
industrial market structure and economic performance.
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If a firm has dominance in a particular market, 
either as a result of new product invention or as result 
of past good fortune, it may lose that dominance in 
either of two ways. If the firm's market share is less 
than 100%, so that other small scale or "fringe"
competitors currently exist, those fringe competitors or 
other similar potential small scale competitors may 
choose to enter the market or expand their market share, 
if the economics are attractive. In this case, such 
competitors would likely view the dominant firm's price
as a^  give^, and would proceed to produce to the point 
where the (price equals their marginal cost. They can
reasonably assume their influence on price will be
negligible because their output is small by definition 
when compared to the total market. A second threat to the 
dominant market position of the firm comes from potential 
j' competitors entering on a large scale). In this case, it 
.is reasonable to assume that a firm considering a large
scale entry has reason to fear that its output can only
"  - -  — ' ' - ' - - - - • • -. • • -., ,. ■ . -. .
be absorbed^ by.-the market if the price,)rfÆi.ll^  that
_cur:reiitl_y_ set_by_the dominant firm. Let's look at how the 
dominant firm can price so as to discourage both types of 
threats.
Small scale competitive threats
By definition, small scale or fringe competitors 
view the dominant firm's price as fa given^ The problem 
for the dominant firm is to choose the best price, from
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its own perspective, considering the likely output of the 
competitive fringe at whatever price set. Obviously, if 
the firm sets a priee below the fringe ' s mi-nimum-man^xnal™
cost, the fringe will supply nil, and the dominant firm ^
will capture the entire demand. Similarly, at a
sufficiently high price the entire market demand will be 
supplied by the fringe leaving nil for the firm.
Assume the firm announces a price between those two 
extremes, in fact a price that equates Its marginal 
revenue with its marginal cost to yield short run 
maximized profit. What effect will such a price have on 
the expansion plans of fringe competitors? The answer 
must be a function of where the announced price falls
with respect to the fringe competitors'Qaverage total 
cost. If the ' price is_iahe^Lthe„frJJ!£e_wiLl_hja.v 
e^nomic. 1 no en tiv^- tc^ex pa nd. If (below^_ ho expansion will 
occur. The limit price, that is the price that limits 
small scale competitors'expansion, is simply the price 
that equals the average total cost of the fringe. \ /
Generally, this limit price can be expected to be 
below the firm's short run profit maximizing p ^  . -The 
decision the dominant firm faces is either higher short
run profits, declining over time as market share is
eroded by fring e expLans-ion, or lower limit pricing
profits remaining constant over time as market share is 
maintained. Both assuming cost functions remain unvarying
over time, i.e., no experience curve effect. The proper
'  ^
solution to this dilemma depends upon thëCdiscount rate
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applied to the firm's cash flow alternatives and the rate 
at which the competitive fringe will expand output at the 
dominant firm's short run profit maximizing price.
Large, scale competitive threats
The second threat to a dominant firm's market share 
is the threat of large scale entry. A competitor 
considering entering the market on a large scale must 
reasonably assume that his incremental output will affect
the market prj^ e, unless he believes that the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic group will reduce their 
output sufficiently to "make room" for the new entrant.
Bain (1956), a pioneer in limit pricing theory.
considers that the most likely assumption of the
^potential large scale entrant will be that (Established 
^Ti^s will \ main1râiîr)productlon in the face of new. large
scale entry. This reaction by established producers.
while _1 o w e r in g _ praflts_l!^or- 611- -c omp el It o ^ , may be useful 
in discouraging other large scale entry and would result
in _lower unit costs of production,, though not higher
profits, by operating at)designed capacity, instead of 
sub St ant i a 11 y 1 e s s tha n_,oa p a cl t y.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the 
new large scale entrant can produce the product at the 
same unit cost as the dominant firm. What other factors 
may discourage large scale entry? Clearly the new 
entrant, with competitive costs, must be concerned that
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his output will drive the market price below a level that 
makes his investment in the business attractive. If that 
occurs, the new entrant will also have destroyed the 
profit potential of the market for the dominant firm —  
by analogy, murder and suicide. The factors that 
influence how low the market price will fall, assuming 
output maintenance by established producers and equal 
cost functions, are the degree of elasticity of market 
demand and the relative amount of incremental production 
required by the new entrant to operate at competitive 
cost. As Scherer (1980:244-45) quantifies , if the 
elasticity of demand is 1.0 and the incremental output 
required to be cost competitive is assumed to be 10% of 
previous market demand, then the price will fall about 
9%. With the same elasticity on a required incremental 
output of 5%, the price will fall only about 4.5%. Should 
the required incremental output be 10% but elasticity 
becomes 5.0 instead of 1.0, the price will fall only 
about 2%. As a rule, the smaller the minimum, efficient 
operating scale, i.e. the smaller the incremental output 
required to reach competitive cost, and the higher the 
elasticity of demand, i.e. the more willingly the market 
absorbs an increment of production without a large 
decline in price, then the less the dominant producer can 
safely hold the price above the competitive cost, without 
attracting large scale entry.
Therefore, to prevent large scale entry the dominant 
firm must set a price at the potential large scale
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entrant's minimum total cost plus an amount slightly less
t j ^  the amount the.markejL-price will fall if entry does
occur. Such a strategy will effectively remove the
financial incentive of the potential large scale 
entrant.
Perhaps the world is not as predictable as just 
described. Wouldn't the established producers really make 
some accommodation with the new entrant on volume and 
prices once new entry had occurred? Surely, such 
accommodation would result in higher profits for all 
producers, particularly when it is realized that the new 
entrant will not be forced to withdraw from the market 
due to low accounting earnings once his investment 
expenditures are made and his fixed costs incurred. And, 
similarly, would the dominant firm really have to set a 
price at the limit price described? Surely, he would 
maximize profits in the short run and at the first hint 
of interest in the market by a potential large scale 
competitor, drop prices to the limit price level or 
perhaps below to "show the flag". The real answer 
probably can not be determined analytically from 
economics alone. Competitive actions and reactions are 
also determined by the ability of the players to 
effectively use the bluff and counter bluff of business 
brinksmanship.
Is the potential new entrant really discouraged by a 
price based on the assumption that established producers
will maintain output? The new entrant can clearly show
\
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that logically, if he enters, the established producers 
will be better off if they recognize their oligopolistic 
interdependence with the new entrant and treat him as a 
member of the "club". A deterrent that cannot be believed 
cannot deter entry I The potential new entrant must assume 
that the established producers will act irrationally,
i.e. not in their own best interest, to be effectively 
deterred from entering the market at the calculated limit 
price. An established producer can go a long way toward 
making the limit price a believable deterrent to the new 
entrant if he "rattles the sabres" by cultivating the 
impression that he will act irrationally or that events 
will get out of control and price discipline will break 
down. An occasional new entrant will call that bluff and 
an established producer must be prepared to act 
"irrationally" occasionally if such a threat is to be 
believed by other or future large scale new entrants. In 
support, Cassady (1963) found that irrational reaction by 
established sellers to new entry was a common cause of 
destructive price wars.
Could established producers hold the price at the 
short-run profit maximizing level and reduce it to the 
Bain's limit price when a potential new entrant began to 
show interest in the market? He probably could, but it 
would be a dangerous and high risk strategy. Bain 
(1956:95) explained a reason that the established 
producers would stick with a lower limit price instead of 
a higher short-run profit maximizing price as follows:
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"The (potential large scale new) entrant is 
likely to read the current price policies of 
established firms as some sort of a 'statement 
of future intentions' regarding their policies 
after his entry has occurred."
In other words, the higher price is very risky, because a 
mistake of intentions might be made. Such a mistake would 
be disastrous for both established producers and the new 
entrant. Recall the murder-suicide analogy.
Another argument against "showing the flag" on price 
when a potential new entrant's interest level rises is 
that even with a multi-year lag in building and equipping 
new production facilities, competitive surveillance may 
not discover a new entrant's interest in time to bluff 
him into cancelling his plans. Certain of the potential 
new entrant's management team would undoubtedly "lose 
face" in such a retreat and under such circumstances 
could not be counted on to act rationally. Again a 
mistake would be disastrous. Finally if the price 
were held above the Bain's limit price, with the 
intention of "showing the flag" when needed, the price 
may be sufficient to cause new entry into or expansion of 
the fringe, or high cost, competitors.
As Scherer (1980:247-48) summarizes, protecting 
market share with pricing policy requires a two-pronged 
strategy of deterrence.
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"Existing sellers hold down the price and 
increase output just enough to deter 
inefficiently small entry and fringe rival 
expansion or to optimize the rate of entry...
(And) on the other hand, implicit or explicit 
threats of price warfare are brandished to 
deter entry at large, relatively efficient 
scales."
Effects of the experience curve on limit pricing
An extremely important consideration is the effect 
the Boston Consulting Group's experience curve has on the 
strategic implications of limit pricing. All previous 
discussion on setting a limit price to deter both fringe 
and large scale erosion of market share assumed that the 
cost functions of both the dominant firm and new and 
potential entrants were static over time. In fact, the 
effect of the experience curve is that relative costs 
depend on total accumulated production volume. And, if a 
limit pricing strategy is (Successful' in deterring
expansion, the /dominant firm's experience) will grow 
faster than his competitors. The dominant firm's ^ ost 
advantage will grow and the rewards of a limit pricing 
-P^Xicy_j^ill increase__over- time.
With respect to small scale competitors, if the 
firm's limit pricing strategy is effective the fringe
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will not expand and their cumulative production 
experience will grow linearly with time. If total demand 
is growing, the share supplied by the fringe will decline 
with time. Using the experience curve effect, the firm's 
costs will decline faster than that of the fringe and the 
firm's spread between the price required to limit fringe 
expansion and its cost will grow over time, thus 
magnifying earnings.
With respect to potential large scale competitors, 
if the firm's limit pricing strategy is effective the 
potential competitor will never enter the market^ 
competitor's cost is truly a function of his cumulative 
volume, then the limit price will remain constant over
time since the competitors' cost does not decline. The 
firm will see its margin and earnings growing quickly as 
costs fall and the limit price remains constant.
Perhaps a more reasonable case would allow for 
declining limit prices over time. Such would assume the 
potential large scale competitor's entry cost would fall 
over time even without actual production experience as a 
result of knowledge "leaks" out of the firm such as that 
with employee turnover, patent expiration, success at 
reverse engineering, etc. If so, the firm's margin and 
earnings would not grow as quickly as initially thought 
due to the falling limit price required to discourage 
large scale competitive entry.
Clearly, the effect of the experience curve on limit 
pricing are large and the implications for strategic
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planning are monumental. As Scherer (1980:251) 
summarizes :
"It is conceivable that when learning-by-doing 
economics (i.e. experience curves) are 
important the capturing of an initial advantage 
by some company could set in motion a dynamic 
process that ends with the relevant product 
line more or less permanently monopolized."
When we integrate the capital investment decision 
process, i.e. net present value, into a limit pricing 
strategy, it becomes clear that the firm can control 
competitors* expansion plans, and therefore market share, 
if:
1. The firm understands how competitors view 
the future of the market, and
2. The firm prices appropriately, and
3. Competition understands the implications of 
the firm's pricing policy and acts 
rationally.
Competitors future expansion plans are determined as 
the firms are, by the financial attractiveness of the 
business investment proposed. Expected financial 
attractiveness is a function of the competitors' :
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1. Sales volume over time, which is determined
by his forecast of the industry product
life cycle and his market share.
2. Cost of sales over time, which is
determined by his initial cost position and 
his forecast of sales volume from (1)
above, which determines progress down the
experience curve.
3. Sales revenue over time, which is
determined by his forecast of sales volume 
from (1) above and market price.
4. Investment requirements.
5. His cost of capital.
If the firm sets the price, and sets a price policy
for future prices, that just makes the net present value 
of the competitors proposed expansion equal zero, then 
the competitor would have no financial incentive to 
expand. The competitors' market share would decline over 
time as the firm continues to expand and as competing 
production facilities wear out or become obsolete. The 
firm might accomplish the same goal, i.e., no further 
competitive expansion, at a higher price, considering 
competitors capital rationing situation. Under capital
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rationing competitors would be unable to accept all 
positive net present value investment. Ideally then, if 
the firm knew all its competitors capital investment 
proposals and their resource availability, the firm could 
set a price higher than that which would yield zero net 
present value to competitors and still have the 
investment rejected by his management. Such a plan, while 
risky, might be a reasonable gamble, because any increase 
in market price that does not result in a deterioration 
of market share increases the net present value of the 
business to the firm.
The firm may wish to control its competitors actions 
in two other ways. The firm may wish to accelerate a 
competitor's progress toward zero market share, or the 
firm may wish competitors to maintain constant market 
share over time. Again, both results may be accomplished 
if the firm prices correctly and effectively use the 
"bluff" of business brinksmanship.
How can the firm encourage competitors to shut down 
existing production facilities? Clearly, the answer, as 
John D. Rockefeller demonstrated with his Standard Oil 
Trust, is low current prices and the expectation of 
continual low prices. If prices are so low that sales 
revenue is below cash operating expenses and such
conditions are expected to persist, competing production 
facilities will be shut down. If prices are so set by a
dominant firm with the intention of harming smaller
competitors, then such predatory pricing has been
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declared illegal in the United States and many other 
Western industrial countries. It is however conceivable 
that the same effects might be accomplished without 
running afoul of antitrust laws. First, in a growing 
business, where experience curve effects are important, 
each production facility will likely have slightly 
different costs. Undoubtedly, the newest facility will 
have the lowest cost because it incorporates newer lower 
cost technology, and older facilities will have higher 
costs. Therefore a certain given low price will 
"pick-off" only the oldest, least efficient facility not 
the whole business of a competitor, assuming he is a 
multi-plant operator. Second, the observed result of 
predatory pricing that was found socially objectionable 
was the fact that prices were raised to monopoly levels
once the competition was destroyed by predatory pricing.
Again, early in the product life cycle, where market 
share gains are most worthwhile, cost can be expected to 
fall dramatically thus disguising the price effects of 
more monopoly power. The key to getting a competitor to 
shut down a production facility is to convince him that 
the lower prices are permanent, at least as long as that 
facility remains in production.
How can we encourage a competitor to maintain 
constant market share over time? In a growing market a
competitor must find expansion financially attractive to 
maintain market share. How can we price to give him
positive present value, but still discourage him from
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trying to gain market share? The answer must lie in
developing a feeling by the competitor that he is a 
member of the "club" supplemented by a believable threat 
of punishment if he upsets established relationships.
The multi-competitor ease
So far, all discussion involved at most one other 
competitor. More generally, there are multiple viable 
competitors in each business. Multiple competitors tend 
to make business relationships more unstable. The
instability makes the calculation of the benefit to the 
firm of investing in a business much more dependent on 
accurate estimates of how each competitor will react to 
the firm's strategic moves.
Recall, a main assumption of the limit pricing 
theory as so far discussed was that the firm could
control the actions of its competitors by proper pricing.
When the firm developed a new product it could set prices 
to discourage other competitors from entering the market. 
And when the firm attempted to increase share, it set 
prices low enough to discourage the competitor's 
expansion or encourage his withdrawal from the market. 
Such pricing strategies can logically be calculated from 
a knowledge of the competitor's economics and the 
application of net present value techniques. However, 
when there are multiple competitors, it is likely they 
will have different economics and one price strategy will
-137-
not affect all competitors the same.
Figure 3-12, below, shows the general case 
of multiple competitors. Points on the Price/Cost axis
A^t Cg, and Cc represent the cost for Firm A, B, 
and C, respectively, and point Pq represent the price 
in effect at that point in time as related to Firm A*s 
cost. The unit profit margin, before tax, can be read as








the difference between price and cost on the graph as:
-FIRM UNIT PROFIT MARGIN
A 0^ - C&
® 0^ - Cg
^0 • CcC
Firm A ’s profit margin is relatively large, B»s is 
relatively small, and C*s is small and negative. Assuming 
Firm A is the price leader and all firms view the market 
as Firm A does, what message would such a pricing policy 
by- A give to firms B and C? If Firm C expected the price 
to continue to follow the price line shown in Figure
3-12, and he could not justify an investment in increased 
market share, his loss position would discourage him from 
any expansion and would eventually guarantee his 
withdrawal from the market. Firm C’s loss of market share 
would be taken up by either Firm A or B. However, Firm 
B*s small profit margin might not be sufficient to 
justify an expansion of market share and Firm A may not 
wish to expand its share or it fears antitrust or other 
problems if it further dominates the market.
If Firm A raises the price from Pq to P.|, as 
shown in Figure 3-13, on the next page, it will give a 
profit margin to Firm C, calculated to encourage him to 
expand with the market and maintain his market share. 
Firm B, however, will now have a large profit margin and 
may be encouraged to attempt to increase his market
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share. Firm A must be willing to give up market share to 
Firm B to keep Firm C growing with the market. Firm A may 
be unwilling to lose share, particularly if he felt his 
market share was financially optimum. Clearly, Firm A*s 
control over price may not be enough to control the 
actions of all competitors, without further strategic 
moves.
Note from Figure 3-13 that if Firm A raised the
price to from Pq , both Firm A and B would increase
their profit margin and total profit, if demand were
inelastic. If Firm B would not use his increased 









profitability to expand his market share, Firm A’s goal 
of maintaining the current shares of each competitor
could be satisfied, as well as profits increased. How 
could Firm B reasonably be expected to restrain from 
attempting to increase share? The answer may be in what 
the Henderson (1979) calls "business brinksmanship".
Suppose Firm A told Firm B of its goal of maintaining
current market share and the need for higher prices to
keep Firm C in business. Further, suppose Firm A told 
Firm B that if B used its increased profitability to 
attempt to gain market share, A would abandon its goal of
keeping Firm C in the market and would start a price war
to punish B.
Perhaps such a threat would deter B*s expansion, 
perhaps not. In any event, such collusion is clearly 
illegal in most industrialized countries under antitrust 
laws. It is clear though that as the number of
competitors expands, the ability of the market leader to 
control competition deteriorates. The implications for 
this model are important. Without the ability to control 
competition, the calculation of the financial 
attractiveness of investing in an SBU becomes highly 
uncertain, primarily due to speculation about how various 
competitors may react. For that reason, I have elected to 
limit the model to a two participant market—  the firm 
and one competitor.
From the perspective of the firm, though, the 
implication seems clear. Unless the firm can control
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competition over the product life cycle, its ability to 
enjoy monopoly power will be limited and the likelihood 
of price warfare will increase. The value of investing in 
such an SBU, while not exactly calculably, will clearly 
be less than it would otherwise have been. Therefore, it 
seems logical that an SBU with at most one viable 






In Chapter 3, "The Conceptual Framework", I
attempted to show that the tools of the product life 
cycle, the experience curve and limit pricing might be 
useful to develop a model to measure the financial
attractiveness to the firm of investing in current or
potential SBU*s.
This chapter’s goals are to integrate fully those 
tools into a quantitative model and to:
* Outline the "standard" assumptions on which 
this thesis* computerized model operates.
* Define the assumptions used to calculate 
incremental cash flows and net present value.
* Use those assumptions in an abbreviated case 
study to demonstrate the mathematical
relationships of the model.
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INTEGRATION OF THE TOOLS
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It is the contention of this thesis that by 
combining the tools of the product life cycle, the 
experience curve and limit pricing, into the capital 
budgeting framework of discounted incremental cash flows, 
the strategic implications of investing in SBU*s can be 
taken into account and the financial attractiveness of 
such investments can be quantified and therefore ranked.
Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate that
integration is to begin by reviewing the McKinsey 
portfolio matrix. Recall that matrix measures "industry 
attractiveness" horizontally and "business strength" 
vertically* It assumes that an SBU judged "high" along 
each axis, i.e. in the upper left-hand block, is
attractive and therefore the firm should invest in that 
SBU.
Quantitatively, what makes an industry attractive to 
the firm? From the capital budgeting standpoint, profits 
should be high relative to the investment required and 
the industry should have a long remaining life so to 
enjoy those large positive cash flows made possible by
high profits. In simple terms, that means a business
early in its life cycle (i.e. with high growth rates) 
that the firm has the ability to dominate (i.e. the firm 
has a degree of monopoly power perhaps through high 
market share). It also certainly helps to be in a 
business that others find unattractive.
Quantitatively, what measures a firm's business 
strength in particular industry? Basically, it must be
-146-
how efficient it is in bringing the goods or services to 
the market (i.e. the slope of its experience curve 
relative to competition and initial starting positions) 
and how able it is to invest the resources required to 
maintain its monopoly power in its business, if
selected.
Therefore, in a dynamic sense, an SBU is most 
attractive for investment, i.e., extra capacity has a 
high net present value, if:
* It is early in a long product life cycle.
* Competitors find the business unattractive 
and can be discouraged from further
investment by appropriate limit pricing.
* The firm has an initial cost advantage 
through experience and the ability to reduce 
cost with experience at least as quickly as 
competitors.
* The firm must have the resources available
and the commitment to use those resources to 
take and maintain a dominant position.
Conversely, the firm will find an SBU unattractive if 
competition views the market as much more attractive or 
if the firm is unable to become a "world class" level
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competitor in that market, given its starting position in 
the product life cycle and its experience curve slope.
Therefore, this model proposes that the financial 
attractiveness to the firms of investing in a current 
potential SBU is a function of:
1. The firm's estimate of the current position 
in the product life cycle and its forecast 
of the subsequent shape, size and length of 
the remaining product life cycle.
2. The competitor's forecast of the shape,
size, and length of the product life cycle.
3.* The firm's initial cost position on the
experience curve and the rate it can reduce 
cost through experience.
4. The competitor's initial cost position on
its experience curve and the rate it can
reduce cost through experience.
all assuming the firm has the resources available and the 
commitment to use those resources to maintain a dominant 
position in the business throughout its life cycle.
For further work, it is assumed that such resources 
and commitment are available. However, let's consider the 
conditions under which resources may not be available. A
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firm may not invest in an otherwise very attractive 
opportunity if the ultimate size of the market is either 
too large or too small relative to the size of the firm, 
as measured by the firm's forecast of its product life 
cycle. If the market is too large, the resource 
commitment required of the firm to maintain a dominant 
position may exceed its total resources, or may be so 
large relative to its total resources as to make the firm 
unduly risky. If the market is too small, the business by 
definition fails to fit the overall plan of the firm, 
most likely because the potential reward does not merit 
even minimum top management attention. Such 
considerations, while important in determining when 
investment is feasible for the firm, do not directly 
affect the calculation of the financial attractiveness 
of the investment; and are therefore set aside.
At this point, it is appropriate to describe in some 
detail exactly how the tools of the product life cycle, 
the experience curve and limit pricing combine to measure 
the net present value of investment in an SBU. For the 
sake of simplicity assume: (1) only two participants in 
the business, the firm and a competitor; (2) no 
uncertainty about the future; and (3) each competitor is 
motivated solely by net present value. The following 
example is qualitative rather than quantitative. A 
quantitative presentation is given in a subsequent 
subsection entitled, "Model Logic".
Since the model is market-oriented, it must begin
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with both participants* forecasts of the product life 
cycle. Assume it is as shown in Figure 4-1, for both 
participants and that the firm is aware of the
competitor’s estimate.




Naturally, it is possible, even highly likely, that 
both participants* views of the market’s future will vary 
in size, shape, and length. The financial effect of such 
different perceptions of market attractiveness are very 
important and are addressed in the next chapter entitled, 
"Mapping Results’*.
Given a forecast of the product life cycle, the 
current cost position of both participants (assumed to be 
based on each accumulated volume) and a measure of the 
competence of both participants as a competitor (assumed
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to be the slope of each experience curve), it is possible 
to forecast relative cost positions throughout the
product life cycle. Assume that the firm has had a
dominant market share in the past and therefore a lower
current cost than the competitor and the both
participants have experience curves of equal slope as 
shown in Figure 4-2:








Relative cost positions of both participants along 
the path for future cost decline are determined by the 
accumulated volume of each, which is again determined by 
their initial cost position and the relative market share 
over the remaining product life cycle. To proceed, the 
firm must decide how it will manage the business. Its 
options are: gain market share, maintain market share, or
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lose market share. Let's assume the firm selects to gain 
market share, without any consideration yet about whether 
or not that is an optimum or even good strategy. There 
are basically two ways to gain share: either take a 
larger portion of future growing sales by adding capacity 
quicker than the competitor, or taking all sales, current 
and future, by driving the competitor out of the 
business. The former involves discouraging the competitor 
from making investments in additional capacity. The 
latter involves making the economics so unattractive that 
the competitor shuts down his existing plants. Let's 
assume the firm selects to gain market share by taking 
all future sales by discouraging additional investment by 
the competitor, without any consideration yet about 
whether or not that is an optimum or even good strategy.
With those assumptions it is now possible to 
calculate both competitors' costs each year over the 
entire product life cycle as shown in Figures 4-3 and 
4-4, on the next page. Note, because the firm plans to 
increase market share, its costs will always be lower 
than the competitor's and the cost difference will grow 
over time.
How can the firm manage the business so that the 
cost patterns described in Figures 4-3 and 4-4 are 
achieved? Since they were calculated assuming the 
competitor never expands his capacity, the firm must 
price to discourage competitive expansion. In financial


















terms, that means the net present value to the competitor 
must be at most zero. However, recall that such decisions 
are based on incremental cash flows, that is the 
difference between expanding and not expanding. Figure
4 - 4 shows the competitor's cost position is he fails to 
expand. Would it differ if he did expand? Of course! 
Costs would be lower each year with increased market 
share. Are there any other incremental effects? Yes! 
Volume would be clearly higher with increased share and, 
more subtly, since the competitor's cost penalty versus 
the firm would be less, he could also expect a higher 
market price. Figure 4-5 summarizes the incremental 
economics to the competitor:





















Certainly, the competitor's incremental economics favor 
expansion is most cases unless the price is quite low.
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But, at some price, say zero for example, the competitor 
will not find expansion attractive if he believes that 
price will persist.
The theoretically correct price to set to assure the 
cost patterns described in Figures 4-3 and 4-4 is the 
price, or more exactly the price pattern over time, that 
yields the competitor a zero net present value on his 
incremental cash flow. The question of the proper price 
pattern versus a single year's price deserves more 
comment. Given the firm has perfect knowledge about the 
competitor's costs and investment requirements over time, 
there is an infinity of price patterns that will yield 
him zero net present value. As an example, assume the 
competitor's costs* are as shown in Figure 4-6, on the 
next page, and for simplicity there is no investment 
requirement for capacity expansion.
If the price the firm set was exactly the same as 
the competitor's costs, net cash flow would be zero each 
year and at any discount rate net present value would 
also be zero. However, the firm could set a price and 
maintain it constant over the product life cycle as shown 
in Figure 4-7, also on the next page.
*Note costs are incremental based on the difference 
between expanding with the market versus not expanding.
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The location of the constant price line, in this example, 
would depend on the competitor's cost of capital.














Since there is an infinity of possible price
patterns, which shall the firm choose to discourage the
competitor's expansion? I believe the most important 
factor to consider in the selection is to pick that one 
that is most believable and understandable to the
competitor.
Let's consider two possible patterns that would not 
qualify on that basis. Pattern 1, assume, is a very high 
initial price with the expectation that prices decline 
faster than costs. The competition may well see the 
initial high price and disregard the threat of rapidly 
falling prices to justify investment. As Scherer
(1980:247) says,
"the (competitor) is likely to read the current 
price...as some sort of a 'statement of future 
intentions.'"
Thus the strategy might fail to discourage expansion not 
because it has theoretical faults but because it is 
misinterpreted by competition.
Pattern 2, assume, is a very low initial price with 
the expectation that prices will rise as costs falls. The 
competitor may well see the initial low price as nothing 
more than a scare tactic that he can disregard. If the 
competitor understands the experience curve, he will have 
a good estimate of the firm's costs and by comparing that 
to the very low market price he will know the very low
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price can only be temporary and prices must go up. He may 
suspect prices will go high enough to justify expansion. 
As Scherer (1980:246) says,
"the threat...lacks credibility, and threats
that are not credible do not deter."
Again, the strategy may fail to discourage competitors.
What price is most believable and understandable to
the competitor? I am not sure that question c.an be
answered with certainty! It surely depends on the 
psychological make-up of the competitor's top management, 
as well as the firm's past pricing policies that 
condition competitors about what to expect. To proceed
with the model, I do need to make a price pattern
proposal.
In this case I elect to follow the Boston Consulting 
Group's (1968: 8-11) recommendation, that is that prices 
will follow the lowest cost producer's costs, that is, 
prices will be related directly to the firm's costs, 
perhaps by a constant percentage mark-up. However, from 
the competitor's perspective, since the cost differential 
is widening as he loses share, the competitor will see 
gradually declining profit margins over time. That 
pattern is shown in Figures 4-8 and 4-9, on the next 
page. The price pattern makes intuitive sense as well as 
paying the dividend that it would make it difficult to 
prove predatory pricing in an antitrust complaint.
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Capital budgeting decisions are made at discrete 
points in time. To achieve the cost positions originally 
shown in Figure 4-3 and 4-4, the firm must discourage 
competitive expansion at each point in time. Assume 
temporary success! The firm has made the investment 
required to satisfy market growth, the competitor has 
failed to expand, and the firm has increased market 
share. What changes over time? Basically two things; the 
firm's cost advantage over the competitor is larger and 
the product is closer to the end of its life cycle.
Temporary success in discouraging competitive 
investment makes "the job of discouraging him in the 
future easier. New conditions will allow a higher price, 
or more precisely a higher price pattern, because the 
business is basically less attractive to the competitor 
as his cost disadvantage widens and time left to "enjoy" 
the market is shortened. The effect over time on the firm 
is as shown in Figure 4-10, on the next page.
Instead of a market price paralleling the firm's 
cost, prices will gradually diverge from cost, increasing 
the firm's margin. At the limit, just prior to the end of 
the product life cycle, the numbers will indicate the 
competitor will not invest even at extremely high prices. 
However, the market price cannot go to extremely high 
levels in practice due to competition from substitute
products. As shown in Figure 4-11, on the second
following page, at some point the firm will have
established an unchallengeable position with respect to
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FIGURE 4-10. ACTUAL PRICE/COST PATTERN WITH SUCCESS 









the competitor and the only restraint on prices will come 
from the cost-in-use of those substitute products.
Early in this section, it was assumed that the 
strategy to follow was to expand market share by 
discouraging competitive investment. The model is now 
able to calculate the financial attractiveness of that 
strategy to the firm by calculating the net present value 
of the incremental cash flows of expanding share as
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proposed versus not expanding share, calculated in a 
similar manner. This net present value can then be 
compared with the best strategy for the firm to follow in 
this SBU. If gaining share is a good strategy, the firm 
might then test if it yields superior results to set 
prices to drive the competitor out of the business.
The capital budgeting decision has been fully 
integrated into the strategic decision in the sense that 
any decision to acquire assets or not to, can now be 
considered directly as a decision to increase or maintain 
share or perhaps to let share fall.
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MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND LOGIC
-163-
The previous section, "Integration of the Tools", 
showed in a qualitative way how the tools of the product 
life cycle, the experience curve and limit pricing can be 
combined to quantify the benefits to the firm of a change 
in its strategy for the management of an SBU. Recall, the 
essence of a strategy for the management of an SBU 
involves a decision regarding adjustments to the firm's 
market share. Since adjustments to market share obviously 
have capital budgeting implications, then if handled 
correctly, strategic planning and capital budgeting 
theory are fully integrated in the model, and the firm is 
able to determine how each SBU should be managed and how 
"profitable" (as measured by net present value) that 
management strategy will be.
The goal of this section is to (1) quantify the 
model by defining the "standard" assumptions used 
regarding the product life cycle, the experience curve 
and limit pricing, (2) to define the assumptions used to 
calculate incremental cash flows and net present value, 
and (3) to demonstrate the model's logic by a simplified 
example.
Naturally results will be heavily influenced by the 
"standard" assumption made about the product life cycle, 
the experience curve and limit pricing, as well as the 
many assumptions made in the quantitative model about the 
calculation of incremental cash flows and net present 
value. It is therefore not the contention of this thesis 
that the quantitative output of this model is universally
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applicable to real world business conditions. It is 
however applicable to the "standard" assumptions made; 
and it is most definitely a theoretical framework in 
which real world assumptions particular to each firm, its 
product, its competition and its technology can be input 
to yield meaningful measures of the financial 
attractiveness of further investment in (or adjustment to 
the market share of) existing or potential SBU*s.
To understand the model output and its implications, 
as described in the next chapter, it is important to 
understand the input to the model —  both the "standard" 
assumptions on product life cycle, the experience curve 
and limit pricing, and the many assumptions required to 
calculate incremental cash flows and net present value.
"Standard" assumptions
To proceed, the firm must understand its market and 
be able to define the product life cycle over time as a 
function of market price. Normally, the product life 
cycle will be bell-shaped and will include a declining 
phase as well as an ascending and maturity phase. For 
computational simplicity, I have elected an ever 
ascending product life cycle of twenty years length, 
declining to zero after year twenty. Such a sales pattern 
is essentially one-half of a stylized triangular product 
life cycle. Importantly, a product life cycle without a 
declining phase will allow me to test the investment 
recommendations of the Boston Consulting Group's growth -
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share matrix, which as described by BCG allows for no 
declining sales. Figure 4-12 defines the assumed product 
life, cycle for the purpose of this model. Naturally any 
length, size and shape product life cycle could be 
substituted to represent real world conditions.












For clarity. Figure 4-13, on the next page, lists in 
tabular form the product life cycle portrayed graphically 
in Figure 4-12.
The firm must also understand how its competition 
views its market. The logical way to proceed would be for 
the firm to define exactly how it believes competition 
sees the market in terras of length, size and shape.





ANNUAL SALES ANNUAL SALES
YEAR VOLUME . YpAP VOLUME
1 100 11 1100
2 200 12 1200
3 300 13 1300
4 400 14 1400
5 500 15 1500
6 600 16 1600
7 700 17 1700
8 800 18 1800
9 900 19 1900
10 1000 20 2000
Naturally, competition may view the market as
substantially different than the firm in terms of length
and/or size and/or shape . As we shall see quantitatively
later, such differences significantly effect the firm's
economics.
For modelling purposes, I have elected to treat the 
subject of competition's view of the product life cycle 
differently than simply varying length, size and shape. 
Reasons for the change include both simplified 
calculations and standardization. I have elected to 
assume that both the competition and the firm view the 
market's length and shape as being twenty years and
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triangular, respectively. With that restriction, the only 
difference possible is in size (i.e. ultimate height of 
annual sales). Such restrictions allow the competitor's 
views of the product of life cycle to be expressed in 
terms of a variable required rate of return on his 
investment for future expansion, as viewed from the 
perspective of the firm, and using as a reference, the 
firm's view of the product life cycle.
As an example, if the firm's cost of capital is 15$, 
then its minimum required rate of return on investment on 
future expansion in the SBU must be 15$ to assure at 
least a zero net present value. Similarly, if the 
competitor views the market exactly as does the firm and 
its cost of capital is also 15$, then, too, the 
competitor's minimum required rate of return is 15$. 
However if the competitor sees the market as more 
attractive than does the firm (i.e. considering the 
before mentioned restrictions, the competitor sees higher 
ultimate sales) the competitor will appear to the firm to 
invest at a lower required rate of return than its cost 
of capital. Clearly, the opposite is true if the 
competitor views the market as less attractive than does 
the firm, both assuming the firm and the competitor have 
equal capital costs.
Figure 4-14, on the next page, shows three examples 
of the product life cycle estimates by the competitor, 
each expressed in terms of ultimate sales and competitive 
required rate of return, assuming equal length and shape:
— 16 8—
FIGURE 4-14. PRODUCT LIFE C Y CL'S SIZE VS 













Exactly how is the ultimate size of the product life 
cycle related to the competitive required rate of return 
as viewed by the firm? Given the firm's estimate of the 
product life cycle as shown in Figure 4-12 and assuming a 
15$ cost of capital; then as shown in Appendix 2, the 
summed discounted value of all sales over the product 
life cycle is 4581.8 units. At a 10$ discount rate (or 
competitive required rate of return), the summed
discounted value of all sales is 7031.3 units —  a 53.5$ 
increase. Assuming, as I have, that both ends of the 
product life cycle (i.e. the beginning of year zero and 
the end of year twenty) are pinned to zero sales and the
shape is triangular, the ultimate height must rise from
"\
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2000 units in Figure 4-12 to 3069 units as shown in
Figure 4-14, a 53.5$ increase. Similarly, at a 20$ 
discount rate (or competitive required rate of return), 
the summed discounted value of all sales is 3193.1 units 
a 30.3$ decline. Therefore, the ultimate height must 
fall from 2000 units to 1394 units as shown in Figure
4-14.
In this model, I have varied the size of the product 
life cycle as viewed by the competitor, using the
surrogate of the competitive required rate of return, as 
shown in Figure 4-15, on the next page.
Complicated as the use of the surrogate, 
"competitive rate of return", seems, after much thought I 
have concluded that the benefits of better defined 
standardization and simplification of computation 
outweigh the "cost" of seeming complexity and loss of 
general applicability. Naturally, if the real world 
demands it, any length, shape and size competitive 
product life cycle could be substituted in the model with 
minor adjustments, and no loss of theoretical accuracy.
The third major variable —  beyond how the firm and 
the competition view the product life cycle —  is how 
able the firm is to bring its product or service to the 
market efficiently, when compared to competition. As 
previously discussed, this "business strength", as 
McKinsey might call it, can be measured by the firm's 
initial cost position (determined by past accumulated 
volume) and its ability to reduce cost over time
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(determined by the slope of the experience curve). For 
modelling purposes, I have elected to vary the slopes of 
the experience curves for both the firm and a competitor 
as shown in Figure 4-16, on the next page.
As already mentioned, I have elected to follow The 
Boston Consulting Group's position on the experience 
curve. As BCG (1968:1) says:
"...costs appear to go down on value added at 
about 20-30$ everytime product experience 
doubles."
I have simply decided to expand the possibilities to 
include a 15-35$ cost reduction to further test the 
implications.
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Two further assumptions are made necessary in the 
model if costs do decline as quoted. First, the model 
assumes that the "normal" slope of the experience curve 
for the firm is 25$, the mid-point of the 20-30$ range 
given by BCG. Naturally, if actual conditions demand it, 
any other experience curve slope could be substituted. 
Second, the model assumes that all costs, not just the 
cost of value added, decline with experience. This 
assumption implies that the firm adds the entire value to 
the product as would an oil company who discovers, 
transports, refines, and markets petroleum products. Or, 
it assumes that if the firm does not add all the value 
(i.e. it makes purchases), then both the firm and its 
suppliers are effectively on the same experience curve, 
as might be a computer company making personal computers 
and purchasing related keyboards and display monitors. If 
neither of those assumptions are valid in a particular 
case, it would be easy to break down costs into the cost
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of value added by the firm and the costs of materials 
purchased, and use separate experience curves for each to 
calculate total cost declines as a function of time.
Three final factors effect the firm's net present 
value of further investment in an SBU —  the current 
position in the product life cycle, the initial share 
positions of the firm and competition, and the initial 
cost position of the firm relative to competition. The 
current position in the product life cycle is, I believe, 
what BCG really had in mind for the growth axis on their 
familiar Growth-Share matrix. Clearly, growth varies 
across the "standard" product life cycle used in this 
model and shown in Figure 4-12. Sales in year two of 200 
units is a 100$ growth from year one sales of 100 units. 
Sales in year three is a 50$ growth from year two sales, 
etc. The model continuously varies the assumption about 
the initial position in the product life cycle while 
holding the other variables —  the length, size and shape 
of the product life cycle as viewed by both the firm and 
competition and the relative slopes of the experience 
curves —  constant.
The initial share position of the firm and its 
competition is very important in determining the
financial attractiveness of further investment in an SBU, 
as will be shown quantitatively later. As with position 
in the product life cycle, the assumption on the initial 
share positions are changed within the model, holding 
everything else constant, according to the plan set out
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in Figure 4-17.











Remember, the model assumes only two participants —  
the firm and a competitor. If there are three or more 
participants then, as discussed in the section "Limit 
Pricing", the firm cannot set a price pattern to 
discourage all competitors* expansion based solely on 
competitive net present value. The firm must use a 
"carrot and stick" approach on the moderate cost 
competitors to discourage their expansion eventhough 
expansion might look profitable to those competitors 
based on prices set by the firm. The usefulness of this 
model depends on the assumption that either there is only 
one competitor, or if there are multiple competitors, the 
"carrot and stick" approach discourages their expansion
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as well.
The final factor effecting the firm's net present 
value of further investment in an SBU is the initial cost 
position of the firm relative to competition. In this 
model, the initial cost position is determined by the 
selection within the model of the initial position in the 
product life cycle and the initial share position of the 
participants. The model assumes further, that the initial 
share positions have remained constant over the period 
from the beginning of the product life cycle to the 
current position in the product life cycle. For example, 
using the "standard" product life cycle shown in Figure
4-12 and the 60-40$ initial market share assumption from 
Figure 4-16, the initial cost position of the firm in 
year one of the product life cycle would be based on a 
cumulative volume of 60 (i.e. total cumulative volume of 
100 units times 60$ market share). Similarly, the
competitor's initial cost position would be based on a 
cumulative volume of 40. Skipping to an assumed initial 
position in the product life cycle of year three, the
initial cost position of the firm would be based on a
cumulative volume of 360 (i.e. total cumulative volume of 
100 + 200 + 300 = 600 units times 60$ market share). This 
assumption of constant past market share simplifies 
computations in the model. However, if the real world 
demands it, any pattern of market share could be
substituted with minor adjustments to the model and no 
loss of theoretical accuracy.
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Assumptions for the calculation of incremental cash 
flows and net present v_alue
There are a number of assumptions built into the 
model that are used to calculate incremental cash flows 
and net present value. Each of these assumptions will be 
discussed in turn. Generally, each assumption made
simplifies computations and if it does not "fit" in a
particular case, different assumptions could be 
substituted with minor adjustments and no loss of 
theoretical accuracy.
Costs are standardized in such a way that each
participant's cost per unit will equal $10 when his 
accumulated volume reaches 1000 units, assuming a 75$ 
experience curve slope. Actually, costs are set such that 
the first unit produced cost $175.84, independent of the 
experience curve slope.
Investment requirements for capital assets are 
assumed to be $1 for each $1 in cost of goods or services 
produced and can be added in any size increments. For 
example, if in a particular year the cost of producing 
100 units is $1000 and the previous year there was no 
production, then the investment requirement for 100 units 
of capacity would be $1000. Investment requirements, 
expressed in dollars per unit of capacity, are assumed to 
fall in line with cost declines through experience. 
Further, capital assets, no matter when purchased, are
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assumed to have a useful life at least as long as the 
remaining product life cycle, with no salvage value.
Marginal tax rates are assumed to be 50$ with all of 
the cost of capital assets immediately deductible (i.e. 
assets are expensed not capitalized and depreciated). 
Taxable losses in any year generate the equivalent of a 
tax refund based on the 50$ marginal tax rate. In other 
words, it is assumed either the firm has a sufficiently 
large tax loss carryback, or that the firm's other 
endeavors produce sufficient taxable income to offset 
losses in the particular SBU. No investment tax credits 
are included.
It is assumed that there is no required working 
capital investment and therefore production matches sales 
in any given year, and there is no inventory. Further, 
all sales and all purchases of materials and labor are on 
a cash basis.
The cost of capital is assumed to be 15$ for both 
the firm and the competitor. The cost holds constant over 
the entire product life cycle and is not influenced by 
the riskiness of the SBU to either firm or competition.
Inflation is assumed to be zero over the entire 
product life cycle. Therefore, costs decline fully with 
experience, as does the cost of capital assets.
Model logic
Following is a discussion of the mathematical
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relationships used in the model to calculate the net 
present value to the firm of adjustments to market share. 
The actual computer program, written in Fortran, is 
available in Appendix 5-
As previously discussed, the model begins with the 
"standard" assumptions about how the firm and competition 
view the product life cycle, what the slopes of the 
experience curves are for both the firm and competition, 
and what the initial positions are both in the product 
life cycle and for each participant's market share. For 
example, assume the product life cycle is that shown in 
Figure 4-12, the slope of both participants experience 
curve is 75$, we are at the beginning of the product life 
cycle and the initial share positions are 60$ for the 
firm and 40$ for the competition.
The model assumes the firm adjusts market share by 
discouraging competitive expansion by pricing such that 
the net present value to the competitor of further 
expansion is always zero. The major unknown in the 
calculation is therefore the price pattern to yield zero 
net present value to the competitor based on his 
incremental economics. The present value to the firm of 
such a strategy is then determined by the firm's costs 
and investment requirements again on an incremental 
basis, given the price pattern required to discourage 
competitive expansion. As required by capital budgeting 
theory, the attractiveness of investment must be 
determined on incremental economics —  the difference
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between investing and not investing. Therefore, the model 
proceeds along two parallel tracks. It determines the 
economics for both participants assuming market shares 
remain constant (i.e. the competitor adds capacity 
proportional to increasing sales) and assuming the firm 
preempts all market growth (i.e. the competitor adds no 
additional capacity).
The first step is to calculate cost as a function of 
time for both participants and both market share 
assumptions. The following equation holds:
n
-.41504= $10 (% Vol^ X Share^ r 1000)
t=1
It can be interpreted that cost in any year t equals an 
initial cost which declines over time with experience. As 
discussed, the $10 and the division by 1000 set an 
initial cost such that the cost will be $10 when
cumulative volume reaches 1000 units. The summation of 
volume times share for any year t calculates cumulative
volume, and the exponent (-.41504) assures that costs
decline 25$ for each doubling of experience (i.e. log .75 
V log 2 = -.41504). Let's do a couple of years
calculations to get the feel of it!
Industry volume for year 1 is 100 and for year 2 is 
200 from Figure 4-12. Assume first that market share 
remains 60$ for the firm and 40$ for competition. If so, 
the firm's cost in year 1 would be:
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= $10(100 X 60$ r 1000)"'*15°*
= $32.14
In year 2, the cost would decline as industry cumulative 
volume expands to 300 (100 + 200) as follows:
Cg = $10(300 X 60$ -r lOOO)"'*^^^*
Cg s $20.37
For the competitor, calculations are identical, except 
that his 40$ share is substituted for the firm's 60$ 
share. The results are costs of $38.04 and $24.11
respectively.
Next ass-ume the firm prices to discourage
competitive expansion. The competitor is then limited to 
40 units of sales per year, the same as his initial
capacity. Costs remain $32.14 and $38.04 respectively in 
the first year, but they change in the second year
because the firm cumulative volume grows to 220 (60 + 
160) while the competitor's cumulative volume is only 80 
(40 + 40) because his capacity is limited to 40 units per 
year. Second year cost can then be calculated for the 
firm:
Cg = $10 (220 f  1000)"'*T5°*
Cg = $18.75
and for the competitor:
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Cg = $10 (80 -  1000)"'*T504
Cg = $28.52
Note, the firm's cost advantage grows with additional 
experience.
The second step is to calculate the competitor's 
incremental net cash flow from operations for investing. 
Adding the built-in assumptions already discussed, the 
following equation holds:
INC NE^ = 0*5C(P^-C^) Vol^ X share]^^^^^ - 
0.5[(P^ -Ct) Volt X share]^ tthout
It can be interpreted that the net earnings if the 
competitor expands less the net earnings if he does not 
expand yield the incremental net earnings from the
expansion. Net earnings, at any time t, are the unit 
price, P^, less the unit cost, C^, multiplied by the 
sales volume (the product of Vol^ and share) all 
multiplied by one minus the marginal tax rate (assumed to 
be 50$). Clearly C^ will differ if the competitor
expands versus not. For example, in the second year as 
already calculated, his cost will be $24.11 if he expands
versus $28.52 if he doesn't. Also, sales volumes will
differ. Second year volume will be 80 units if 
competition expands (40$ of 200) versus 40 units if he 
doesn't (limited by capacity). Further, and very
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importantly, prices will also differ. In the section, 
"Integration of the Tools" , I elected to set a price 
pattern as a function of the firm's costs —  in fact a 
constant markup. Since the firm's costs are a function 
of whether or not competition expands, will differ 
as well. Allowing the unknown (p), to be that markup on 
the firm's cost, the unit price (P^) can be expressed 
as :
P^  = p X $32.14 and Pg = P x $20.37
if the competitor expands versus
P^  = p X $32.14 and Pg = P x $18.75
if the competitor fails to expand.
Therefore, substituting the above relationships, we 
can write the competitor's incremental net cash flows 
from operations (in this case simply incremental net
earnings) as a function of the unknown price markup on
the firm's cost as follows:
INC NE^= 0.5[(32.14p - 38.04)40] - 0.5C(32.14p-38.04)40]
INC NE^= 0.5C(20.37p - 24.11)80] - 0.5C(18.75p-28.52)40]
The third step is to calculate the incremental
investment cash flow to the competitor. Using the built
in assumptions, the following equation holds:
— 182—
F.INV^ =
It can be interpreted that the investment requirement is 
the product of the increased volume sold by the 
competitor times a unit cost of capacity, tax effect 
considered. As discussed, I have assumed the unit cost of 
capacity equals the unit cost of production, C^, that 
all capital investments are immediately deductible from 
taxable income, and that there is no working capital 
requirement. With those assumptions we can write the 
competitor's incremental net cash flows from,investment 
as follows:
F - INV^ = 0.5C40 - 40] x 38.04 
F - INVg = 0.5C80 - 40] x 24.11
Since the incremental net cash flow from investment 
is always a cash outflow due to the assumptions of zero 
salvage value and no working capital recovery, we can now 
write the competitor's full incremental net cash flow as 
follows:
F^ z INC NE^ -(F - INV^)
with INC NE^ being a function of the yet unknown price 
markup on the firm's costs. However, we have a 
mathematical way to calculate that price markup! The
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competitor will not expand if his net present value does 
not exceed zero. That relationship can be written as:
20
NPV = 0 = r  F t f  (1 + year + 1
tzinitial year
where is the competitor's full incremental net cash 
flow, which is discounted at his cost of capital (assumed 
to be 15$). Net present value equals zero because the 
price pattern included in the cash flows is precisely 
that which makes net present value zero. Therefore, the 
output of the above equation is the required price 
markup, p, first discussed in the calculation of the 
competitor's incremental net cash flow from operations.
The final step is to calculate the firm's net 
present value based on its incremental net cash flows, 
now knowing the required price mark-up to assume 
competition does not expand. The equations are identical, 
in theory, to those discussed for the calculation of the 
competitor's incremental net cash flows and net present 
value. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated 





Recall; the model described in the preceding chapter 
calculates the incremental NPV to the firm of a strategy 
of pricing to discourage competitive expansion as a 
function of (1) how the firm views the current position
in the product life cycle, (2) the firm’s current market 
share, (3) the competitor’s view of the shape and size of 
the product life cycle, and (4) how successful the firm
is compared to the competitor in reducing costs through
experience. The calculation is based on the incremental 
economics of both the firm and a competitor in an assumed 
two participant market.
The relationship theorized can be simply expressed 
mathematically as:
NPV = /" ( N, S^, Eg, R ) 
where N is the position (year) in the product life cycle
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as viewed by the firm, is the firm's initial market 
share in year N, the year the firm's strategy of 
increasing share begins. Eg is the slope of the 
competitor's experience curve slope, assuming the firm's 
experience curve slope is held constant, and R, the 
competitor's required rate of return, is the surrogate 
for how the competitor views the product life cycle.
It is the goal of this chapter, the heart of this 
thesis, to:
* Show graphically how NPV changes as the variables 
change.
* Determine the importance of each variable in its 
influence on NPV.
* Define quantitatively the pricing implications of 
the firm's strategy to discourage further 
investment by competition in the SBÜ
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FACTORS AFFECTING NET PRESENT VALUE
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This thesis assumes that NPV is a function of 4 
variables: N, S^, Eg and R. As described previously,
the computerized model changes the variables, one at a 
time holding the others constant and calculates NPV. 
Since each variable changes many times: N(19), S^(9), 
Eg(5) and R(7), the number of NPVs calculated is large 
(5985). Therefore, I will be selective in the results I 
present. Within this section, results will be shown in 
two ways. First, NPV versus one variable graphs, all 
other variables held constant. Second, two separate 
variables will be graphed (one horizontally, the other 
vertically) with isobars of NPV mapped out, holding the 
other variables constant. The second method is, I think, 
particularly useful since it follows the form of the 
portfolio matrices proposed by the Boston Consulting 
Group, McKinsey and others. Appendix 3 shows in tabular 
form all the numbers used to prepare the graphs presented 
in this section. The tables themselves are taken directly 
from the computer output, which exceeds 75 pages and is 
not attached to reduce bulk.
The first presentation format shows NPV on the 
y-axis as a function of one variable on the x-axis, two 
other variables held constant, and selected values of the 
fourth variable shown to reduce the number of graphs and 
to aid comprehension. Considering that there are four 
variables, there will be four basic types of graphs:
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1. NPV vs Position in the Product Life Cycle, as
viewed by the Firm
2, NPV vs The Firm's Initial Market Share Position
3, NPV vs The Competitor's Experience Curve Slope
4. NPV vs The Competitor’s View of Its Product Life
Cycle
Since I am presenting selected rather than comprehensive 
data, each basic type of graph will have at most a few, 
but certainly not all, variations, based on changes in 
the other three variables.
— ELesenS yalue_ver&u&__DO&ilion_ln_lbe_Droduct_ lif e
cycle, as viewed by the firm
Figure 5-1, on the next page, shows NPV as a
function of position in the product life cycle for
selected initial market share positions, assuming both
the firm and the competitor have equal experience curve 
slopes, i.e.. Eg = .75, and both see the product life 
cycle exactly the same, i.e., R = .15.
As expected, NPV approaches zero as the product
matures, independent of NPV earlier in the product life
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Year in the product life cycle 
cycle. Including selected initial market share positions 
for the firm shows that if the investment in additional
market share is a "good" investment, e.g., at = 90%,
then NPV declines as a function of time. And, if
investment in market share is a "bad" investment, e.g., 
at = 10%, then NPV rises as a function of time and
becomes less "bad".
The relationship between NPV and position in the 
product life cycle is not controversial. Logic demands 
that NPV be inversely related to the remaining product
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life if NPV is positive. Conversely, if NPV is negative 
it should rise as the product matures, i.e., as N 
increases. Perhaps the more interesting aspect of Figure
5-1 is the implied relationship between NPV and the 
firm's initial share position, S^. Under the conditions 
of Figure 5-1, NPV is strongly negative at low initial 
share positions and only slightly positive at high 
initial share positions . This is the subject of the next 
sub-sect i on.
Net present value versus the_firm's initial share 
position
Figure 5-2, on the next page, shows NPV as a 
function of initial share position at selected 
competitive views of the product life cycle, assuming 
both the firm and the competitor have identical 
experience curve slopes, i.e.. Eg = .75 and the product 
i s "new", i.e., N = 1.
Logic from microeconomics suggests, everything else 
equal, that NPV declines as the firm's market share 
decreases. The reason is simple. Eigh market share is a 
surrogate for a high degree of monopoly power. Since 
monopoly power allows for.supranormal profits, it makes 
sense that investments to protect those high profits 
would be attractive.
As expected, NPV falls as share declines. In fact, 
the rate of decline accelerates as the firm's initial
-195
share diminishes. Note also that NPV falls below zero for 
all initial market share positions below the 50%-70% 
range.
NPV
FIGURE 5-2 NPV = ffFTRNJS INITIAL SHARE)
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Firm's Initial Market Share
It appears that there is a threshold level or 
"critical mass" of market share that must be attained 
before price warfare to dominate a business becomes 
attractive, at least when competitors have equal 
competence, as measured by their experience curve slope. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion from Figure 5-2 is 
that if the firm’s initial market share is below this 
"critical mass", the firm can not attractively increase
- 196-
its market share through price warfare. The graph shows 
the NPV of such a strategy consistently negative.
Figure 5-2 allows for the effect of different views
of the product life cycle by the competitor to be
considered. Recall, the competitor's required rate of 
return, the variable R, is the surrogate for different
competitive views of the size and shape of the product
life cycle. A large R, say R = .30, means that it appears 
to the firm that the competitor requires an IRR of 30% to 
invest. Since both participants are assumed to have equal 
cost of capital, the competitor must view the market as 
less attractive (i.e., a smaller product life cycle) than 
does the firm. Conversely, a low R, say R = 0, means the 
competitor sees the market as more attractive than does 
the firm. As would be expected. Figure 5-2 shows the 
firm's NPV higher at all initial share levels as the 
competitor's view of the market's attractiveness declines 
(that is as R increases).
Figure 5-3, on the next page, again shows NPV as a 
function of initial share position, this time at selected 
experience curve slopes for the competitor, assuming both 
the firm and the competitor see the product life cycle 
exactly the same, that is R = .15, and the product is 
"new", that is N = 1. As would be expected, the firm's 
NPV is higher at all levels of initial market share if 
the firm has an experience curve slope advantage over the 
competitor. However, contrary to Figure 5-2, the firm's 
NPV does not fall, in all cases, as share declines. In
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fact, when the firm has a large experience curve slope 
advantage, NPV grows as share declines to about the 40% 
share level.
NPV
FTOITRE 5-a NPV (FIRM'S INITIAL SHARE) 





Firm's Initial Market Share
The cause of such an apparent anomaly is a built-in 
assumption of the model —  the assumption that the price 
elasticity of demand is zero. That is, the same quantity 
will be demanded at any price. Appendix 4 includes a
-198-
detailed explanation of this elasticity assumption's 
effect on the firm's NPV. I have elected to reserve that 
detailed discussion to the appendix to preserve 
continuity within this chapter. However, I do believe a 
discussion of the reasonableness of the elasticity
assumption used in this thesis is appropriate here, even 
though it requires a slight diversion in the trend of 
thought.
The price elasticity of demand measures the
percentage change in quantity demanded for a given 
percentage change in price. Elasticities vary widely 
among products and services and vary whether we are
referring to the short run or long run. Further,
elasticities are not constant over large variations in 
price and can generally be expected to vary as a function 
of price, since they are nothing more than a weighted 
first derivative of the demand curve function. Obviously, 
all products and services have a negative (due to the 
downward sloping demand) and non-zero elasticity, except 
perhaps for air for the purpose of breathing.
This model requires that some assumption be made 
about the price elasticity of demand. Figure 3-3, in the 
section entitled, "The Product Life Cycle" demonstrates 
the theoretical effect of elasticity on industry sales 
volume as a function of price strategy. However, in 
building the model I am forced to be specific about 
exactly how the "standard" product life cycle used will 
be affected by price changes. I have elected to assume
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zero elasticity! Is that assumption realistic and useful 
for business research? The answer is "sometimes" to the 
first part of the question and "probably yes" to the 
second part.
Many products and services do have a very low 
elasticity, e.g., cigarettes and electricity. Thompson 
(1981:138-140) lists characteristics of products that 
would tend to have low elasticities as:
* An important product to the buyer.
* A product near market saturation.
* A low price relative to income levels.
* A product with few if any close substitutes.
* A product with a very limited use.
* A non-durable product.
Is an assumption of zero elasticity generally useful? 
Obviously, the closer any product is to zero elasticity 
the more representative the results of this thesis. 
Alternately, a variable price elasticity of demand could 
easily be built into the model, but the practical job of 
specifying the elasticity function for a particular 
product would be very hard, and is not attempted here.
Is an assumption of zero elasticity useful for 
business research? I believe it is as good as any, if we 
recognize the assumption and are wary of stating 
conclusions claimed to be generally applicable. Since 
elasticity can vary greatly among products, over time and
-200-
products, over time and over price ranges, any elasticity 
function used in this general model would have to be 
totally arbitrary. The advantage of using zero elasticity 
over any other is that it simplifies the model.
Net present value versus the competitor's experience
curv? slops
Figure 5-4, on the next page, shows NPV as a 
function of the competitor's experience curve slope for 
selected competitive views of the product life cycle, 
assuming the product is "new", i.e., N = 1, and the firm 
has a small initial market share, i.e., = 30%.
The results show NPV declining as the firm's 
experience curve slope advantage decreases, as expected 
intuitively and as shown in Figure 5-3. Also as expected, 
NPV is highest when the competitor views the market as 
less attractive than does the firm, i.e., R is large.
Nea_^^resenl value^ versus the competitor's view of the 
product life cycle
Figure 5-5, on the second following page, shows NPV 
as a function of the competitor's view of the product 
life cycle, as measured by the surrogate required rate of 
return, at selected initial market share positions for 
the firm assuming the product is "new", i.e., N = 1 and
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Competitor's Experience Curve Slope
assuming the competitor and the firm have equal 
experience curve slopes.
The results are noncontroversial• The firm's NPV is 
greater when the competitor views the product as less 
attractive than does the firm and the firm's NPV is 
strongly dependent on its initial share position —  both 
as expected. It is interesting however, that the 
relationship between NPV and the competitor's view of the 
market is essentially linear, independent of share.
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The second way I have elected to show results is 
with two variable graphs showing isobars of constant net 
present value. I consider this an important presentation 
of data since it follows the format of the matrix 
analyses proposed by both the Boston Consulting Group and 
McKinsey and Company. However, before beginning, let me 
compare and contrast thesis assumptions with both BCG's 
and McKinsey's work.
The Boston Consulting Group matrix shows the cash 
flow implication of SBUs as a function of relative market
share and market growth. BCG divides the matrix into four
quadrants -- question marks (or problem children), stars, 
cash cows and dogs. The division along the relative
market share axis generally is shown to occur at a value 
of 1.0, which corresponds to a value of = 50%, in my 
assumed two participant market. That is, if = 50%, 
then Sg = 50% and v Sg = 1.0. The division along
the market growth axes generally is shown to occur at a 
market growth rate of 10% per year. This corresponds to 
year 11 in the position in the "standard" product life 
cycle. That is, in year 11 sales are 1100, 10% more than 
the 1000 level of sales in year 10. Therefore, the BCG 
matrix is easy to translate into the format used in this 
thes i s.
This thesis calculates the net present value to the 
firm of a pricing strategy to discourage a competitor 
from further investment in an SBÜ. In effect, the net
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present value of incremental cash flows to the firm of a 
leftward move within BCG's Growth-Share matrix. BCG, 
however, uses the Growth-Share Matrix more as a tool for 
balancing cash flows within the firm. They contend that 
the excess cash that results from normal operation of 
cash cows and the divestment of dogs should be reinvested 
in stars and the remainder invested in selected question 
mark SBU's, to balance cash flows within the firm. In 
that sense, BCG does use the Growth-Share Matrix as a 
guide for investment attractiveness —  stars and at least 
certain question mark SBU's are attractive for further 
investment (with the relative attractiveness of 
investments not specifically mentioned); and cash cows 
and dogs are unattractive.
McKinsey's Industry Attractiveness-Business Strength 
matrix, while not nearly as quantitative in defining its 
axes, seems to be quite specific in its investment 
recommendations. As you will recall, the McKinsey matrix 
is divided into nine blocks by splitting both industry 
attractiveness and business strength into above average, 
average and below average categories. The three blocks 
which contain at least one above average classification 
have the directive: "invest". The three blocks which
contain at least one below average classification have 
the directive: "divest". The rest we are supposed to
"retain". Can we assume that "retain" means to invest 
enough to maintain the firm's current position in that 
SBU, i.e., grow with the market? If so, then the "invest"
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directive must mean to concentrate resources to grow 
faster than the market, i.e., gain market share. Reminded 
again that this thesis calculates the firm's net present 
value of a price strategy of increasing market share, it 
appears that the McKinsey matrix implies that such net 
present value is positive when the directive is "invest", 
negative when the directive is "divest", and about zero 
when the directive is "retain".
Finally, let me try to categorize the McKinsey
matrix using only two of the four variables used in this 
thesis. My choice for industry attractiveness must be N, 
the position in the product life cycle, the same variable
used for the market growth axis in BCG's matrix. McKinsey
themselves relate industry attractiveness to the product 
life cycle in their own presentations of their matrix. My 
choice for the business strength axis is Eg, the 
competitor's experience curve slope. Eventhough McKinsey 
lists many ideas such as technological competence, 
financial and human resources, product strength and image 
in determining business strength, the common thread seems 
to me to be adequately encompassed by the idea of
competence, eventually to be measured by the firm's 
ability to reduce costs quicker than its competitor.
Interestingly few, if any, have noticed a 
significant difference between the BCG and McKinsey 
matrices. BCG themselves show the dividing line between 
"Stars" and "Cash Cows" at 10% growth per annum and never 
display negative growth rates. See for example Hedley
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(1977:12). Therefore, in terms of the product life cycle, 
BCG*s matrix ends at the point of peak sales volume and 
does not consider declining sales. McKinsey on the other 
hand, relates their matrix to the full product life cycle 
including declining sales. See for example my Figure 2-5 
"The McKinsey Matrix". Therefore, as presented, the BCG 
matrix is but the left-hand side of the McKinsey matrix. 
Figure 5-6 superimposes BCG*s matrix on McKinsey*s.
FIGURE 5-6 THE BCG M ATRIX SUPERIMPOSED 















diverge on certain of their investment recommendations. 
For example, according to BCG, only certain queries 
should be selected by the firm for further support with 
the rest divested early on. However, if BCG*s matrix can 
be superimposed on McKinsey*s, as drawn, then McKinsey*s
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advice for these SBUs is that the majority, at least as 
measured by area, should be retained with the remainder 
invested in, not divested.
The following subsections show six forms of the 
proposed two variable graphs showing isobars of constant 
net present value. Six are required since this thesis 
assumes that:
N P V  = f ( N ,  S^, Eg, R)
Given four variables —  one each on the x- and y-axes and
two held constant —  yields six combinations. They are:
®A' %
N, Eg S^, R
N, R  Eg, R
The first (N, S^) is the equivalent of the Boston
Consulting Group’s Growth-Share matrix. The second (N,
Eg) is my approximation to the McKinsey matrix. The 
other four are more esoteric, but I hope no less 
interesting. Ideally, I would map out N P V  in four 
dimensional space to show graphically the full 
relationships. Alas, paper only permits two dimensions at 
a time. However, multiple regression, the subject of the 
next section will allow us to study the importance of 
each variable in net present value.
Position in the product lifecycle versus the firm’s.
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initial market share (N. Sj^)
Figure 5-7, on the next page, shows isobars of 
constant net present value as a function of position in 
the product life cycle and the firm’s initial market 
share, assuming both competitor’s have equal experience 
curve slopes, i.e. Eg = .75, and the competitor views 
the market as much less attractive, i.e., R = .30.
As expected from previous work, the firm’s NPV 
increases as its initial share position increases and as 
the years remaining in the product life cycle increase. 
That is, the "payoff" from a policy of pricing to preempt 
all future market growth is high when relative market
share is high and when growth is high. Using BCG’s terms, 
that means "stars" are most attractive for further 
investment. However BCG also implies that certain
"problem children" are also attractive as in investment, 
with the idea of developing them into future "stars". My 
work, however, indicates that "problem children" are 
incorrigible! That is, they can not be profitably 
converted into "stars" if the firm must buy market share 
with price, at least if the participants are equally
competent and view the market the same.
BCG sees "cash cows" as unattractive investments
primarily because slow growth businesses do not require 
much investment to maintain share, but also they suggest 
attempts to increase share will be unattractive. My work.
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on the other hand, indicates that further investment in 
these slow growth, high share SBU’s is attractive, even 
to the point of attempting to preempt all remaining
market growth with price. Taken as a group, "cash cows" 
are the second most attractive for further investment. 
"Dogs", as predicted by BCG, are unattractive.
Note, however, that the isobars of NPV make it clear 
that BCG’s categories are not homogeneous, at least based 
on the "dividing lines" suggested by BCG • Some "dogs" 
have higher NPV than some "stars". Compare, for example 
the NPVs for Point A versus Point B on Figure 5-7. As a 
general rule though, share is much more important in 
determining NPV than is growth.
Figure 5-8, on the next page, has the same
conditions as Figure 5-7 except that the competitor sees 
the market exactly the same as does the firm, i.e. R=.15. 
Again, I have superimposed BCG’s boundaries on the data.
I am presenting Figure 5-8 not because the 
conclusions of Figure 5-7 become invalid if the 
competitor’s view of the market increases. The same
conclusions hold. However, the logical dividing line on
the market share axis does move. Recall, the Growth-Share 
matrix shows market share high above 50% (for my model), 
and Figure 5-7 displayed a shift between negative and 
positive NPV’s near there. Figure 5-8 shows a similar 
shift, but in this case it occurs above 60% early in the 
product life cycle. Interestingly, this is exactly the 
results described by the BCG (Hedley (1977)) themselves.
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They show the dividing line between "Stars” and at 
1*5 relative market share (60% in my model ) shifting to 
1,0 relative market share as the dividing line between 
"Cash Cows” and ”Dogs” .
More importantly, perhaps, both Figures show there 
is no logical dividing line on the growth axis (the 
equivalent of N in model). "Stars" blend gradually into 
"cash cows" and "question marks" blend gradually into 
"dogs", contrary to the suggestions of BCG.
My criticism of the Boston Consulting Group's 
Growth-Share matrix is not with the cash flow 
implications of each quadrant. Adding the experience 
curve and managing the SBÜ for dominance using limit 
pricing do not cause conflict. However, I do disagree 
with their investment implications. My results indicate 
it is unattractive to invest in market share expansion if 
initial market share is low to begin with, if share must 
be bought with low price. Therefore "Problem Children" 
and "Dogs" do not merit further investment, unless share 
is effectively given to the firm free by a competitor's 
mistake. Also, "Cash Cows" deserve further investment so 
they may expand share, even though market growth is slow.
What is it in the model or its assumptions that 
causes investment recommendations to differ between this 
thesis and the Boston Consulting Group? Without the aid 
of a psychic I can only speculate, but I must conclude 
that BCG under estimated the importance of their own 
experience curve. By splitting their matrix into four
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quadrants they imply a symmetry of importance between 
share and growth. Including the quantitative effect of 
the experience curve magnifies the importance of share 
over growth. The rule now becomes —  look for SBUs where 
the firm has a large current market share, then favor 
those SBUs with the faster market growth. The BCX5's four 
block matrix collapses to two blocks for investment 
decisions, though not for cash flow balancing, at least 
down to the point where sales begin to decline.
With these rules, where do the firm's new products 
come from as its former "Stars" mature to "Cash Cows" and 
eventually disappear? The answer can only be that they 
must be developed by the firm through its own research, 
or much less likely, they must be high market share 
businesses acquired from the outside at a price less than 
the present value of the firm's expected cash flows. 
Sticking with a low share SBU, or acquiring one, and 
trying to build a "Star" through price will not pay off. 
Perhaps also, some of the divergence between this 
thesis and the common interpretation of BCG may be one of 
definition. Allow an example from my own industrial 
experience to clarify. Assume a firm invents a new 
plastic with unique combined properties of strength, heat 
tolerance, and abrasion resistance. Assume also that the 
plastic will find its highest value-in-use as a material 
for engine components in automobiles and aircraft. Engine 
component parts are currently made from machined steel, 
die-cast aluminum, die-cast zinc, and a variety of
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engineering plastics such as acetal, nylon, polyester, 
etc. What would be the definition of the market and the 
competition used to calculate market growth and market
share? Possibilities for the definition of the market
include: (1) all uses of steel, aluminum, zinc and
engineering plastics, (2) uses of the same materials only 
in automobile and aircraft engine components, (3) only 
engineering plastics used in those same applications, and 
(4) only the firm's newly discovered plastic used in any 
application. The table below sets out likely initial
market share, long run potential market share, and market
growth rate for the firm's new plastic for each mentioned 
possibility.
Market Share Market
Initial Long Run Grow.th_Ba.te
Possibility 1 About 0% About 0% Very Low 
Possibility 2 Very Low Moderate Low 
Possibility 3 Low High Moderate
Possibility 4 100% Very High Very High
Well, what have we here —  a "Dog", a "?", or a 
"Star"? It all depends on the definition of the market 
doesn't it? An imprecise user of BCG would likely 
classify it a "Problem Child". I define it as a "Star"! 
BCG itself, as described by Hedley (1977) does follow the 
same definition as used here. With regard to the market, 
their statement that the ability to generate operating
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cash increases with market share because of the 
experience curve effect implies the firm and its
competitors are providing the same product. Otherwise
talk of a cost advantage based on the experience curve is 
meaningless.
Position in the product life evcle vs the competitor's
relative experience curve slone (N.
Figure 5-9, on the next page, shows isobars of 
constant net present value as a function of position in 
the product life cycle and the competitor's relative
experience curve slope, assuming both participants view 
the market identically, i.e., R = .15, and the firm has a 
60% market share.
As expected, the NPV rises as the firm's experience 
curve slope advantage increases. As described in Figure
5-1, NPV declines as the time remaining in the product
life cycle decreases if the investment in increased share
has positive NPV and rises if it has negative NPV.
Since I proposed this combination best fits 
McKinsey's matrix, I have superimposed one-half of the
McKinsey matrix on Figure 5-9. Recall, my work limits the
product life cycle such that sales never decline, to test
BCG's more quantitative matrix. As shown in Figure 5-6,
that limits my conclusions regarding McKinsey's 
investment recommendations.









FIGURE 5-9. NPV = (N. . R=.15. S.= ROK
COMPETITIDR’S EXPERIENCE CURVE SLOPE
O © ©
N 85% 80% 75% 70% 65%
BUSINESS STRENGTH
1 9914 3478 1 -1868
-2806
2 9645 3260 1 -125 -1857 -2707
3 9394 3117 1 -148 -1782 -2565
4 9115 2992 1 -145 —1688 -2413
5 8800 2870 1 -131 -1586 -2258
6 8447 2742 1 -112 -1480 -2103
7 8052 2608 1 -91 
1
-1372 -1948
8 7616 2463 1 -70 -1261 -1792
9 7136 2307 1 -50 -1149 -1635
10 6611 2139 1 -30 -1035 -1476
11 6042 1958 1 - 1 2 -919 -1314
12 5428 1763 1 3 -802 -1151
13 4773_ __ 1555 ____1__ 16 __ -685__ -987
14 4079 1334 1 25 -567 -822
15 3357 1102 1 ^1 -452 -659
16 2617 863 1 33 -341 -500
17 1878 623 1 30 -236 -349






conclusions regarding "invest", "retain",and "divest" for 
the cells numbered 1, 4, 5, and 6, We disagree on the
other cells.
Therefore, the McKinsey matrix shown in Figure 5-10, 
should be redefined as shown in Figure 5-11, both on the 
next page; if we can accept my quantitative definition of 
their qualitative axes, and if we regard the NPVs in 
blocks 2 and 5 as essentially zero.
What is it in the model or its assumptions that 
causes investment decision results to differ between this 
thesis and McKinsey? One possibility is that they would 
disagree totally with my definition of their axes. The 
other possibility, which is more interesting, is that 
McKinsey either failed to include or underestimated the 
importance of the experience curve. McKinsey, by their 
matrix construction, implies a symmetry between business 
strength and industry attractiveness. That is, one "unit" 
of business strength trades off evenly for one "unit" of 
industry attractiveness. The experience curve upsets that 
relationship, if it ever existed, and magnifies the 
importance of business strength. The rule now becomes —  
look for SBUs in which the firm is strong and favor those 
which are in the most attractive industries.
Position In the product life cycle vs the competitor's 
view of the product lile-cvcle (N. Rl
Figure 5-12, on the second following page, shows
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FTGURE 5-10. THE BUSINESS STRENGTH-
INDUSTRY ATTRACTIVENESS MATRIX
B U S IN E S S  S TR E N G TH
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FIGURE 5-12. NPV =/(N. R) . S^=.70.
- 2 1 9 -
COMPETITOR'S VIEW OF THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 
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isobars of constant net present value as a function of 
the position in the product life cycle and the 
competitor*s view of the size of the market, assuming 
both participants have equal experience curve slopes, and 
the firm has a 70% initial market share.
As expected from previous work, NPV increases as the 
competitor’s view of size of the the market decreases and 
NPV declines as the time remaining in the product’s life 
decreases. The isobars point out that early in the 
product life cycle NPV is strongly influenced by how the 
competitor views the market, while late in the product 
life cycle NPV is much more strongly influenced by the 
passage of time.
Since no comparable matrix system has been proposed
previously, I am unable to contrast my findings with
other predictions. However, let me take this opportunity 
to comment on the implications of this matrix. Its 
usefulness, I believe, is primarily in directing
competitive research within the firm. Clearly, the
results show that the benefits of knowing how competition 
views the market are greatest early in the product’s life 
cycle. Therefore, in a world of limited resources, 
including limited funds available for competitive 
research, such funds should be concentrated in SBUs early 
in their product life cycle.
The firm's initial market share vs the competitor's 
experience curve slope E^)
-221.
Figure 5-13, shows isobars of constant net present 
value as a function of the firm's initial market share 
and the competitor's experience curve slope, assuming 
both participants view the market identically, i.e., 
R = .15, and it is early in the product life cycle, i.e., 
N = 1.
EIS.VPE 5-13, NPV (S,. E^). N = 1. R Z.1S











As expected, NPV increases as the firm's experience 
curve slope advantage grows. Further, there is a very 
strong functional relationship. Generally we would also 
expect the firm's NPV to decline as its initial market 
share diminishes. Figure 5-13 shows this to be true 
except for high initial share positions when the firm has 
an experience curve slope advantage. This apparent 
anomaly was discovered to be caused by the model's 
built-in assumption of zero price elasticity of demand. 
This was fully discussed in the subsection entitled, "Net 
present value versus the firm's initial share position", 
and supported by Appendix 4. No further explanation will 
be given here.
Perhaps the most important finding of Figure 5-13 is 
the ability of an experience curve slope advantage to 
overcome a poor initial market share position, and 
conversely the inability of high initial share to protect 
an SBU if the firm has an experience curve slope 
disadvantage. I believe these findings to be intuitively 
non-controversial. It makes sense that if the firm is 
more competent in the business (as measured by the 
relative experience curve slope), then a poor initial 
position in that business can be successfully overcome. 
The implication is important I The firm must invest the 
resources required to determine the competence of 
competitors before embarking on a strategy of market 
domination no matter what its initial market share 
position, assuming it is possible that experience curve
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slopes may vary among competitors.
The fipm's initial market share vs the competitor's view 
of the product life cycle (S^. R)
Figure 5-14, on the next page, shows isobars of 
constant net present value as a function of the firm's 
initial market share and the competitor's view of the 
product life cycle, assuming both participants have equal 
experience curve slopes, i.e.. Eg = .75 and it is early 
in the product life cycle, i.e., N = 1.
As expected from previous work, NPV increases as the 
firm's initial market share increases and as the 
competitor's view of the market decreases. The isobars 
clearly point out that the main determinant on NPV in 
this matrix is market share. What little functional 
relationship there is between the firm's share and how
the competitor views the market occurs mostly at high 
initial market share. However, as with the previous 
matrix, competitive knowledge does have value,
particularly at moderate initial share positions, e.g., 
60% share. Note, at that share level NPV goes from
slightly negative if the competitor views the market as
more attractive (i.e., R = 0) to slightly positive if the 
competitor views the market as less attractive (i.e., R = 
.30). Therefore, if the strategy to dominate the market 
appears marginal based on the firm's initial market 
share, research into how the competitor views the market
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The competitor's experience curve slope vs the 
competitor's view of the product life cvcle (E^. R)
Figure 5-15, on the next page, shows isobars of 
constant net present value as a function of the 
competitor experience curve slope and the competitor's 
view of the product life cycle, assuming it is early in
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the product's life cycle, as viewed by the firm, i.e., N 
= 1, and assuming the firm has an initial market share of 
60%.
EIGÜEE. 5-15. NPV R K  N = 1 . 60%
COMPETITOR "S VIEW OF THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 
B .00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30
azj/. 10629 10322 10078 9914 9336 9335 9900
=263 -------^  1 ' 266 . 418
/V/. - z i / i     -1753 -1638 -1523
65% -3014 -2952 -2391 -2806 -2729 -2652 -2577
As expected from previous work, the NPV of further 
investment in an SBU is high if the firm both has an 
experience curve slope advantage and sees the market as 
more attractive than does the firm. Also as expected, NPV 
will decline as the competitor's experience curve slope 
advantage increases and if the competitor sees the market 
as less attractive than does the firm.
Figure 5-15 is an interesting matrix. Consider that 
it shows that the firm's NPV of further investment in an 
SBU is strongly a function of the competitive
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environment, as suggested by Henderson (1979: 7,11). This 
is fully independent of the share and growth 
considerations felt sufficient by the Boston Consulting 
Group. It is clear that how the competitor views the 
market compared to the firm and how efficient the 
competitor is in reducing cost with experience compared 
to the firm are important determinants of the firm's NPV, 
as logic suggests.
Mapping conclusions
The results portrayed in this section are the heart 
of this thesis. The conclusions, as I see them, are 
twofold. First, the capital investment suggestions of the 
two variable, matrices proposed by the Boston Consulting 
Group and McKinsey and Company cannot be fully supported 
by the mathematical model. However, there is certainly an 
element of truth in each.
Second, model results indicate that a two-variable 
description of factors affecting investment 
attractiveness is insufficient if it is possible that 
competition views the market differently than does the 
firm or if competition's efficiency in reducing cost 
through experience differs from that of the firm.
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ANALYSIS BY tlULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION
-228-
The previous section showed selected one and two 
variable maps of NPV. However, it is assumed in this 
thesis that NPV is a function of four variables. Since it 
is impossible to show functional relationships among four 
variables graphically, this section uses the statistical 
tool of multiple linear regression to more fully display 
the interrelationships of the variables wi thin the 
model.
-229
Considering the range of variation tested in each of 
the four factors proposed to influence NPV and the 
quantity of data output, a method is needed to summarize 
the findings beyond selected one and two variable maps. 
Also, if the results are to be generally useful to 
business any such summarization tool must be simple to 
understand. I propose multiple linear regression as such 
a tool. The goal of this analysis is to discover the 
importance of each variable in determining NPV, so that 
business might better select which current or potential 
SBU's have the highest probability of success for further 
investment, and so that business may better allocate 
competitive research expenditures.
First though, a word of caution about interpreting 
the results of analysis by multiple regression in this 
context. Generally, a regression analysis is applied to 
empirical data gathered by a researcher to test a 
hypothesis. The results of such an analysis are first the 
numerical values of U q , a^,....a^ in the equation:
y = *0 + *1=1 + •••• + *n=n
The coefficients measure how each independent variable 
best combines to determine the dependent variable, 
assuming linearity. Second, the associated correlation 
coefficient, R , measures how fully the postulated 
relationship explains observed variations in the 
dependent variable, Y. The correlation coefficient in
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such analysis may be less than 1.0 if either all 
independent variables effecting Y are not included or the 
relationship is non-linear, or both.
Since this thesis is theoretical rather than
empirical, the data analyzed results solely from applying 
capital budgeting theory to various standardized 
assumptions about conditions in an SBÜ and its 
competitive environment. Therefore, the coefficients in 
the regression equation are specific only to those 
standardized assumptions about the SBU and may have 
little general usefulness. Further, the correlation 
coefficients measure only the degree of nonlinearity in 
the relationship. They cannot, by construction, consider 
the possibility of missing independent variables.
It is not the goal of this section to calculated a 
general formula to describe NPV a's a function of the four 
variables proposed. Such a goal would be suspect due to
wide variation possible in conditions within an SBU and 
its competitive environment, especially size, length and 
shape of the product life cycle. It is the goal of this 
section to quantify how important each variable is in 
determining NPV. I propose that a reasonable way to 
accomplish that is through elasticity calculations from 
the results of multiple linear regression. Since the
standardized assumptions regarding the SBU are, I
believe, reasonable and comprehensive, such elasticities 
should be broadly applicable to the real world, at least 
within the limits of R^.
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All data points result from applying the
standardized assumptions to capital budgeting theory,
i.e., there is a direct functional relationship.
Therefore, it is theoretically possible to calculate
exactly how important each variable is in determining NPV 
by taking partial derivatives of NPV with respect to each 
variable in turn. Eventhough the functional relationship 
is very complex, approximation methods applied on modern 
high speed computers could calculate such partial
derivatives to a high degree of accuracy. I have
considered and rejected such an approach in favor of
elasticities based on multiple linear regression,
eventhough the partial derivatives approach would clearly 
be more academically elegant. The reason is that partial 
derivatives would be complex mathematically, difficult
for practicing businessmen to appreciate and therefore 
unlikely to be applied in the real world. The
elasticities proposed, on the other hand, are simple 
mathematically, easy to appreciate and more likely to be 
applied, eventhough they are only approximations.
To help smooth out the effects of inherrent
non-linearity and to study interesting individual cases,
I will present fifteen separate linear regression 
results. For reasons to be discussed later, the results 
will be broken into two parts; (1) cases where the
experience curve slope is allowed to vary, and (2) cases
where the experience curve slope is held constant.
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Results with variable experience curve slopes
This subsection looks at nine cases where the 
experience curve slope is allowed to vary. They are;
1. All: All four variables, S^, Eg, R  and N,
are freely allowed to vary (i.e., at least 
within the limits specified in the model 
i nput).
2. New Products; The variable N, the position in 
the product life cycle, is held constant at year 
one. The other three variables, S^, Eg and 
R, are fully variable.
3. Equal View of the Market: The variable R, the 
competitor's view of the shape and size of the 
product life cycle, is held constant at the same 
level as the firm's. The other variables, S^, 
Eg and N, are fully variable.
4. High Share; The variable S^, the firm's 
initial market share, is limited to levels above 
60%. The other variables. Eg, R and N, are 
fully variable,
5. Low Share; The variable S^, the firm's initial 
market share, is limited to levels below 40%.
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The other variables, Eg, R and N, are fully 
variable.
6. "Stars": The variable S^ is limited to levels 
above 50%, and the variable N, the position in 
the product life cycle, is limited to years 
below eleven. The other variables. Eg and R, 
are fully variable,
7. "Question Marks"; The variable S^ is limited 
to levels below 60%, and the variable N is
limited to years below eleven. The other 
variables. Eg and R, are fully variable,
8. "Cash Cows"; The variable S^ is limited to 
levels above 50%, and the variable N is limited 
to years above ten. The other variables. Eg
and R, are fully variable,
9. "Dogs": The variable S^ is limited to levels 
below 60%, and the variable N is limited to 
years above ten. The other variables. Eg and 
R, are fully variable.
Figure 5-16, on the next page, lists the regression
equation, the associated correlation coefficient and the 
F-Test value for each case.
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FIGURE 5-16 THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS. VARIES
______ COEFFICIENTS FOR:
Eg R N CONSTANT R^ F
ALL 4564 17935 1002 7.3 5129 0.59 2176
NEW PRODUCTS 7778 30884 731 N/A 9098 0.77 354
EQUAL VIEW 4579 17824 N/A 9.9 5182 0.59 416
OF MARKET
HIGH SHARE -1806 11171 805 -95.1 8014 0.64 885
LOW SHARE 12560 22141 1038 126 3673 0.69 1446
"STARS" -1145 18552 1251 -69.6 10352 0.75 1050
"?" 14461 30786 1297 78.3 6894 0.83 2068
"COWS" -801 6790 506 -121 5784 0.59 457
"DOGS" 5635 12025 850 78.2 -5395 0.79 1489
Notice first the coefficients presented in Figure 
5-16. From prior work, we would expect the following.
Since is a positive number (ranging 0.1 to 0.9) and 
since we expect that NPV increases with the firm's
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initial share, the coefficient of should have a
positive sign. Since Eg is a negative number (ranging
-0 , 2 3 4 4 7 for a 85% experience curve slope to -0,62149 for 
a 65% experience curve slope) and since we expect that 
NPV decreases as the firm's experience curve slope
advantage declines, the coefficient of Eg should have a
positive sign. Since R is a positive number (ranging 0.0
to 0 ,3 0 ) and since we expect that NPV increases as the
competitor's view of the shape and size of the product 
life cycle decreases (i.e., as R increases), the
coefficient of R should have a positive sign. Finally, as 
shown in Figure 5-1, the sign on the coefficient of N
should logically vary. It should be negative in cases
w there is positive NPV as NPV declines with the 
passage of time and it should be positive when there is 
negative NPV as NPV grows (i.e., becomes less negative) 
with the passage of time.
The coefficients presented in Figure 5-16 follow the 
described logic above for Eg and R. With respect to N, 
the logic holds except for the first and third cases. In 
both cases, while the coefficient of N is positive, the 
value of the coefficient is very small and since R^ for 
both cases is only 0.59, the results are understandable, 
if not theoretically satisfying. As mentioned, we expect 
the coefficient of to be positive, if increases in 
the firm's initial share position increase the NPV of 
further investment in the SBU, The results are as 
expected except for "Stars", "Cash Cows", and High Share
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cases. This anomaly is directly related to the built-in 
assumption of a zero price elasticity as shown in Figure 
5-3 and Figure 5-13 and discussed there and in Appendix
4. To get a better look at the relationship among the 
variables for these high share cases, I have elected to 
present results of cases where the competitor's 
experience curve slope is held constant in the second 
part of this section.
Figure 5-16 also shows the correlation coefficients 
for each regression. Results indicate R^  ranges from a 
low of 0.59 to a high of 0.83. As previously mentioned, 
r2 in this context can only measure the degree of 
nonlinearity of the function and not the absence of 
important independent variables. Generally, the results 
of the correlations are not particularly high. Is this 
linear model sufficient as a useful tool? I believe it 
is, particularly when it is broken down into smaller, 
more linear segments like the BCG categories. Considering 
the degree of uncertainty involved in defining the 
product life cycle and understanding the competition, 
formulas that explain over two-thirds of the variation in 
NPV, based on wide variations in standard assumptions do 
not add appreciably to uncertainty. Finally, Figure 5-16 
also lists F-Test results for each case. The value 
strongly rejects the null hypothesis at the %^ level.
Figure 5-17, on the next page, shows the results of 
average elasticity calculation of NPV with respect to
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FIGURE 5-17 THE ELASTICITY RESULTS, E„ VARIES 
ELASTICITIES OF NPV WRT:
AVG MPV #
ALL 30.6 101.5 2.02 0.98 74.5 0.59 5985
NEW PRODUCTS 49.0 164.2 1.38 n/a 79.3 0.77 315
EQUAL VIEW 39.4 129.3 n/a 1.70 58.1 0.59 855
OF MARKET
HIGH SHARE 1.40 4.57 0.12 0.92 1030 0.64 1995
LOW SHARE 2.84 8.43 0.14 1.13 -1107 0.69 2660
"STARS" 0.58 5.29 0.13 0.93 1478 0.75 1400
"?" 3.87 11.59 0.17 0.38 -1120 0.83 1750
"COWS" 1.04 4.95 0.13 3.14 578 0.59 1260
"DOGS" 6.76 20.27 0.51 4.69 -250 0.64 1575
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each variable. Point elasticities are calculated 




To calculate average elasticities, the regression
coefficient for the variable is assumed to approximate
the partial derivative term, and the average of the
variable over the range and the average NPV in the range
are used to replace point estimates. Figure 5-17 also
2
shows the average NPV, the R and the number of data 
sets included in the case, all for reference. These 
average elasticities measure what percentage change 
occurs in NPV for a 1$ change in the independent 
variable.
Notice first the elasticities of the two variables
that refer to the competitive environment. Eg and R.
NPV is always most sensitive to changes in the relative
experience curve slope. In fact, in all cases the
elasticity of Eg is higher than all other variables
combined. NPV is always least sensitive to changes in how
the competitor views the shape and size of the product
life cycle, except for the "ALL" case, where it is next
2to last. The "ALL" case, however, has the lowest R and 
therefore the results regarding R are at least suspect.
With respect to the elasticity of S^, it is
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usually second most sensitive after Eg, except in 
"Stars" and "Cows" where the built-in assumption of zero 
price elasticity of demand causes distortions. The next 
part of this section clarifies those relationships.
Finally, NPV is generally not very sensitive to 
changes in the market growth rate, as measured by the 
position in the product life cycle, N. The only 
exceptions occur in the BCG categories "Cows" and "Dogs" 
where %^ changes in N produce 3$-5$ changes in NPV.
A final comment about Figure 5-17. Notice how very 
sensitive NPV is to changes in and Eg for the
first three cases. In each case, the average NPV is low 
within the case thus magnifying sensitivity.
The results of the regression analysis and the 
associated elasticities are generally satisfying. The 
overall conclusion must be that the firm's relative 
experience curve slope is most important in determining 
the financial success of a strategy of dominating a 
market. And that the firm's initial market share is more 
important than the growth rate, given the experience 
curve effect. Somewhat surprising, the competitor's view 
of the product is relatively unimportant, at least when 
compared to the other three. The reason, undoubtedly, is 
that R is the only variable that does not effect the 
participant's relative cost position over time, and 
therefore a small price change can overcome a large 
difference in market perception.
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Results with constant experience curve slope
This subsection looks at seven eases where the
competitor's experience curve slope is held constant at 
the same slope as that of the firm. The cases presented 
are the same as those shown before with Eg held 
constant and the New Product and Equal View of the Market 
cases dropped. I have concentrated on those cases where 
the firm's initial share is included in the case
definition, because as discussed, it appears that the 
combination of high initial market share and large
experience curve slope advantage combine with the
assumption of zero price elasticity to offset some of the 
advantages of relative share.
Figure 5-18, on the next page, lists the regression 
equation, the associated correlation coefficient and the 
F-Test value for each case, assuming both participants 
have equal experience curve slopes. While logic demands 
and the results of the previous subsection clearly shows 
the importance of relative experience curve slopes in 
determining NPV, I believe large differences in 
experience curve slopes are unlikely, at least among 
"world class" competitors in the same market. The section 
entitled, "Long-Run Cost Estimation and the Experience 
Curve", reviewed the implications of differences in 
experience curve slopes. I believe that this subsection's 
presentation of the importance of each variable in 
determining NPV is more realistic for practicing
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businessmen than the results of the previous subsection, 
as long as they believe all participants are equally 
competent or close to it.
FIGURE 5-18 THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS. Eg CONSTANT 
COEFFICIENTS FOR: 
s. ■ _ E _  _E__ CONSTANT ^
ALL 5880 1017 103 -5196 0.70 945
"STARS" 2590 1410 -30.9 -1530 0.86 568
n 9 n 14355 1652 152 -8494 0.94 1972
"COWS" 655 337 -29.4 47 0.74 242
"DOGS" 5719 507 246 -6553 0.80 412
HIGH SHARE 996 817 -38.7 -153 0.86 850
LOW SHARE 12019 1077 247 -8203 0.88 1253
Notice first the coefficients presented in Figure 
5-18. The sign on the coefficient of S^ is positive in 
each case, as expected. Since S^ is a positive number, 
NPV increases with the firm's initial market share. The 
sign on the coefficient of R is likewise always positive, 
and since the higher R is, the less the competitor
- 2 4 2 -
thinks the market attractive, and the higher the firm's
NPV. The sign of the coefficient of N varies. As already
discussed the coefficient should be negative if NPV is
positive and vice versa. The results are as expected. The
signs of the regression coefficients make sense!
Figure 5-18 also shows the correlation coefficients
2
for each regression. Results indicate R ranges from a 
low of 0.70 up to 0.94. Again, the F-Test results, also 
listed, strongly rejects the null hypothesis at the 1%
o
level of confidence. As expected, the R improves
substantially as the "ALL" case is broken down into
2
smaller, more linear quadrants. The highest R occurs 
in "?" SBÜS and the lowest in "Cows". The conclusion must 
be that the function is most linear near N = 1 and =
0.1 and least linear near N = 19 and = 0.9 as
• 2
demonstrated in Figure 5-7. Overall, the R is much
higher when variations in the highly nonlinear experience 
curve slope is excluded.
Figure 5-19, on the next page, shows results of 
average elasticity calculations of NPV with each variable 
when the competitor’s experience curve slope is held 
constant. The format is as described for Figure 5-17.
Generally, NPV is most sensitive with respect to 
changes in the firm's initial market share, S^. For 
"Stars", share is overwhelmingly the most important 
determinant of NPV. For "Problem Children", the dominance 
of share continues. Later in the product life cycle, the 
growth rate becomes more important. In fact for "Dogs"
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the growth rate, as measured by N, is almost twice as 
important in determining NPV. This is certainly as
EIGURE_5-1.9_THE,ELASTICITY RESULTS. Eg, CONSTANT 
ELASTICITIES,OF,NPV WRT;
AYG NPV #
ALL 2.75 0.14 0.96 -1068 0.70 1197
"STARS" 4.79 0.54 0.43 393 0.86 280
"?" 1.39 0.08 0.27 -3104 0.94 350
"COWS" 3.32 0.34 2.98 148 0.74 252
"DOGS" 1.59 0.07 3.43 -1076 0.80 315
HIGH SHARE 2.10 0.32 1.00 380 0.86 399
LOW SHARE 1.17 0.06 0.96 -2569 0.88 532
expected. Early in the product life cycle, share is 
important in determining future costs. Later on, with 
slower growth, share differences have little influence on 
relative cost.
Interestingly, the competitor's view of the market, 
R, is the least important variable in all cases shown.
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except for "Stars". It is highly inelastic in all other 
cases, particularly when the firm's initial share is low. 
However, as might be anticipated, when we have a 
particularly attractive SBU, i.e., a "Star", then the 
competitor's opinion of that market assumes greater 
importance.
The general conclusions of this section are that (1) 
thé firm's relative experience curve slope is most 
important in determining the financial attractiveness of 
a strategy of market dominance. A poor initial share 
position can be overcome if the firm can get costs down 
faster than competition. Even a high initial share 
position cannot protect the firm if it is incompetent. 
(2) Assuming that most competitor's are equally 
competent, then share usually dominates growth and 
competitive view of the market. (3) Splitting SBUs into 
the BCG quadrants adds information about the relative 
importance of each variable and increases linearity.
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PRICING IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
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In the section "Limit Pricing", it was shown that the
firm can discourage the competitor's further investment
in an SBU with a correct pricing strategy. Considering 
that the competitor makes his investment decisions based 
partially on expected prices over the entire product life 
cycle, it was further shown that the firm needs to set a 
believable price pattern over time, the assumption of 
this thesis as described in the section "Integration of 
the tools" is that price will follow the firm's costs as 
a constant percentage markup. As discussed, that
assumption is made because it seems most believable to
the competitor and it follows the suggestions of the
Boston Consulting Group.
It is the purpose of this section to :
♦ Describe again how a proper pricing strategy may 
be used by the firm to discourage competitive
expansion.
♦ Demonstrate and interpret a proper pricing 
strategy given specified parameters about the 
competitive environment.
♦ Describe quantitatively what happens to the 
pricing pattern over time, assuming the firm is
successful in discouraging competitive
expans i o n .
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Pricing strategy logic
It is assumed that the competitor makes investment 
decisions based on the net present value of incremental 
cash flows, and that the competitor will not invest 
further in an SBU if the net present value of such 
investment is at most zero. Since price is a major 
controllable variable, it makes sense that at some price 
(actually pricing pattern), the competitor will find the 
net present value unattractive. Of major importance in 
the model proposed in this thesis is the calculation of 
exactly that pricing pattern. The logic of that 
calculation follows.
The competitor's incremental cash flows from further 
investment in an SBU are the difference between what cash 
flows occur if he invests and if he fails to invest. If 
the competitor invests in the SBU at the same rate as the 
market, and he expects prices to fall in line with the 
firm's cost, then the competitor's costs will decline 
with his cumulative volume and the price will also 
decline, but in line with the competitor's cost, as well 
as the firm’s cost. The reason is simple. If the 
competitor grows with the market, then both the firm and 
the competitor progress equally fast down the experience 
curve. If price is a constant percentage markup on the 
firm's cost, then it is also a constant percentage markup 
on the competitor’s cost.
The competitor's earnings are then a function of his
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declining cost and the price pattern over time yet to be 
determined by the firm. The other component of cash flow 
is the competitor's investment requirements. Clearly, if 
the competitor expands sufficiently to maintain market 
share, it incurs negative cash flow. Combining properly 
the operating cash flows, which are a function of the 
unknown price pattern, and the investment requirement 
yields the net cash flows over time to the competitor if 
he expands with the market.
If the competitor elects not to expand, then his 
costs will decline, but not as fast as the firm's cost 
declines. The reason is simple. If the competitor does 
not expand and the firm does, the firm's growing relative 
cumulative volume will translate into a growing cost 
advantage. Further, if the competitor believes that price 
will be a function of the firm's cost, then he will 
predict lower prices if he fails to invest, along with 
higher costs and lower volume. Combining properly the 
competitor's estimate of his cost and volume along with 
the as yet unknown markup on the firm's cost yields the 
competitor's net cash flows over time if he elects not to 
expand. By definition there is no investment requirement 
if the competitor elects not to expand.
The problem from the perspective of the firm is to 
determine the proper percentage markup to discourage the 
competitor from investing. That percentage markup is the 
one that yields the competitor zero net present value on 
the competitor's incremental net cash flows. The model
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calculates that percentage markup and prints it out.
A pricing pattern_case study
It is useful, at this point, to use a concrete 
example to clarify a proper pricing strategy. As an 
example, assume the firm's market share is 70%, the 
competitor's market share is 30%, the SBU is at the 
beginning of its product life cycle, and both the firm 
and the competitor view the product life cycle 
identically and have equal experience curve slopes. 
Under these conditions, the competitor is able to 
calculate his costs and the firm's both if he expands and 
if he does not. Figure 5-20, on the next page, sets out 
those costs, based on the "standard" assumptions;
Since the competitor can calculate both his and the 
firm's cost position over time under each option, his 
decision on investing in the SBU is a function of what 
price the firm sets in year one, assuming the competitor 
believes that the markup implied by the announced price 
will be maintained by the firm over the entire product 
life cycle. The model logic calculates the correct price 
that the firm should set is $48.09, a 59.5% markup on its 
cost.
With an implied 59,5% markup on the firm's cost, the 
competitor is able to calculate the price pattern it
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FIGURE 5-20. .COST PATTERNS IF THE COMPETITOR EXPANDS
VS IF THE COMPETITOR DOES NOT EXPAND
GQMEETlinB_DQE&_B0I_E2&AND
FIRM'S COMPETITOR'S FIRM'S COMPETITOR'S
fFAR COST COST COST ____ COST____
1 30.15 42.86 30.15 42.86
2 19.11 27.17 18.08 32.15
3 14.33 20.37 13.22 27.17
4 11.60 16.48 10.54 24.11
5 9.80 13.93 8.83 21.98
6 8.52 12.11 7.63 20.38
7 7.56 10.75 6.74 19.11
8 6.81 9.68 6.05 18.0 8
9 6.21 8.83 5.50 17.22
10 5.71 8.12 5.04 16.48
11 5.30 7.53 4.67 15.84
12 4.94 7.03 4.35 15.28
13 4.64 6.59 4.07 14.78
14 4.37 6.21 3.83 14.33
15 4.13 5.88 3.62 13.93
16 3.92 5.58 3.44 13.56
17 3.74 5.31 3.27 13.22
18 3.57 5.07 3.12 12.91
19 3.42 4.86 2.98 12.63
20 3.28 4.66 2.86 12.36
-251*
expects, both if the competitor expands and if he does 
not expand. Figure 5-21, on the next page, sets out those 
price patterns based on the firm's cost and the markup.
When the competitor calculates the net cash flow 
from each option, given the implied price pattern and his 
investment requirements if he expands, and calculates his 
net present value it will be zero. The reason is simple. 
The firm has made the identical calculation with its 
unknown percentage markup that makes the competitor's net 
present value zero.
The theoretical result of the firm's initial price 
of $48.09 is, as expected, that the competitor will not 
invest in maintaining market share. The implied pricing 
pattern entitled "Competitor Does Not Expand" in Figure 
5-21 will hold and the model calculates the firm's net 
present value of that strategy as positive $538. 
Therefore, given the conditions of this cast study, such 
a pricing strategy is attractive to the firm. Figure 
5-22, on the next page, shows the firm's costs and the 
price over the product life cycle, assuming success in 
discouraging competitive investment.
Actual pricing pattern held over time
As discussed in the section, "Limit Pricing", 
temporary success in discouraging competitive investment 
make the job of discouraging him in the future easier. 
The business is now basically less attractive to the
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competitor as his cost disadvantage widens and the time 
left to "enjoy" the market is shortened. The model 
calculates the percentage markup on the firm's cost for 
each year, assuming in discouraging competitive 
investment.
FIGURE 5.22. FIRM'S COST AND_PRLCE 
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Figure 5-23, on the next page, shows the calculation 
of the actual price pattern as a function of the firm's 
cost pattern and the percentage markup on the firm's cost 
calculated by the model to discourage competitive 
investment. The results are based on the same conditions 
described in the preceding subsection.
Notice, only nineteen years data is shown. Since 
calculations are based on incremental economics between 
the current position and the next year, and there is a 
twenty year product life cycle, there are nineteen data 
points. At the absolute end of the product life cycle, 
even an extremely high price would not encourage the 
competitor to expand. The reason is that any investment 
requires a cash outflow; and since the model assumes no 
salvage value, no investment, no matter the price, will 
be made, since any such investment will be immediately 
obsolete.
Figure 5-24, on the second following page, shows
graphically the actual price pattern and the firm's cost
over time. As time passes, actual price diverges from the 
firm's cost as first theorized in the section, 
"Integration of the Tools". However, as previously
mentioned, the price the firm actually received is a 
function of the cost-in-use of the best substitute.
Clearly, the price will not approach infinity as the life
cycle ends. Product users will substitute other products 
which are more reasonably priced.
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1 30.15 59.5 48.09
2 18.08 54.7 28.12
3 13.22 52.8 20.20
4 10.54 52.2 16.04
5 8.83 52.3 13.45
6 7.63 53.0 11.67
7 6.74 54.2 10.39
8 6.05 55.8 9.43
9 5.50 57.9 8.68
10 5.04 60.5 8.09
11 4.67 63.7 7.64
12 4.35 67.7 7.29
13 4.07 72.7 7.03
14 3.83 79.1 6.86
15 3.62 87.4 6.78
16 3.44 98.8 6.84
17 3.27 115.5 7.05
18 3.12 142.6 7.57
19 2.98 195.5 8.81
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FIGURE 5-24. ACTUAL PRICE PATIERN-AND-TPE_EIEM1S_CQSI
IN GRAPHICAL FORM
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Finally, at this point it is logical to comment on 
one final assumption made that affects all net present 
value numbers calculated by the model• A decision had to 
be made as to the price pattern to be used in calculating 
NPV. The three options are :
1, The pricing pattern assumptions used to create
the price pattern shown in Figure 5-22, That is, 
price parallels the firm’s cost,
2, The pricing patter assumptions used to create
the price pattern shown in Figure 5-23, That is, 
price diverges from the firms cost and heads for 
infinity.
3, Something in between 1 and 2, above.
Option 2 clearly becomes ridiculous, particularly as 
the product life cycle ends. Option 3, while
intellectually satisfying, requires the model to assume
not only the current cost-in-use of the best substitute 
product, but how the substitute product’s cost-in-use 
declines over time. Option 1 is the lowest price pattern 
and therefore the most conservative, Eventhough it is 
probably too conservative for the real world, it is the 
pricing pattern used by this model to calculate all net 
present values. What Option 1 implies is that the product 
provided by the SBU is only marginally better for
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customers than the next best available substitute and 
that both the product’s and the substitute’s cost decline 
over time in the same fashion. If the real world demands 
it, any appropriate substitute product’s cost-in-use 
decline pattern could be substituted in the model with 






Chapter 6 is designed to be the chapter in which all 
"loose ends" remaining are finally tied. Since this work 
is theoretical, I have elected to attempt to lend support 
to its conclusions by comparison to the PIMS study. Since 
this work is heavily dependent on the existence of the 
experience curve, I have elected to include a section on 
the results if the experience curve does not exist. Since 
I have preliminarily proposed that further investment in 
"Stars" does not always have the highest NPV, but is 
heavily dependent on how the competitor views the market, 
a final clarification is needed. And, since it is 
traditional, I have included a section in which I suggest 
areas for further research.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OP THIS THESIS 
TO PTMS RESUT.TS
-262"
The purpose of this section is to compare and 
contrast the theoretical findings of this thesis with the 
empirical results found by the PIMS project. It seems 
obvious that if this thesis’ findings are valid, it 
cannot conflict with PIMS results.
According to Buzzell, et al (1975:97),
”It is now widely recognized that one of the 
main determinants of business profitability is 
market share. Under most circumstances, 
enterprises that have achieved a high share of 
the markets they serve are considerably more 
profitable than their smaller share rivals...On 
average, a difference of 10 percentage points 
in market share is accompanied by a difference 
of about 5 points in pretax RDI.”
In support of that last comment Buzzell, et al (1975:98) 
shows graphically the relationship between market share 
and pretax KOI, which I have reproduced as Figure 6-1, on 
the next page.
As a comparison, I have calculated average NPV over 
the entire product life cycle, assuming market 
participants have equal experience curve slopes and view 
the market identically. Results are summarized in the 
table below Figure 6-1.
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I have combined these into categories approximating 
Figure 6-1 by assuming Buzzell*s 10-20% market share can 
be the average of my 10% and 20% market share, etc. The 
results are graphed in Figure 6-2.
FTGimE 6-2. THESIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 





30^40% Over 40%%Under 10% 10,20
Market Share
The results are interesting. First, the relationship 
is highly linear, as found by PIMS. Second, eventhough I
am using NPV instead of ROI as the y-axis, it appears the
profitability measure is reasonable. Note, the NPV when 
market share is over 40% is about zero, actually -382.
Since the thesis assumes a 15% cost of capital to
discount the firm's cash flows to net present value, and 
the thesis assumes a 50% tax rate, a zero NPV translates
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into a 30% "pretax IRR"• PIMS results, as shown in Figure 
6-1, show pretax ROI when market share is over 40% to be 
slightly less than 30%, consistent with this work.
Buzzell, et al (1975:99) reports that the main 
difference in ROI between high and low share businesses 
is caused by profit margin differences, not asset 
turnover differences or capacity utilization rates. Their 
findings are summarized below:
MARKET INVESTMENT CAPACITY PRETAX PROFIT
SHARE TO SALES (%) UTILIZATION (%) TO SALES (%)
Under 10% 68.66 74.7 -0.16
10-20% 67.74 77.1 3.42
20-30% 61.08 78.1 4.84
30-40% 64.66 75.4 7.60
Over 40% 63.98 78.0 13.16
As mentioned, this model calculates a price pattern 
designed to discourage competitive expansion based on a 
constant markup on the firm's cost. The size of that 
markup can be used as a surrogate to measure changes in 
profit margin as a function of share. The thesis results, 
shown on the next page, demonstrate that profit margin 
grows dramatically as share increases, assuming equal 
experience curve slopes and equal views of the product 
life cycle, as observed by the PIMS study.
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With respect to the other factors affecting ROI, the 
model as constructed allows for no differences based on 
share. For example, since the model assumes capacity can 
be added continuously rather than in discrete "lumps", 
both participants always operate at 100% of capacity.
And, since the cost of capacity is a function of the
experience curve and sales are also a function of the
experience curve, no difference can exist in the 
investment to sales ratio.
The thrust of this thesis is clearly to study the 
economics of changing market share using a pricing 
strategy to limit competitive expansion. Since Buzzell, 
et al (1975:104) relate PIMS results on how ROI is
affected by market share changes, it seems worthwhile to 
make the comparison. I have reproduced their findings as
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F i g u r e  6-3.
FIGURE 6-3. PIMS RESULTS.ON 





up 2 pointa 
or more
Holding: 
lees than 2 
points up or 
down
Harvesting: 
down 2 points 
or more
Avwaga ROI, 1970-1972
Under 10% 7.5% 10.4% 10.0%
l0%-20% 13.3 12.6 14.5
20%-30% 20.5 21.6 9.5
30%-40% 24.1 24.6 7.3
40% or over 29.6 31.9 32.6
Their most consistent relationship is that ROI 
suffers, at least temporarily, when a strategy of 
building market share is implemented. Since this thesis 
is designed to calculate cash flow required for net 
present value, rather than income statements and balance 
sheets required to calculate ROI, I have elected to 
recalculate only one case to check this thesis and PIMS 
findings. In fact, such recalculation requires additional 
assumptions. For instance, in the model I have assumed 
that all capital investment is immediately expensable 
rather than being capitalized and depreciated. With that 
assumption, net fixed assets are always zero and ROI 
would approach infinity. To simulate a more realistic 
financial accounting system, I have assumed that assets 
are capitalized as acquired and are depreciated over a 
ten-year life on a straight line basis assuming no
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salvage value.
Using that assumption I have calculated earnings and
investment for the case where the firm's initial share is
70% and where both market participants have equal
experience curve slopes and equal views of the product's 
life cycle. Taking a typical year, say year 10 of the 
product life cycle, calculations show an ROI of 37.1% if 
the firm implemented a strategy of gaining market share
versus an ROI of 38.7% for a strategy of maintaining
market share. Averaging all twenty years, for this case,
shows ROI about 0.7% less with a strategy of building 
market share when compared to a strategy of maintaining
market share. This is consistent with the Buzzell, et al
(1975:103) report that:
"Generally, the businesses that were 'building' 
(i.e., had share increases of at least 2 
points) had ROI of 1 to 2 points lower than 
those that maintained more or less steady 
('holding') positions."
Finally, Woo (1984) used PIMS results to contrast 48 
low performing market share leaders (which had pretax 
ROIs of less than 10%) with 71 high performing market 
share leaders (pretax returns exceeding 40%) to determine 
why the benefits of market share dominance were not 
universally enjoyed. This thesis contends that increasing 
market share is attractive financially, at least as long
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as the firm has reached the initial "critical mass" of 
market share. A review of her findings compared to thesis 
assumptions is worthwhile.
Woo (1984) found low performing market share leaders 
tended to have the following characteristics:
1. Slower growth markets -- 3% growth vs 5% growth 
for high performers.
2. Highly fragmented market -- 24% in markets with
twenty or more competitors vs 8% for high
performers.
3. High product and technology changes.
4. A market with exiting competitors.
5. Low value added.
6. Poorer reputation for quality.
7. Tendency to charge higher prices than
competition.
8. Tendency to have higher costs than 
competition.
None of these conditions fit this model except,
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interest ingly, #8! The market growth rate is always 
higher than 5%. There are only two participants in the 
market. Neither participant faces difficult product or 
technology changes. No participants exit the market. All 
of the value is added by the participants. The model 
allows for no product quality or price differences.
As long as competitors have equal experience curve 
slopes, the market share leader has, by definition, lower 
cost. However, this thesis allows differences in 
experience curve slopes. One of the primary findings of 
this work is that a higher initial market share cannot 
protect the firm if it is incompetent relative to its 
competitors. Woo's (1984) study corroborates!
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AnJÜSTMENTS TO THE THEORY IF 
EXPERIENCE, CURVES, DO_NOT_EXIST
- 2 7 2 -
In the section entitled "Long-Run Cost Estimation 
and the Experience Curve", both Kart's (1983) and Hall 
and Howell's (1983) criticism of the experience curve 
were reported. Basically, they argue that the experience 
phenomena does not exist because cost declines can be 
statistically explained using current volume (i.e. scale 
factors) instead of cumulative volume (i.e. experience). 
In that section, I promised to address the effect on the 
model if such criticism proves to be true. This 
section fulfills that promise.
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Again, this thesis assumes that the net present 
value to the firm of further investment in an SBÜ is a
function of the position in the product life cycle (N), 
the firm's relative market share (S^), the competitor's 
view of the product life cycle (R) and the relative 
slopes of the participants' experience curve (Eg)* That 
i s :
NPV =/(N, S^, R, Eg)
The chapter entitled, "Mapping Results", reported 
that NPV increases if it is early in the product life 
cycle and if the firm's relative share is high, as
predicted by the Boston Consulting Group. Further, the 
model predicted that the firm's NPV of further investment 
in an SBÜ will be high if the competitor views the market 
as less attractive than does the firm and if the firm has 
an experience curve slope advantage.
What if the experience curve does not exist? What if 
cost declines as a function only of current scale? If so, 
the importance of current relative market share and 
future relative market share may under certain conditions 
still be important. The value of past relative market
share is zero. Before proceeding further, let us examine
the conditions under which current and future relative 
market share are important.
If scale factors alone determine cost, then the 
value of market share must be a function of minimum
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economic scale. Assume a market size of 300 units with a 
minimum economic scale for production facilities of 200 
units. If the firm has a two-thirds share, then he will 
have a cost advantage at least as long as it takes the 
competitor to reach a sales volume of 200 units through 
market growth, assuming share remains constant. However, 
if technological advances increase the minimum economic 
scale over time, that cost advantage may persist. In 
contrast, if the minimum economic scale if only 50 units 
in a 300 unit market, then a two-thirds share provides no 
cost advantage. Therefore, without the experience curve, 
the importance of relative market share is strongly 
dependent on minimum economic scale, and changes in 
minimum economic scale with changes in technology.
Eventhough cost advantages may persist as a function 
of market share even without the experience curve 
phenomena, it seems obvious that the value of market 
share in determining attractive investment opportunities 
in SBU's will decline, if experience curves do not exist. 
As already mentioned, since this thesis elects to assume 
the existence of experience curves, no attempt will be 
made to quantify that potential reduction in the value of 
market share.
The second major way in which experience curves 
enter the model is through changes in the relative slopes 
of the participant's experience curve, the variable 
called Eg. An experience curve slope measures how 
efficient a competitor is in reducing cost through
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experience. If one competitor has a steeper experience 
curve slope than another, then his costs will decline
further for an equal change in cumulative volume. And, a 
cost advantage will persist without the influence of 
market share.
Is anything analogous possible if experience curves 
do not exist? Of course! Varying experience curve slopes 
are nothing more conceptually than measuring the 
efficiency of a competitor, or as McKinsey might call it, 
their "business strength". Without experience curves,
cost positions over time are determined by long-run 
average cost curves, which are simple envelopes enclosing 
successive short-run average cost curves. Could a cost 
advantage over competitor’s persist without the 
experience phenomena? Certainly* if one competitor had a 
lower long-run average cost curve and could maintain it 
over time. Assume that were possible, eventhough there 
are good arguments that it isn’t, just as there are good 
arguments that long-run differences in experience curve 
slopes cannot persist. How would differences in 
"efficiency" between competitors influence the investment 
attractiveness of an SBÜ?
Without experience curves, cumulative volume does 
not effect cost and assuming scale does not change, cost 
differences based on efficiency remain constant. For 
example, assume the sales volume for each firm is 100
units per year and sales remain constant over time.
Further assume that one competitor’s cost is $10 and the
- 2 7 6 -
Other’S is $12, the difference based on difference in the 
positions of long-run average cost curves. Ten years 
later, the cost difference is still $2, assuming scale 
has not changed. On the other hand, assume experience 
curves do exist and the initial assumptions still hold; 
however assume that efficiency is measured by experience 
curve slope, and the competitor with a $10 initial cost 
has a 70% experience curve slope, while the competitor 
with a $12 initial cost has only a 75% slope. Ten years 
later, experience curves would predict cost declines such 
that only a $1.56 difference in cost would remain instead 
of a $2 difference without experience curves.
The conclusion, perhaps, is that efficiency 
differences based on differences in long-run average cost 
positions are more important than efficiency differences 
based on different experience curve slopes, particularly 
in slowly growing businesses. Again, as with market 
share, no attempt will be made here to quantify the 
relationship.
The other two variables —  the current position in 
the product life cycle as viewed by the firm (N), and the 
competitor’s view of the product life cycle (R) are not 
influenced by the existence of the experience curve. They 
both are market rather than cost oriented. Therefore, 
their importance in determining the investment 
attractiveness of an SBÜ should be uninfluenced by the 
existence of experience curves.
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FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE NPV OF "STARS" 
AS_A_FUNCTION'OF THE COMPETITIVE VIEW 
OF THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
-278-
As first mentioned in the subsection entitled, 
"Usefulness of portfolio matrix analysis", it seems 
logical that "Stars" are the highest value SBUs to the 
firm, since by definition, a "Star" has a long remaining 
life and it enjoys a cost advantage over competition. 
However, it also appears logical that a case can be made 
that the NPV of further investment by the firm is not 
necessarily high for "Stars", and is a function of how 
the competition views the current position in the product 
life cycle and his likely investment action based on that 
assessment. This section fulfills the promise made to 
investigate and comment further.
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As a basis for further discussion, allow me to
reproduce the argument. Assume a simple competitive
environment with only two players, the firm (A) and a
competitor (B), and allow the transformation of the B C G ’s 
"growth" axis into position in the product’s life cycle. 
Figure 6-4, on the next page, shows the position on the 
matrix of the firm at A and therefore the firm’s estimate 
of the competitor’s position at B q . Two alternate
positions for the competitor are also shown depending on
how he views the product. Note, there can be no argument 
about the current relative market share, and therefore 
the relative cost position if the experience curve effect 
is in force. But reasonable men can differ on the 
position in the product life cycle, primarily based on
their ability to understand the market. At B ^ , the
competitor believes it is very early in the life cycle. 
At B g , he believes it is much later, even later than 
the firm suspects.
Will the competitor’s response vary depending on 
whether he views his position as being B^ or Bg?
Likely so -- the competitor is much more apt to select 
the business for further support if he believes the 
business is located at B^ instead of B g . As
previously discussed, the way a firm moves a "Problem
Child" product toward becoming a "Star" is to invest in 
market share. Generally, a competitor selecting one of 
















result in lower prices and/or higher costs and therefore 
lower earnings and cash flow for the "Star".
Logically, there are basically two extremes in
incremental cash flow that the firm can expect from 
further investment in its "Star". They depend primarily 
on whether and to what extent the competitor desires to 
increase share. Let's look in more detail at those two 
extremes.
The firm's present value of further investments in 
it "star" business, given the competitor thinks that his 
position is at , is very high. A look at the firm's 
incremental cash flow position for investing versus not 
will show why. If the firm invests, it will likely 
maintain share and therefore volume; and if the
"experience curve" effect is in operation, it will also 
maintain a cost advantage over its competition. If it 
fails to invest, and the competitor does as he is likely 
to do, the firm will lose share and volume, and the cost 
advantage will deteriorate. The difference between those 
two scenarios is likely to produce large incremental cash 
flows and therefore a large present value for further 
investment in the "Star" business.
Conversely, the present value of further investment
by the firm, given the competitor thinks that his
position is at is not nearly so high. Again, an
incremental cash flow analysis tells the story. If the 
firm invests and the competitor does not, it is true that 
the firm's market share will grow and its cost advantage
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on the experience curve will widen. However, if it fails
to invest and the competitor does not fill the void, no
volume will be lost and prices might even improve as 
product scarcity takes over. Further, the firm's 
operating rates, i.e. operation as a percent of capacity, 
would likely improve thus lowering costs. The total 
effect may well be only a small incremental cash flow and 
therefore a low present value of further investments in 
the "Star" business.
The argument is logical, but it is flawed because it 
relies on the erroneous investment directions of the 
Boston Consulting Group. They say that certain "Problem 
Children" SBUs should be invested in with the intention 
of transforming them into "Stars". This thesis clearly 
shows that "Problem Children" are incorrigible! That is 
they can not be profitably converted into "Stars" if 
market share must be bought by price, or price equivalent 
competition. This is best shown in the Chapter 5 
subsection entitled, "Position in the product life cycle 
vs. the firm's initial market share (N, S^)".
Therefore, if competition were aware of the
unattractiveness of further investment in their "Problem
Children", it is unlikely they would make such investment 
even if they believed the product to be much earlier in 
its product life cycle than does the firm. This is best 
shown in the Chapter 5 subsection entitled, "The firm's 
initial market share vs. the competitor's view of the 
product life cycle (S^, R)".
- 2 8 3 -
The only exception to these findings is if the 
competitor believes he is more competent than the firm, 
i.e., has a steeper experience curve slope. In that case 
the competitor can justify investment in "Problem 
Children" SBUs. This is best shown in the Chapter 5 
subsection entitled, "The firm's initial market share vs. 
the competitors experience curve slope (S^, Eg)".
The implications of this section are major. First, 
if both participants in the market operate under the 
erroneous investment directives of the Boston Consulting 
Group, then firms that invest in low share SBUs with the 
intention of developing "Stars" will generally find their 
investments financially unattractive; and further, their 
pricing actions to buy share will at least partially 
destroy the benefit of high share to the dominant firm. 
Again the murder and suicide analogy.
Second, if the dominant firm alone is operating 
under the BCG directives, it may place too much 
importance on how its low share competitors view the 
products position in its life cycle. It may be too 
conservative in its investments in its "Star" product, or 
it may devote too many resources to discovering what its 
competitors think of the product.
However, if all participants operate under the same 
correct rules, "mistakes" can be avoided and scarce 
corporate resources can be channeled to their most 
productive uses.
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In a theoretical thesis, particularly one that 
proposes a complex model for the real world, suggestions 
for further research seem to present themselves with
great regularity as the work progresses. For presentation 
purposes, I have elected to organize those suggestions




With respect to theory, this thesis made three major 
assumptions. It assumed that financial theory could 
provide an appropriate cost of capital with which cash 
flows can be discounted to net present value. As 
mentioned in the section entitled "Traditional Capital 
Budgeting Theory, Similarities and Contrasts to Strategic 
Planning", significant controversy remains regarding the 
cost of capital. The conclusions presented in this thesis 
are certainly influenced by the cost of capital. 
Appropriate conclusions in the real world await 
settlement of that issue.
The thesis assumes that the market includes only the 
firm and one competitor. This assumption was made 
necessary because limit pricing theory is designed to 
consider pricing based on the economics of one competitor 
if experience curve effects are important. As mentioned 
in the section entitled "Limit Pricing", if there are 
multiple large scale competitors, then intermediate cost 
competitors must be discouraged from expansion not only 
by the limit price but by threat of retaliation by the 
low cost producer if they expand. Further work is needed 
to define how such threats may be made meaningful and 
pred ictable.
Perhaps most importantly, this thesis is built on 
the assumption that the experience curve phenomena 
exists. Recent criticism deny its existence. Even
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considering the limited data on which the criticism is 
based and the lack, so far, of extensive academic debate, 
the critics' points are well made. While I personally
believe that experience curves do exist, and that scale
expansion is an important part of it, further academic
debate and research are sorely needed to settle this 
important question.
The model proposed in this thesis is naturally a 
compromise between what should be done to most fully 
describe the variables and conditions that determine the 
attractiveness of further investment in an SBÜ and what 
can be done considering limited time and a sincere desire 
to limit the scope of the work to a reasonable size. 
Given unlimited resources and time, I would suggest the 
following changes in the model to make it more "real 
worldly".
First, with respect to the assumed product life 
cycle, I would suggest a bell-shaped curve for industry 
sales versus time instead of the right triangle used in 
the model. Clearly, a more realistic product life cycle 
would yield more believable results. Further, it would 
allow a test of the effect of declining sales on the NPV 
of the firm's investments in SBUs. This would allow a 
full critique of the McKinsey matrix. Also, the model 
assumed that the competitor views the market as having
- 2 8 8
the same shape and length as the firm. More realistic
would be varying the competitor's view of shape and 
length; as well as the size of the product life cycle.
Second, the model assumes that no matter when
capital investment is required, such assets last until
the end of the product life cycle. More reasonable would 
be the assumption that capital assets have a more limited 
life and that such assets have a residual value on
disposal. Further, the model assumes no working capital 
investments requirement. More reasonable would be the 
assumption that working capital requirements grow during 
the growth stage and decline as the product matures.
Third, the model assumes a continuous world in which 
both prices and capacity can be changed incrementally.
More realistic would be adjustments that allow the
inclusion of pricing focal point and minimum economic
scale for capacity expansions.
Fourth, the model assumes both a constant cost of
capital between the firm and its competitor and a 
constant cost of capital over time. Assuming the
traditional view on the cost of capital, it seems most
logical that capital costs could vary between
participants based on varying debt to equity ratios as 
determined by varying corporate risk preferences. 
Undoubtedly, such differences would be important in 
determining SBÜ investment attractiveness. Furthermore, 
over such long periods of time as implied by the full
product life cycle of an SBU, capital costs would be
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expected to vary. Particularly considering the 
historically high current cost of capital, variations in 
such costs would be a useful refinement.
Finally, the model assumes a zero price elasticity 
of demand. Much more useful would be a functional 
relationship between the quantity demanded and the price 
level, perhaps also related to the position in the 
product life cycle.
Experimental
The true test of a theoretical proposal is its 
reasonableness in the real world. As such a test, I 
propose the following. First, do the conclusions of the 
model, fully explained, make sense to the decision makers 
in the real world? I, naturally, predict the answer is 
yes! The conclusion that the firm's competence in the 
business (as measured by its relative experience curve 
slope) is most important can not be controversial. The 
conclusion that share is more important than growth makes 
sense if relative costs are more a function of share than 
growth. Finally, the conclusion that the competitor's 
view of the market is least important is logical once we 
realize that this is the only variable that is not 
influenced by the experience curve and therefore does not 
influence relative cost positions in the future.
Finally, and most likely most importantly, further 
researchers should look for evidence that investments
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made with characteristics predicted by the model as those 
yielding highest NPV actually perform as predicted. 
Again, that should be those investments with the longest 
expected remaining life, those with the highest initial 
share for the firm, those that the firm believes the 
competitors view the market as less attractive than the 
firm and those in which the firm is believed to have an 
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Small scale competitive threats
In dealing with the case of small scale, fringe 
competitors, who view the dominant firm's price as a 
given, the problem for the dominant firm is to choose the 
best price, from its own perspective, considering the 
likely output of the competitive fringe at whatever price 
it sets, A graphical description of the problem is shown 
in Figure Al-1, on the next page.
The total market demand is P^D. The supply curve 
for all members of the fringe is PgSp. The
competitive fringe supply curve is assumed linear to 
simplify construction. Clearly at a price of Pq  or 
below, the fringe will supply nothing since price is 
below their minimum marginal cost, and at a price of P^ 
or above, the fringe will supply all the demand. Assuming 
the dominant firm knows the fringe supply function it 
will know how much the fringe will supply at each 
announced price, and therefore by difference from the 
total market demand curve, how much will be left for it 
to supply. By construction, angles "A" are equal. Hence, 
the dominant firm's residual demand curve is the kinked 
line P^D'D and its marginal revenue curve is P^MR, 
The dominant firm can then equate marginal revenue and 
marginal cost, announce a price, P, produce a quantity 
Qg and have profit equal to the area of the shaded 
rectangle. Similarly, the fringe competitors will accept 
the price, P, and produce Qp, which equals Q^,-Qg,
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at least in the short run.
However, in the long-run, if the price is above the 
fringe competitors average total cost, A T C p , the fringe 
will earn economic profit and will as time passes have an 
incentive to expand capacity. Also, potential fringe
competitors will be attracted. The effect over time of
such expansion and new entry will be to shift the fringe 
supply function downward and to the right thereby 
increasing the quantity . supplied by the fringe,
decreasing the dominant firm's long-run profits. This 
process will continue as long as the fringe producers 
average total cost is below the market price or until the 
fringe producers' share becomes so large that they can no 
longer ignore the effect their output decision has on 
price, i.e. they recognize their oligopolistic 
interdependence.
A simple way for the dominant firm to avoid this 
problem of erosion of market share by fringe competitors 
is to set a price at which the fringe is discouraged from 
expanding. Clearly though, this means a price that 
forgoes maximized short-run profits. Such a limit 
pricing strategy is shown in Figure Al-2 on the next page. 
Assume that the dominant firm's residual demand 
curve is the line P^AB, that is the amount supplied
by the competitive fringe has been subtracted from the
total market demand function. If the dominant firm is a 
monopolist, the line P^AD then represents total
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market demand. Assume that the conditions describing a
threat to the market share of the dominant firm by the
competitive fringe also apply; namely, their output is 
small individually when compared to market demand and 
they take the price set by the dominant firm as a given, 
unaffected by their output decision. Let be the
price that just equals the lower average total cost per
unit, normal profit included, for the fringe competitors. 
If the dominant firm holds the price above P^, existing 
fringe competitors will be encouraged to expand and 
potential fringe competitors will be encouraged to enter 
the market, because more than "normal" profits could be 
earned. If the dominant firm persists in holding the
price above P^, the fringe will continue to expand 
until the dominant firm's market share is essentially 
zero. Given that tendency by fringe competitors, the 
dominant firm's long-run demand curve becomes perfectly
elastic at price P^, if it wishes to deter market share
loss to the competitive fringe. The effective demand
curve for the dominant firm becomes the kinked line 
P^AD, and the dominant firm must satisfy the market 
demand, Q^, at the limit price, P^.
The concept of a perfectly price elastic long-run 
demand curve over much of the relevant output range for a 
monopolist or the dominant firm in an oligopoly may
require further theoretical support to be convincing.
Clark (1940:248) was first to suggest that long-run
demand schedules might:
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"in numerous cases approach the horizontal so 
closely that the slope would not be a matter of 
material movement, in light of all the 
uncertainty involved."
Clark's work was followed by Heflebower (1954) and by 
Andrews (1964) who suggested that such elasticity is 
caused not only by the long-run threat of competitive
entry but also from the long-run threat from competitive 
products. A simple description of the logic of the threat 
from competitive, or substitute products follows.
Essentially all products have substitutes —  steel 
for wood, aluminum for steel, engineering plastic for 
aluminum, etc. The consumer's choice between substitute 
products is affected b/ the product's cost-in-use which 
is determined by its physical properties and its price. 
Competition between substitutes caused by relative price 
changes is more intense in the long-run than in the
short-run, caused by adjustment lags on both the demand 
and supply sides of the market The effect of these
factors is to make market demand much more sensitive to
price in the long-run. Such a high degree of demand 
elasticity effectively restrains the price the monopolist 
or oligopolistic group can charge without inviting sales 
losses through the substitution effect.
The profitability of a limit pricing strategy by the 
dominant firm depends upon how low the limit price, Pj^ ,
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is when compared with his costs and what output quantity 
the dominant firm has designed his production facility to 
operate at most efficiently. Figure Al-3 on the next page 
assumes the dominant firm's minimum average total cost is 
reached at the quantity demanded at the limit price. 
Under these conditions and following a limit pricing 
strategy, the dominant firm will earn supranormal profits 
enclosed by the rectangle P^ABC. Using the same
dominant firm cost functions, but assuming no threat to 
market share exists, the dominant firm would equate 
marginal revenue and marginal cost and set a price Pj^ ,^ 
supply an output Qjyj and earn supranormal profits 
enclosed by the rectangle P^^DEF. The profits earned at 
the short-run maximizing price, P^, will exceed those 
earned at the limit price, P^, at least in the 
short-run.
The decision that the dominant firm faces is then 
either higher short-run profits, declining over time as 
market share is eroded by the competitive fringe, or 
lower limit pricing profits, remaining constant over time 
as market share is maintained. Both assuming cost 
functions remain unvarying over time. Such a dilemma is 
shown in Figure Al-4, on the second following page.
The solution to the dilemma depends upon the discount 
rate applied to the cash flows that result from either 
strategy, and the rate at which the competitive fringe 
will expand output at the dominant firm's short-run 
profit maximizing price.
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Scherer (1980:237) explains the dynamics of 
expansion by and new entry into the competitive fringe, 
causing market share erosion to the dominant firm to be 
described by the simple differential equation:
dQ/dT = k [P^ft) - P^]
where dQ/dT is the rate of fringe expansion, k is the
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rate at which fringe competitors respond to the 
supranormal profit potential of a price higher than the
limit price, and [P^^t) - P^] describes the profit
stimuli to the fringe, where P^^t) is the market price 
set by the dominant firm over time and is the limit 
price required to maintain the dominant firm’s market
share. Depending on conditions in the market, e.g. a 
product in decline, and the rate of expansion by the 
fringe and the k factor in the differential equation
above, the optimum strategy for the dominant firm may be
to set. a price above the limit price and allow market 
share to deteriorate.
fffects of the exoerience_curve. on_1imjt_Driclng
A final, and extremely important, consideration is 
the effect the Boston Consulting Group’s experience curve 
has on the strategic implications of limit pricing. All 
previous discussion on setting a limit price to deter 
both fringe and large scale erosion of market share 
assumed that the cost functions of both the dominant firm 
and new and potential entrants were static over time. In 
fact, the effect of the experience curve is that relative 
costs depend on total accumulated production volume. And, 
if a limit pricing strategy is successful in deterring 
expansion, the dominant firm’s experience will grow
faster than his competitors. The dominant firm’s cost 
advantage will grow and the rewards of a limit pricing
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policy will increase over time.
Figure Al-5, on the next page, shows the effect of 
the experience curve on limit pricing for small scale or 
fringe competitors. Assume initially the dominant firm’s 
long-run residual demand curve is given by the kinked 
line P^AD, because P^ is the limit price set to 
discourage small scale entry. The dominant firm then 
producers quantity on its average total cost curve 
ATCjj and earns supranormal profits enclosed by the 
rectangle P^ABC. Assume further that demand grows over 
time and the limit pricing strategy is successful in 
deferring capacity additions at the fringe. At this later 
point in time the dominant firm’s residual demand curve 
becomes the kinked line P^^’D D ’. The limit price
required at the fringe has been assumed to fall to Pj^’
from P^ because the fringe producers’ costs have
declined with their added experience. However, the 
dominant firm’s costs have declined even further to
A T C p ’ from ATCp because the dominant firm has 
increased market share as the market grows and expansion 
of the fringe is zero. The dominant firm now produces 
quantity Q ^ ’ and its profits explode to the area
enclosed by the shaded rectangle P ^ ’DEF.
Figure Al-6, on the second following page, shows the 
effect of the experience curve on limit pricing to deter 
large scale entry. Recall, the limit price P^ is set by 
taking the potential large scale entrant’s cost at his 
minimum operating scale (assumed to be the same as the
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dominant firm's minimum average total cost), OC on the 
price-cost axis, and adding to it an amount slightly less 
than the market price would fall if the potential large 
scale producer entered at his minimum operating scale, 
CP 2^ on the price-cost axis. Given the conditions shown
the dominant producers profits will be the area enclosed
by the shaded rectangle Pj^ABC. As time passes, and 
assuming demand increases, the price required to limit 
large scale entry may remain P^, because the potential 
entrance has accumulated no experience and his costs have 
not declined. However, the dominant firm's costs have not 
declined to ATC^' due to experience; and its profits 
have exploded to the area of the shaded rectangle 
P^DEF. Moreover, as long as entry is deterred, the 
dominant firm's cost advantage over the potential large 
scale new entrant will increase and the profit of such a 
strategy will grow. The above assumes that the Bain's 
limit price required, P^, will not decline over time 
because the potential entrant's costs will not decrease 
because of the lack of the experience of production. It 
does seem reasonable that some of the dominant firm's 
cost reducing knowledge, gained from its experience, will 
"leak out" as production techniques become well known, as 
knowledgeable employees leave, as patents expire, and as 
a result of reverse engineering. If that occurs, Pj^
will decline over time and we face the exact conditions
shown in Figure Al-5 and discussed earlier.
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ANNUAL SALES. VOLUME DISCOUNTED.AT
10% -15% 20%
100 100.0 100.0 100.0
2 200 181.8 173.9 166.7
3 300 247.9 226.8 208.3
4 400 300 .5 263.0 231.5
5 500 341.5 285.9 241.2
6 600 372 .5 298.3 241.1
7 700 395 .2 302 .6 234.4
8 800 410.4 300.7 223.3
9 900 419.9 294.2 209 .3
10 1000 424.1 284.3 193.8
11 1100 424.1 271.9 177.7
12 1200 420 .6 257.9 161.5
13 1300 414.2 243.0 145.9
14 1400 405.6 227.5 130.9
15 1500 395.0 212.0 116.9
16 1600 383.0 196.6 103.8
17 1700 369.9 181.7 92.0
18 1800 356 .0 167.2 81.2
19 1900 341.8 153.5 71.4




DATA SOURCE FOR MAPPING RESULTS
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DATA SOURCE FOR FIGURES 5-1 AND 5-8
KFV = r (N.S^I. Eg =.75. R = .15
FIRM'S MARKET SHARE (Î)
YR 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
1 947 884 538 -23 -795 -1801 -3105 -4840 -7360
2 845 767 424 -125 -882 -1874 -3168 -4904 -7443
3 776 700 374 -148 -871 -1827 -3087 -4798 -7336
4 720 649 346 -145 -829 -1741 -2954 -4621 -7137
5 670 607 327 -131 -773 -1636 -2796 -4408 -6883
6 624 569 312 -112 -712 -1524 -2624 -4173 -6589
7 • 579 533 298 " -91 -647 -1406 -2443 -3920 -6263
8 536 497 285 -70 -582 -1284 -2254 -3652 -5908
9 492 461 272 -50 -515 -1160 -2059 -3370 -5523
10 448 424 257 -30 -449 -1035 -1857 -3073 -5108
11 403 385 240 -12 -384 -907 -1650 -2761 -4661
12 357 345 222 3 -320 -780 -1438 -2436 -4181
13 310 303 200 16 -259 -653 -1223 -2099 -3669
14 262 259 177 25 -201 -529 -1007 -1754 -3126
15 214 214 150 31 -148 -409 -794 -1405 -2558
16 165 167 121 33 -101 -298 -590 -1061 -1976
17 118 121 90 30 -62 -197 -401 -732 -1397
18 72 75 58 23 -31 -112 -234 -434 -848
19 32 34 27 12 -10 -45 -97 -184 -367
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DATA SOURCE FOR FIGURE 5-7
NPV = /  (W.Sj^ l. =.75. R = .30
FIRM'S MARKET SHARE (J)
N 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
1 1179 1216 937 418 -329 -1334 -2660 -4448 -7068
2 1055 1068 785 273 -465 -1460 -2782 -4579 -7227
3 968 975 706 220 -485 -1443 -2729 -4500 -7150
4 895 902 652 196 -468 -1380 -2616 -4339 -6963
5 829 837 607 183 -439 -1298 -2476 -4138 -6714
6 767 777 566 175 -403 -1209 -2323 -3915 -6425
7 719 . 736 540 134 -366 -1116 -2163 -3676 -6103
8 648 663 490 162 -328 -1021 -1997 -3423 -5753
9 591 606 452 156 -290 -925 -1825 -3159 -5375
10 533 549 413 149 -252 -827 -1649 -2881 -4969
11 475 492 373 141 -214 -727 -1468 -2591 -4534
12 418 435 333 132 -177 -627 -1282 -2288 -4067
13 359 376 292 122 -141 -526 -1092 -1974 -3570
14 301 317 249 110 -107 -427 -902 -1651 -3042
15 244 258 206 96 -75 -331 -713 -1324 -2491
16 187 200 162 80 -48 -240 -530 -1000 -1924
17 132 143 118 62 -25 -158 -359 -691 -1360
18 81 89 74 42 -9 -88 -208 -409 -825
19 36 40 34 21 0 -34 -86 -172 -356
DATA SOURCE FOR FIGURES 5-3 AND 5-9
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COMPETITIOR'S EXPERIENCE CURVE SLOPE
N 85% 80% 75% 70% 65%
1 9914 3478 -23 -1868 -2806
2 9645 3260 -125 -1857 -2707
3 9394 3117 -148 -1782 -2565
4 9115 2992 -145 -1688 -2413
5 8800 2870 -131 -1586 -2258
6 8447 2742 -112 -1480 -2103
7 8052 2608 -91 -1372 -1948
8 7616 2463 -70 -1261 -1792
9 7136 2307 -50 -1149 -1635
10 6611 2139 -30 -1035 -1476
11 6042 1958 -12 -919 -1314
12 5428 1763 3 -802 -1151
13 4773 1555 16 -685 -987
14 4079 1334 25 -567 -822
15 3357 1102 31 -452 -659
16 2617 863 33 -341 —500
17 1878 623 30 -236 -349
18 1169 390 23 -141 -211
19 525 176 12 -61 -92
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data SOURCE FOR FIGURE 5-12
NPV=
COMPETITOR *S VIEW OF THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
N .00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30
1 230 316 420 538 665 799 937
2 151 227 319 424 539 660 785
3 123 194 278 374 479 591 706
4 113 180 258 346 442 545 652
5 112 174 246 327 415 509 607
6 115 172 238 312 392 477 566
7 120 172 232 298 370 447 528
8 124 172 226 285 349 418 490
9 128 171 219 272 328 388 452
10 131 169 211 257 306 358 413
11 131 164 201 240 282 327 373
12 128 157 188 222 257 294 333
13 122 147 173 280 229 260 292
14 113 133 154 177 200 224 249
15 100 116 133 150 168 187 206
16 83 95 108 121 134 148 162
17 63 72 81 90 99 108 118
18 41 47 52 58 63 69 74
19 19 22 24 27 29 32 34
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85% 80% 75% 70$ 65$
90 4366 2248 947 166 -289
80 6876 3079 884 -350 -1023
70 8680 3454 538 -1040 -1866
60 9914 3478 -23 -1868 -2806
50 10582 3162 -795 -2837 -3852
40 10611 2471 -1801 -3969 -5027
30 9829 1307 -3105 -5311 -6371
20 7863 -539 -4840 -6963 -7969
10 3712 -3637 -7360 -9177 -10029
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DATA SOURCE FOR FIGURES 5-5 AND 5-14
COMPETITOR'S VIEW OF THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
^A .00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30
90 767 818 878 947 1021 1099 1179
80 627 699 785 884 990 1101 1216
70 230 316 420 538 665 799 937
60 -363 -268 -153 -23 117 266 418
50 -1150 -1051 -931 -795 -646 -490 -329
40 -2156 -2058 -1938 -1801 -1653 -1496 -1334
30 -3440 -3347 -3234 -3105 -2964 -2814 -2660
20 -5130 -5050 -4953 -4840 -4716 -4584 -4448
10 -7569 -7512 -7442 -7360 -7268 -7170 -7068
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data SOURCE FOR FIGURES 5-3 AND 5-15
NPVr f (Eg.R). N=1. S^=60$
COMPETITOR 'S VIEW OF THE PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
.00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30
85% 10629 10322 10078 9914 9836 9835 9900
80% 3341 3353 3398 3478 3589 3727 3885
75% -363 -268 -153 -23 117 266 418
70% -2171 -2081 -1979 -1860 -1753 -1638 -1523
65% -3014 -2952 -2881 -2806 -2729 -2652 -2577
-317-
APPENDIX 4
IKE. EFFECT OF PRICE ELASTICITY_QF. DB1AND = 0 
ON IKE FIRM'S NPV
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To understand the effect of the built-in assumption
of the model of zero price elasticity of demand on the
firm's NPV, it is useful to analyze the apparent anomaly 
of increasing NPV as the firm's experience curve slope
advantage varies. This phenomenon was first discussed in
Figure 5-3, which is reproduced below as Figure A4-1.
NPV
FIGT3RE A4-]. NPV =f(FIRM'S INITIAL SHARE) 








90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 #
Firm's Initial Market Share
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To understand Figure A4-1 
the calculation of NPV at 
= 90%, 70%, and 20%, The 
Figure A4-2.
FIGURE A4-2. NPV RESULTS
I have analyzed in detail 
Eg = 75%, 65% and 85% and 




75% 90% 2.834 1152 -205 947
75% 70% 1.595 1186 -648 538
75% 20% 0.590 -2708 -2132 -4840
65% 90% 0.8G4 -85 ‘ -204 -289
65% 70% 0.388 -1221 -645 -1866
65% 20% 0.117 -5840 -2129 -7969
85% 90% 8.279 4568 -202 4366
85% 70% 5.683 9329 -649 8680
85% 20% 2.511 9992 -2129 7863
The columns Eg and S^ simply locate nine points
on the fami ly of curves shown in Figure A4-1. Those nine
points are ci rcled. The column entitled "Price" is
really the cost multiplier on the firm's cost (described
i n detail i n the sect i on entitled "Model Logic")
calculated to set a price 'where the competitor finds
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expansion unattractive based on incremental economics. 
For example, a "Price" of 2.834 where Eg = 75% and 
is 90% means a price 2.834 times the firm's cost
discourages competitive expansions. Clearly, the larger 
the "price" number the larger the firm's earnings, but
not necessarily the larger the firm's incremental
earnings. More on this in the next figure. The column 
NPVq p  is the firm's discounted incremental earnings 
from its strategy of discouraging competitive expansion. 
The column NPVjj^^ is the present value of the firm's 
investment in building additional capacity. The number is 
always negative because only the cost not the benefit of 
such investment is counted in Clearly, the
lower the firm's initial market share, the greater the 
cost of the investment of a strategy of preempting all 
market growth. Due to rounding in my calculations, the 
N P V j n v numbers vary very slightly. For example at 
of 90%, -205 for Eg = 75% and at the same
share at Eg = 85%, N P V ^ ^  is -202 . Conceptually,
NPVq p  varies only with and not with Eg, The
column NPV^qj, is simply the sum of NPVQp and N P V ^ ^
and is the value graphed on the y-axis in Figure A4-1.
We might expect NPVq p  to grow as share grows. 
However when Eg = 85%, NPVq p  declines as share grows. 
More analysis is required!
Again, NPVq p  measures the firm's incremental
discounted earnings from a strategy of preempting all 
market growth by discouraging competitive expansion. Such
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a value is determined by the difference in earning 
between the stated strategy and only growing with the 
market. For analysis, I have calculated actual price and 
unit earning under a number of circumstances, as shown in 
Figure A4-3.
FIGURE A4-3. PRICE AND UNIT EARNINGS 
AT, VARIOUS EgJAND
FIRJ^ ,',S UNIT EARNINGS IF FIRM;
YR 1 YR 20 YR 1 YR 20 YR 1 YR 20
75% 90% 77.00 8.05 49.83 5.21 49.83 5.10
75% 70% 48.09 4.56 17.94 1.70 17.94 1.2 8
75% 20% 29.92 1.72 -20.80 -1.20 -20.80 -3.79
85% 90% 224.94 23.51 197.77 20.67 197.77 20.56
85% 70% 171.34 16.25 141.19 13.39 141.19 12.97
85% 20% 127.36 7.33 76.64 4.41 76.64 1.82
As previously mentioned, NPV^p is a function of
the difference in uni t earnings between a strategy of
preempting all market growth versus growing with the 
market. Note the case where Eg = 85%. At 90% share the 
difference in unit earnings is only 0.11 after 20 years, 
while at 20% the difference is 2.59. However, when Eg = 
75%, exactly the same differences in unit earnings 
appear. If there is no differences in unit earnings when
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Eg varies, and there is no difference in sales volumes 
if initial market shares are equal, why is there such a 
difference in incremental discounted earnings (NPV^p) 
as shown in Figure A4-2? The answer must be the large 
differences in the price (really the price pattern) 
required to discourage competitive expansion. Figure A4-4 
shows selected calculations to illustrate the point.
F1GUBE_A4-4^„SELECTED_CALCULATJ0NS, OF NPV^p 
AS A FUNCTION OF







m SALES UNIT -NET SALFS tmi. EABKiB
1 70 141.19 4942 70 141.19 4942 0
2 170 84.67 7197 140 83.64 5854 1343
3 270 61.91 8358 210 60.80 6384 1974
4 370 49.36 9132 280 48.30 6762 2364
5 470 41.30 9706 350 40.32 7056 2650
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CASE 2; S^= 70%, Eg= 75%, PRICE = $48.09, WHEN N=1
EARNINGS




SALES UNIT J Œ L SALES W I T M L EAESIBGS
1 70 17.94 628 70 17.94 628 0
2 170 10.76 915 140 9.73 681 234
3 270 7.87 1062 210 6.77 711 351
4 370 6.27 1160 280 5.21 729 431
5 470 5.25 1234 350 4.28 749 495
CASE 3: S^= 20%, Eg= 85%, PRICE = $127.36, WHEN N=1
FIRM EXPANDS SHARE
EARNINGS




YR SALES W I l NET SALES W I T -JiEL EARNINGS
1 20 76.64 766 20 76.64 766 0
2 120 34.16 2050 40 24.62 492 1558
3 220 23.09 2540 60 14.26 428 2112
4 320 17.74 2838 80 9.98 400 2438
5 420 14.52 3049 100 7.65 383 2666
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The "sales" column when the firm elects to expand 
share is simply determined from the standard product life 
cycle assumed in this thesis (i.e. industry sales in year 
1 are 100, year 2 200, etc.), the firm's initial market
share, 70% under the first condition and the policy of 
discouraging competitive expansion. The "sales" column 
when the firm elects to maintain market share is simply 
the industry sales as above times the firm's initial 
market share. The "unit earnings" column is simply the 
difference between the price required to discourage 
competitive expansion and the firm's cost under each 
option. The "net earnings" column is simply the "sales" 
column times the "unit earnings" column times one minus 
the tax rate (50%). The incremental net earnings column 
Is the difference between the "net earnings" column if 
the firm elects to expand its share and the "net 
earnings" column if the firm expands with the market.
Recall, the purpose of this appendix is to explain 
the apparent anomaly of increasing NPV as the firm's 
initial share declines, when the firm has an experience 
curve slope advantage. As a memory refresher, I have 
reproduced Figure A4-1, on the next page.
Looking at the "incremental net earnings" columns 
for Case 1 and Case 2 clearly shows incremental net 
earnings are substantially higher when Eg = 85%, that is 
an investment by the firm in increased market share is 
more attractive if the firm has an experience curve slope 
advantage. This occurs even though sales volumes are the
-325-
EIGÜRE_A4-I.__NPy_= /FIRmIs INITIAL SHARE) 





Firm's Initial Market Share
same under each case and the difference in unit earnings 
are the same under each case. The reason for the higher 
incremental net earnings is the much high initial price 
in Case 1 ($171,34) compared to Case 2 ($48,09). However, 
the "sales" columns for both cases are identical. The 
built-in assumption of the model is therefore that the
- 3 2 6 -
price elasticity of demand is zero. In other words, the 
firm’s sales are independent of the price charged.
Looking at the "incremental net earnings" columns 
for Case 1 and Case 3 clearly shows incremental net
earnings is higher when the firm has a lower initial
market share. The main reason here is significantly 
higher incremental sales volume when S^= 20%, but also 
a significantly different price. The initial price in 
Case 1 is $141.19 versus $76.64 in Case 3.
The conclusion must be that the firm’s NPV of a
strategy of preempting all market growth through a price
strategy is heavily dependent on the price elasticity of 
demand functions. The closer an actual product is to zero 
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* FPK20), FK20), F2(20), NEA(20), NEC(20>, F3(20>,




READ (5, /) (R(K),K*1, 7)
DO 999 1*1,9 
DO 999 J=l, 5 
DO 999 K*l,7
%WNITE(6, /)SA(I), SB( I), EA( J), EB(J), R(K)
%WRITE(4, /)SA(I), EB(J>, R(K)
1 FORMAT (F2. 1, F7. 1,F3. 1, )
X*20
U^ 175. 84 
N=0
110 N=N+1
IF (N. GT. 19) GO TO 999
VW-0
VX*0
IF (N. LE. 1) GOTO 98 























470 IF (N.LF.1) GOTO 99





530 SVD(T > =VD< T > +VZ
540 VZ«SVD(T>
550 70 CONTINUE
560 99 DO 20 T=N,X
570 VD(T)-V(N>*SB(I)

















2150 DO 30 T=N,X
2160 FPl(T)=(NEPUB(T)-NEHUC(T)>/(l/+R(Ky>**(T-N+l. >
2170 FP11=FP1(T)+FP11
2180 FI(T) = (NEUB(T>-NcUC(T>)/(l.+R(K> >**(T-N+1>
2190 F11=F1(T)+F11
2200 30 CONTINUE









2300 DO 50 T-N, X
2310 NEA(T>«(C0STA(TULŒTl._)A*VACTJ*O 5. .
2320 NEC(T>"(C0STC(T)*(P-1. >>*VC(T)*0.5
2330 F3(T)=(NEC(T>-NEA(T))/(l.+0.15)**(T-N+1. >




2380 DO 60 T«N,X-1
2390 IF(VA(T+1)-VA(T>)301, 301, 302
2400 301 CEA(T>«0
— 330"
2410 00 TO 303 ___
2420 302 CEA(T)*(VA(T+1>-VA(T))*C0STA(T+1>«0.5/(l+0.15>**(T-N+1>
2430 303 CEAT=CEA(T)4CEAT
2440 IF (VC(T+1>-VC(T>) 401,401,402
2450 401 CMA(T)«0





2510 %WRITE(6,152)N, P, NPVA
2512 WRITE(4./)SA(I>,Ew<J), R(K>)
2515 WRITE(4,/>N,NPVA








100 100, 200/ 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300,
200 1400,1500,1600,1700,1800,1900,2000
300 . 1, . 9, . 2, . 8, . 3, . 7, . 4, . 6, . 5,
400 . 5, . 6, . 4, . 7, . 3, . 8, . 2, . 9, .1
500 41504, 41504, 41504, 51457, 41504,
600 32193, 41504, 62149, 41504, 23447
700 .30, .25, 20, .15, .10, 05, .00
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TEFINITION OF VARIABLES AFFECTING NPV
-342
This thesis assumes that the NPV to the firm of 
further investment in an SBU is a function of four 
var1ables;
NPV = f  ( N, S^, Eg, R )
The purpose of this section is to provide a handy 
place to refer to the definition of each variable, to aid 
in reading this thesis.
1. N ! the year in the product.life.cycle.
N may vary from one to twenty because the 
"standard" product life cycle is limited to twenty 
years. N is the surrogate for the BCG matrix 
"growth" axis, since the position in the product 
life defines industry sales growth.
2. ; the firmes initial market share.
may vary in ten percentage point increments 
from 10% to 90% in the model. It measures the firms 
current (an past) market share before a strategy of 
preempting all market growth, i.e., gaining market 
share, begins. In this two participant model the 
firm's initial market share (S^^ and the
competitor's initial market share (Sg) always add 
to 100%.
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3. Eg ; the eomoetitor's,experience,curve slope^
Eg varies in five percentage point increments 
from an experience curve slope of 15% to 35%, When 
Eg is 65% the competitor's costs decline 35% for 
each doubling of cumulative production volume. When 
Eg is 85% costs only decline 15% on the same
basis. Since the firm's experience curve slope
(E^) is always held constant in the model at 75%,
also defines relative experience curve slope
advantages. For instance, when Eg jg 65% the 
competitor has a large cost advantage. When Eg |g 
85% the firm has a large advantage.
4. R  ! the competitor's required rate of return.
R varies in five percentage point increments from 
0% to 30%. R is a surrogate for the competitor's 
view of the size of the product life cycle. When R 
is 0%, it appears to the firm that the competitor 
is willing to invest in the SBU at an 1ER of 0%, 
using the firm's estimate of the shape, length and 
size of the product life cycle to predict future 
sales. Since both the firm and the competitor are
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assumed to have a 15% cost of capital and both act 
rationally, the competitor must see a larger
product life cycle than does the firm to justify
investment. Therefore, when R is less than 15%, the 
competitor sees a more attractive product. When R
is more than 15% a less attractive one, and when R
equals 15% both participants view the market 
identically.
